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THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

and 

A  PLAN  FOR  THE  ALLIES 

By  ANDRE  CHERADAME 

PAN  GERMANY    IN    1917 


CO 
CO 
v% 

03 


rmaiiy  is  an  accomplished  fact.     Whether  it  shall  remain 
or  not  is  for  America  to  say. 

This  little  book  is  of  essential  importance  to  the 
understanding  of  the  War. 

THE   ATLANTIC   MONTHLY    PRESS 

BOSTON 


PAN-GERMANY 

THE  DISEASE  AND   CURE 

and 

A  PLAN  FOR  THE  ALLIES 

By  ANDRE  CHERADAME 


New  and  Greatly  Enlarged  Edition 

containing  not  only  all  of  the  material  of  the 
first  Edition  of  Tan-Germany:  The  Disease 
and  Cure',  but  also  articles  from  later  issues 
of  The  Atlantic  Monthly  and  two  chapters 
revcr  before  published.. 


THE  ATLANTIC  MONTHLY  PRESS 
BOSTON 


Copyright,  1917  and  igi8,  by 
THE  ATLANTIC   MONTHLY  COMPANY 

Copyright,  1918,  by 
THE  ATLANTIC  MONTHLY  PRESS,  INC. 


[No  student  outside  of  Germany  itself  has  studied  the  Pan- 
German  scheme  in  all  its  details  more  thoroughly  than  the 
distinguished  French  publicist,  Andre  Ch6radame.  For  more 
than  twenty  years  he  has  devoted  all  his  energies  and  resources, 
physical  and  intellectual  alike,  to  a  vigorous  and  exhaustive 
investigation  of  the  origin  and  progress  of  the  monstrous  con- 
spiracy which  threatens  to  overwhelm  the  liberties  of  the 
entire  world. 

His  articles  from  the  Atlantic  Monthly  issued  in  paper- 
covered  book  form  under  the  name  of  'Pan-Germany:  The 
Disease  and  Cure',  have  been  distributed  throughout  the 
country  by  the  thousands.  To  meet  the  constantly  changing 
war  conditions  and  to  elaborate  upon  his  earlier  suggestions, 
M.  Cheradame  contributes  much  timely  material  to  the  new 
and  enlarged  edition.  In  the  additional  chapters,  the  author 
not  only  emphasizes  his  delineation  of  the  menace  of  Pan- 
Germany  and  the  proper  means  of  meeting  it,  but  he  criti- 
cizes fearlessly  the  failure  of  the  Allies  to  adopt  comprehen- 
sive measures  to  that  end,  because  of  their  belief  that  war 
is  to  be  won  or  lost  on  the  Western  Front. 

Published  in  inexpensive  form  with  special  rates  for  patri- 
otic distribution,  the  new  edition  offers  to  the  American 
people  further  understanding  of  the  present  crisis. 

Besides  the  articles  which  M .  Cheradame  has  contributed 
to  The  Atlantic  Monthly,  the  same  author  has  written  'Pan- 
Germany  Plot  Unmasked'  and  'Pan-Germanism  and  the 
United  States'  (Charles  Scribners  &  Son). 

The  last  two  chapters  in  the  present  edition,  pertaining  to 
'A  Plan  for  the  Allies,'  have  never  before  been  published  in 
any  form.] 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

I.  How  Cheaply  Germany  Has  Fought  The 

War i 

II.  How  Much  Germany  Has  Won  in  The 

War 18 

III.  The  Necessity  for  a  Decision 47 

IV.  The  Allies  and  Pan-Germanism 62 

V.  Military  Operations 81 

VI.  Pan-Germany's  Strength  and  Weakness  91 

VII.  The  Best  Way  to  Crush  Pan-Germany.  . .  113 

VIII.  Political  Strategy 129 

IX.  The  German  Pacifist  Manoeuvres 156 

X.  The  Western  Front 165 

XI.  The  Western  Front  Theory  Criticized.  . .  182 

XII.     The  Lesson  of  Three  Years  of  War  and 

of  Events  in  Russia 200 

XIII.     A  Plan  for  the  Allies 214 


Pan-Germany 
The  Disease  and  Cure 


CHAPTER   I 

How  CHEAPLY  GERMANY  HAS  FOUGHT 
THE  WAR 

AT  the  beginning  of  1916,  I  said  in  my  book  The 
Pan-German  Plot  Unmasked, — 

'  Finally,  when  all  negotiations  for  an  armistice 
have  fallen  flat  and  Germany's  situation  has  be- 
come still  more  critical,  we  shall  see  Berlin  play 
her  trump  card.  Protests  against  territorial  an- 
nexations will  become  insistent  beyond  the  Rhine, 
secretly  sanctioned  by  the  German  government, 
which  will  finally  say  to  the  Allies:  "Let  this 
slaughtering  of  one  another  cease !  We  are  willing 
to  listen  to  reason ;  we  resign  our  claims  to  those 
territories  of  yours  now  occupied  by  our  armies. 
The  game  has  been  played  to  a  draw;  so  let  us 
treat  for  peace  on  that  basis." 

'On  the  day  when  this  proposition  is  put  for- 
ward, the  Allies  will  find  themselves  face  to  face 
with  the  most  subtle  move  yet  made  by  Berlin  — 
the  most  insidious  German  snare.  Then,  above 
all  things,  must  the  steadfastness,  the  perspicacity, 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


and  the  unity  of  the  Allies  be  most  brilliantly 
made  manifest.  The  trick  of  the  ' '  drawn  game, ' ' 
if  successful,  would  involve  an  overwhelming  tri- 
umph for  Germany  and  an  irreparable  tragedy  for 
the  Allies  and  for  the  liberty  of  the  world.' 

Only  a  few  months  after  these  lines  were  print- 
ed, the  prophecy  began  to  be  fulfilled  more  and 
more  completely.  Every  possible  step  has  been 
taken  by  Germany  to  bring  about  peace  on  the 
basis  of  a  draw.  The  slogan,  '  Peace  without  an- 
nexations or  indemnities,'  was  coined  to  that  end. 
At  first  the  Allies  believed  that  this  formula  origi- 
nated in  Russia ;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  it 
was  worked  out  in  Berlin  and  then  suggested  to 
the  Russian  Socialists  through  secret  agents  whom 
Germany  has  successfully  established  in  the  Pet- 
rograd  Soviet.  These  Socialists,  doubtless  well- 
meaning,  but  over-fond  of  theories  and  always 
ready  to  embrace  the  wildest  Utopian  schemes,  - 
ignorant,  too,  of  all  realities,  as  has  been  shown  by 
the  steady  aggravation  of  the  general  situation  in 
Russia  since  they  came  into  power  with  the  Rev- 
olution, —  have  declared  enthusiastically  for  the 
'  peace  without  annexations  and  indemnities/  As 
there  exist  also  in  the  other  Allied  countries  groups 
of  Socialists  with  a  stronger  grip  on  theories  than 
on  facts,  and  also  because  Allied  sympathies  natur- 
ally rallied  strongly  to  the  support  of  the  Russian 
Revolution,  the  formula,  '  peace  without  annexa- 
tions or  indemnities,'  thanks  to  its  apparent 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

origin,  has  unquestionably  made  serious  inroads 
on  a  certain  section  of  Allied  public  opinion. 

The  Stockholm  manoeuvres,  engineered  by  all 
the  powerful  and  varied  means  at  the  disposal  of 
German  propagandists,  were  designed  to  estab- 
lish this  formula  as  the  fixed  basis  of  all  peace 
negotiations.  When  the  astuteness  of  the  Allied 
governments  prevented  the  fulfillment  of  this 
attempt  within  the  period  desired  by  Berlin,  the 
Vatican  was  persuaded  through  Viennese  agencies 
to  throw  its  influence  on  the  side  of  peace  as  deter- 
mined by  Germany. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Pope's  peace  proposals, 
while  not  embodying  the  exact  terms  of  the  Kai- 
ser's formula,  involved,  in  the  last  analysis,  prac- 
tically the  same  essential  results.  Berlin,  there- 
fore, in  order  to  assure  unceasing  discussion  of  her 
formula,  —  a  discussion  tending  at  least  to  bring 
about  an  armistice,  which  would  split  up  and  mor- 
ally disarm  the  Allies,  thus  making  it  possible  for 
her  to  deal  with  them  separately,  —  outdid  her- 
self in  mobilizing  toward  one  end  the  most  widely 
divergent  forces,  from  the  Maximalist  anarchists 
of  Petrograd  to  the  most  hidebound  reactionaries 
of  the  Sacred  College.  The  extent,  the  vigor,  and 
the  persistence  of  the  amazing  '  pacifist'  offensive 
launched  by  Germany  were  such  that  the  expres- 
sions 'peace  without  indemnities  or  annexations,' 
'drawn  game,'  'white  peace/  lpaix  boiteuse,'  have 
become  as  current  in  the  Allied  countries  as  if 


PA  N  -GERM  A  NY 


they  had  some  established  connection  with  reality. 
This  is  entirely  contrary  to  the  fact:  with  the  best 
intentions  in  the  world,  peace  without  annexations 
or  indemnities,  as  things  stand  now,  is  impossible. 
There  can  be  no  'white  peace'  no  l  drawn  game,' 
no  'paix  boiteuse.' 

To  tell  the  truth,  a  section  of  Allied  opinion  has 
become  befuddled  by  these  formulae  of  Berlin, 
whose  function  is  to  accomplish  in  the  moral  order 
the  same  asphyxiating  action  as  that  of  the  gases 
employed  on  the  battlefield  by  the  German  Gen- 
eral Staff.  The  result  of  this  moral  intoxication  is 
that  important  groups  of  the  Allies  begin  to  juggle 
with  words  and  lose  sight  of  facts.  As  the  natural 
outcome  of  giving  serious  thought  to  impossibili- 
ties, grave  errors  are  made  in  weighing  the  present 
situation,  with  an  attendant  weakening  of  the 
joint  action  of  the  Allied  democracies.  It  is  im- 
perative, therefore,  that  the  pursuit  of  Utopias, 
leading  only  to  disaster,  be  abandoned,  and  that 
we  return  to  those  realities  which  alone  can  lead 
to  victory  and  the  establishment  of  a  durable 
peace. 

If  the  formula  '  peace  without  annexations  and 
indemnities'  has  been  allowed  to  insinuate  itself 
into  the  general  discussion,  it  is  only  because  great 
numbers  of  the  Allied  peoples  fail  to  understand 
the  overwhelming  advantages  which  Germany,  by 
means  of  the  war,  has  been  able  to  assure  to  her- 
self for  the  present  and  the  future.  The  object  of 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

this  paper  is  to  show  just  what  these  advantages 
are,  and  at  the  same  time  to  brand  the  utter  hy- 
pocrisy of  the  slogan,  *  peace  without  annexations 
and  indemnities/  which,  regarded  even  in  the 
most  favorable  light,  would  allow  Germany  to 
make  off  with  immense  booty,  leaving  the  Allies 
to  face  the  incalculable  losses  incurred  by  them  in 
a  war  launched  by  their  adversary. 

The  significance  of  the  low  rate 
of  German  exchange 

The  continual  fall  of  German  exchange  is  re- 
garded by  many  of  the  Allies  as  proof  of  the  pro- 
gressive and  irremediable  impoverishment  of  Ger- 
many. When,  for  instance,  the  mark  drops  47  per 
cent  in  Switzerland,  while  the  franc  has  depreci- 
ated only  13  per  cent,  Frenchmen  are  for  the  most 
part  inclined  to  believe  that  the  war  has  affected 
the  two  countries  in  relatively  the  same  propor- 
tion ;  they  then  conclude  that  Germany's  financial 
situation  is  infinitely  worse  than  that  of  France. 
In  reality,  such  a  comprehensive  conclusion  can- 
not be  reached  simply  through  the  rise  and  fall  of 
exchange,  which  reflects  only  certain  special  as- 
pects of  the  financial  situation  of  a  country. 

Among  the  various  causes  affecting  exchange, 
there  are  two  principal  ones.  The  first  is  moral. 
It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  fluctuation  of  ex- 
change responds  to  foreign  confidence.  If  German 
exchange  is  low,  it  implies,  to  a  certain  extent  at 


PA  N-  GERM A N Y 


least,  the  existence  of  a  universal  conviction  that 
in  the  long  run  Germany  cannot  hold  out  against 
her  formidable  ring  of  adversaries.  As  a  result, 
there  is  no  great  demand  for  the  currency  of  a 
state  whose  credit,  it  is  thought,  must  finally  col- 
lapse. It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  rea- 
son for  this  fall  of  exchange  is  only  a  moral  evalua- 
tion anticipating  a  probable  outcome;  it  is  not 
due  to  a  mathematically  certain  estimate  of  what 
Germany  now  stands  to  win  or  lose  as  a  result  of 
the  war. 

The  second  great  factor  affecting  exchange,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  based  on  present  realities  which 
are  susceptible  of  being  accurately  determined. 
Germany,  since  she  has  been  blockaded  by  sea, 
exports  infinitely  less  than  formerly;  consequently, 
her  ability  to  settle  her  accounts  in  foreign 
countries  is  limited.  When  she  was  able  to  sell 
the  United  States  a  million  marks'  worth  of  mer- 
chandise, she  then  had  at  her  disposal  a  million 
marks  with  which  to  pay  cash  for  such  imports  as 
she  needed.  Now  that  her  exports  have  been  so 
reduced,  she  has  little  money  to  spare  for  spending 
abroad.  If  she  wishes  to  increase  these  foreign 
purchases,  she  must  export  her  gold  and  conse- 
quently reduce  the  security  behind  her  bank- 
notes. This  results  in  a  lowering  of  the  basis  of 
German  credit,  with  a  resulting  drop  in  exchange. 

We  shall  now  see  that  this  falling  exchange, 
whatever  its  importance,  does  not  take  into  ac- 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

count  all  the  elements  of  the  general  financial  situ- 
ation. 

If  the  blockade  of  Germany  seriously  compli- 
cates her  food  problems,  on  the  other  hand  it  is 
in  a  way  advantageous  from  a  financial  point  of 
view.  In  a  word,  when  Germany  found  herself 
blockaded  she  was  obliged  to  evolve  means  of  ex- 
isting on  her  own  resources  or  those  of  her  allies. 
Our  enemies  had  great  difficulties  of  organization 
to  overcome,  but  they  turned  them  to  good  ac- 
count: for  if  Germany's  exports  are  small,  her  im- 
ports have  been  correspondingly  reduced.  Hence 
she  needs  to  send  very  little  money  abroad — a  fact 
which  is  financially  in  her  favor. 

Now,  the  case  of  France  is  radically  different. 
The  French  government,  feeling  assured  of  the 
liberty  of  the  seas  and  believing  that  the  war 
would  be  a  short  one,  found  it  more  expedient  to 
place  enormous  orders  abroad  than  to  rely  on  do- 
mestic resources  to  supply  the  nation's  need.  As 
a  result,  French  imports,  according  to  published 
statistics,  exceed  exports  by  one  billion  of  francs  a 
month.  This  means  that,  as  things  stand  now, 
France  must  pay  to  foreign  countries  the  stagger- 
ing sum  of  twelve  billion  francs  a  year,  with  no 
corresponding  compensation,  since  her  purchases 
consist  of  products  which  are  destroyed  in  use. 
For  this  reason  France  is  undergoing  serious  im- 
poverishment while  Germany  gets  off  compara- 
tively easily.  It  is  therefore  plain  that  the  fluctua- 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


tions  of  exchange  bear  little  relation  to  those  con- 
ditions which  must  be  taken  into  consideration  in 
making  an  appraisal  of  the  general  situation ;  they 
reflect,  in  fact,  only  a  special  and  limited  aspect  of 
the  financial  situation  as  a  whole.  Popular  con- 
clusions drawn  from  the  fall  in  the  value  of  the 
mark  are  false  when  attempts  are  made  to  give 
them  an  absolute  or  general  significance. 

Why  people  are  still  ignorant  of  the  vast  advantages 
gained  by  Germany  from  the  war 

Many  of  the  Allies  are  hoodwinked  by  the  'great 
illusion*  which  even  now  prevents  them,  to  their 
endless  detriment,  from  seeing  things  as  they  ac- 
tually are.  In  the  Allied  nations,  in  fact,  people 
continue  to  speak  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  as  if  these  states  remained 
j  ust  as  they  were  before  the  war.  But  these  terms 
have  no  longer  any  relation  to  reality.  The 
Quadruple  Alliance  of  Central  Europe  is  simply 
a  great  illusion,  studiously  fostered  by  William 
II,  for  by  its  means  his  plans  are  vastly  facili- 
tated. As  a  matter  of  fact,  Turkey,  Bulgaria, 
and  Austria-Hungary  are  not  the  allies,  but  the 
vassals,  of  Berlin,  and  their  influence  with  her  is 
less  than  that  of  Saxony  or  Bavaria.  The  rulers 
at  Constantinople,  Sofia,  Vienna,  and  Budapest 
are  simply  marionettes  moved  by  threads  which 
are  pulled  by  Berlin  according  to  her  strategic 
needs, 

8 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

Very  often  we  hear  it  said, '  Germany  has  creat- 
ed Mitteleuropa.'  This  is  another  mistake.  Geo- 
graphically speaking,  Mitteleuropa  includes  only 
Central  Europe;  and  Germany's  dominion  is  in- 
finitely further  flung,  extending  as  it  does  from  the 
west  front  in  France  to  the  British  front  before 
Bagdad.  If  we  wish  to  see  things  in  the  light  of 
reality,  we  must  say,  for  the  present  at  least, 
1  There  is  no  longer  any  Germany;  instead,  there  is 
Pan-Germany.''  This  is  an  essential  assumption 
if  we  are  to  reason  justly.  The  map  of  Pan-Ger- 
many at  the  beginning  of  1917,  which  is  printed 
above,  shows  clearly  the  essential,  but  all-too- 
little-known  elements  of  the  present  situation, 
which  is  characterized  by  the  fact  that  73  million 
Germans,  aided  by  21  million  vassals,  —  Magyars, 
Slavs,  and  Turks,  —  have  reduced  to  slavery  82 
millions  of  Latins,  Slavs,  and  Semites,  belonging 
to  thirteen  different  nationalities.  Pan-Germany, 
which  has  now  almost  completely  reached  the  lim- 
its set  by  the  Pan-German  plan  of  1911,  consists, 
therefore,  of  one  vast  territory  containing  about 
176  million  inhabitants  and  natural  resources  of 
the  greatest  variety. 

I  beg  my  readers  to  refer  to  this  map  of  Pan- 
Germany  every  time  it  is  made  desirable  by  the 
text.  This  repeated  study  of  the  map  is  indispen- 
sable to  a  clear  and  complete  comprehension  of 
the  demonstration  which  follows.  As  regards  the 
profits  which  Germany  has  wrung  from  the  war, 


PA  N  -GERM A N Y 


it  is  particularly  important,  in  order  to  grasp  the 
idea  of  Pan-Germany;  for  it  is  the  direct  result  of 
its  creation  that  Germany,  in  spite  of  the  losses 
and  expenses  inevitably  incurred  by  a  warring 
nation,  has  been  able  to  assure  herself  of  certain 
advantages  which,  considered  as  a  whole,  far  out- 
balance her  losses  and  expenses,  as  we  shall  see. 

In  order  to  understand  the  nature  of  these  ad- 
vantages, one  point  must  first  be  made  clear. 

The  war  has  cost  the  Germans  comparatively  little 

For  six  fundamental  reasons,  the  conduct  of  the 
war  has  really  cost  the  Germans  far  less  than  it 
has  cost  their  adversaries. 

I.  No  Experimentation.  Germany,  in  order  to 
produce  a  vast  output  of  various  types  of  guns  and 
projectiles  economically  evolved  in  times  of  peace, 
needed  only  to  extend,  by  means  of  machinery  of 
domestic  manufacture,  her  arsenals  and  muni- 
tion-factories, which  before  the  war  were  already 
considerable.  On  the  other  hand,  the  production 
of  war-material  in  France  at  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities was  very  slack,  while  in  England  and  Rus- 
sia it  was  almost  negligible.  In  these  three  coun- 
tries, therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  improvise,  as 
best  might  be,  thousands  of  new  plants,  to  equip 
them  with  machinery  purchased  in  America  at 
vast  expense,  and  hastily  to  evolve  new  types  of 
cannon,  projectiles,  and  the  rest.  Now,  improvi- 
sation, especially  in  war-time,  means  false  starts 

10 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

and  inevitable  bad  work,  which  must  be  paid 
dearly  for.  Germany  was  not  obliged  to  incur 
these  very  considerable  expenses. 

2.  Regulated  Wages.    The  fact  that  the  problem 
of  German  wages  was  worked  out  at  leisure  in  ex- 
act correlation  to  productions  whose  types  were 
exhaustively  studied  in  the  calm  of  peace-time 
certainly  allowed  the  Germans  to  obtain  war-ma- 
terials at  a  lower  net  cost  than  was  possible  for 
the  Allies. 

3.  The  Prevention  of  Waste.    The  absence  of  ex- 
perimentation and  the  simple  extension  to  war- 
work  of  highly  efficient  industrial  methods  tested 
in  peace-time,  naturally  allowed  the  Germans  to 
avoid  in  all  spheres  those  immense  losses  of  ma- 
terial of  every  nature  whose  bad  effects  and  heavy 
cost  were  incurred  by  the  Allies.     This  state  of 
affairs  in  France  caused   losses  which  were  as 
expensive   as  they  were  inevitable.    One  may 
imagine  the  conditions  existing  in  Russia,  where 
control  is  far  more  difficult  of  exercise  than  in 
France. 

4.  Cheap  Labor.    The  Germans  have  forcibly 
enlisted  the  labor  of  about  two  million  prisoners 
of  war.     Moreover,  the  official  French  report  of 
April  12,  1917,  concerning  acts  committed  by  the 
Germans  in  violation  of  international  law,  asserts 
that  in  the  occupied  territories  deportation  of 
workers  has  been  a  general  measure.    It  has  '  ap- 
plied to  the  entire  able-bodied  population  of  both 

ii 


PA N -  GERM A N Y 


sexes,  from  the  ages  of  sixteen  to  sixty,  excepting 
women  with  young  children. ' 

Now,  the  Germans  requisition  labor  from  among 
7,500,000  Belgians,  3,000,000  French,  4,500,000 
Serbians,  5,000,000  Roumanians,  22,000,000 
Poles,  Ruthenians,  and  Lithuanians  —  a  total  of 
42,000,000  slaves. 

Let  us  see  what  sort  of  remuneration  is  made. 
Take  the  case  of  a  young  girl  of  Lille,  twenty  years 
old,  who  was  forced  to  work  for  six  months,  har- 
vesting and  threshing  wheat  and  digging  pota- 
toes from  six  in  the  morning  to  twilight,  receiving 
all  the  while  the  vilest  food.  For  her  six  months 
of  work  she  was  given  9  francs,  45  centimes.  The 
Germans,  therefore,  have  at  their  disposal  a  vast 
reservoir  of  labor  for  which  they  pay  next  to  noth- 
ing; moreover,  the  small  amounts  they  do  pay  re- 
main in  Pan-Germany. 

The  Allies,  on  the  contrary,  pay  high  wages  to 
their  workers,  and,  when  they  run  short,  must 
needs  pour  out  good  gold  in  bringing  reinforce- 
ments from  Asia,  Africa,  and  America.  This 
means  that  a  considerable  part  of  the  wages  paid 
these  foreign  workmen  will  leave  France  or  Eng- 
land for  all  time. 

5.  Free  Coal  and  Iron  Ore.  In  addition  to  their 
own  mines,  the  Germans  have  seized  important 
coal  and  iron  mines  in  France,  Belgium,  and  Po- 
land. A  vast  proportion  of  their  ore  and  coal 
therefore  costs  them  nothing.  Naturally,  then,  a 

12 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

German  shell  made  with  French  iron  and  Belgian 
coal  costs  far  less  than  a  French  shell  made  with 
American  steel  and  English  coal.  As  a  result,  the 
net  price  of  a  greater  part  of  German  munitions 
is  much  lower  than  that  paid  by  the  Allies. 

6.  Economical  Transportation.  By  reason  of 
the  grouping  of  the  Central  Powers,  —  a  result  of 
the  conquest  of  the  Danube  front  by  the  Teutons, 
—  Germany  profits  by  a  geographical  situation 
which  is  infinitely  more  advantageous  than  that 
of  the  Allies,  as  regards  not  only  the  speed,  but 
also  the  cheapness,  of  war- transportation.  It  is 
evident  that  it  costs  far  less  to  send  a  shell  from 
the  Krupp  factory  to  any  one  of  the  Pan-German 
fronts  than  to  send  an  American  shell  to  France, 
a  Japanese  shell  to  the  Polish  front,  a  French  shell 
to  Roumania  via  Archangel,  or  an  English  shell 
to  the  army  operating  in  Mesopotamia.  By  the 
same  token,  the  cost  of  transporting  a  soldier  of 
Pan-Germany  to  any  of  the  battle-fronts  is  infi- 
nitely lighter  than  that  of  transporting  Allied 
soldiers  from  Australia  or  America. 

We  should  note  that  each  one  of  these  six  fac- 
tors which  we  have  just  enumerated  reacts  pro- 
foundly on  the  sum-total  of  general  war-expenses, 
and  that,  taken  together,  they  involve  a  formid- 
able sum.  It  can  therefore  truthfully  be  said  that 
Germany  carries  on  the  war  much  more  econom- 
ically than  the  Allies.  Figures  are  so  far  lacking 
which  will  give  the  true  proportions,  but  we  shall 

13 


PA N -GERM A N Y 


certainly  remain  well  within  the  realities  of  the  case 
if  we  conclude  that,  as  a  result  of  the  six  factors 
mentioned  above,  France  must  spend  one  hundred 
and  fifty  million  francs  for  war  material  to  every 
hundred  million  spent  by  Germany.  When, 
therefore,  France  spends  thirty  billions,  Ger- 
many evidently  spends  not  more  than  twenty  bil- 
lions. And  what  is  true  of  France  applies  even  more 
accurately  to  some  of  the  other  Allied  nations. 

This  is  a  fact  of  the  greatest  general  import- 
ance in  coming  to  a  true  understanding  of  the  fin- 
ancial situation  created  by  the  war  —  a  fact 
which  takes  on  its  full  significance  when  we  real- 
ize that  Germany  is  not  only  carrying  on  the  war 
cheaply,  but  that  she  has  been  enabled,  by  means 
of  this  war,  to  win  very  important  advantages. 

They  consist  of  seven  principal  elements.  The 
last  six  of  these,  it  should  be  noted  without  fail, 
depend  solely  on  the  existence  of  central  Pan- 
Germany  —  that  is,  on  the  hegemony  exercised  by 
Germany  over  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey;  they  are  therefore  wholly  independent 
of  the  first  element,  which  relates  to  Germany's 
occupation  of  enemy  territories,  particularly  to 
the  east  and  west.  They  may  be  summarized 
as  follows:  — 

SEVEN  ELEMENTS  IN  TWO  GROUPS 

The  first  group  includes:  — 

The  advantages  derived  directly  from  Ger- 

14 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

many's  aggression,  comprised  in  a  single  element, 
namely,  the  plunder  accruing  from  the  occupa- 
tion of  enemy  territory.  This  may  be  analyzed 
thus:- 

(a)  The  value  of  the  500,000  square  kilometres 
of  Montenegrin,  Serbian,  Roumanian,   Russian, 
Belgian,  and  French  land  held  by  the  Germans. 

This  value,  estimated  according  to  the  national 
fortunes  of  the  respective  countries  before  the 
war,  —  the  area  and  population  of  the  occupied 
portions  being  taken  into  consideration,  —  is  in 
the  neighborhood  of  155  billion  francs. 

This  figure,  though  naturally  only  approximate, 
is  probably  far  below  the  real  sum.  We  know  that 
the  entire  national  fortune  of  France,  with  its 
536,000  square  kilometres,  was  put  before  the  war 
at  325  billion  francs.  The  valuation  of  the  500,- 
ooo  square  kilometres  of  occupied  territory  at 
155  billions  seems  therefore  an  underestimate,  es- 
pecially when  one  remembers  that  these  500,000 
square  kilometres  include  Belgium  and  the  North 
of  France  —  the  richest  districts  in  the  world. 

(b)  The  plunder  of  human  beings,  supplies,  and 
property  (laborers,  war-material,  provisions,  min- 
erals, raw  products,  manufactured  products,  per- 
sonal property,  art  objects,  war  levies,  specie, 
jewels,  and  securities)  which  has  been  going  on,  in 
some  cases  for  as  long  as  three  years,  throughout 
the  occupied  territories.    This  booty  unquestion- 
ably represents  a  value  of  tens  of  billions  of  francs. 

15 


PA  N-  GERM A N Y 


These  tens  of  billions  should  be  deducted  from 
the  total  of  the  national  fortunes  of  the  invaded 
districts.  The  plunder  in  question  is  composed  of 
property  or  supplies  already  used  up  by  the  Ger- 
mans or  taken  away  by  them  into  Germany ;  the 
value  it  represents,  therefore,  no  longer  exists  in 
the  invaded  districts. 

The  second  group  includes:  — 

The  advantages  which  Germany  has  assured 
herself  for  the  present  or  for  the  future  through 
the  creation  of  Pan-Germany,  which  in  turn  re- 
sult from 

(a)  Germany's  burglarization  of  her  own  allies 
—  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey. 

(b)  The  seizure  by  Germany  and  her  allies  of 
Serbia;  in  all  six  elements: — 

I.  The  Pan-German  loans,  which  throw  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  into  a  state  of 
absolute  financial  dependence  on  Berlin. 

II.  The  value  of  Germany's  monopoly  in  ex- 
ploiting the  latent  resources  of  the  Balkans  and 
Asia  Minor,  resulting  from  the  Pan-German  loans. 

in.  The  inherent  value  of  the  creation  of  Eco- 
nomic Pan-Germany.  This  cannot  fail  to  be  a 
powerful  instrument  for  the  acquisition  of  wealth. 

IV.  The  valueof  Military  Pan-Germany,  which 
is  a  guaranty  of  the  security  of  Economic  Pan- 
Germany. 

v.  The  value  of  the  enormous  economic  profits 
16 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

assured  to  Berlin  through  the  existence  of  Pan- 
Germany  at  the  cost  of  Russia.  These  are  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  establishment  of  Military  Pan- 
Germany. 

vi.  The  taking  over  by  Germany  of  at  least 
2 1  billions  of  French  credit.  This  is  a  consequence 
of  the  establishment  of  Economic  Pan-Germany. 


CHAPTER  II 
How  MUCH  GERMANY  HAS  WON  IN  THE  WAR 

LET  us  now  take  up,  in  their  order,  the  seven 
elements  mentioned  in  the  last  chapter. 

I 

The  first  element  of  German  advantage:  the  booty 
acquired  from  the  occupation  of  enemy  territory 

Germany  is  getting  direct  war-profits  from  the 
enemy  territories  occupied  by  her.  These  terri- 
tories, listed  in  the  ascending  order  of  their  rich- 
ness, are:  Montenegro,  14,000  square  kilometres; 
Albania,  20,000;  Serbia,  87,000;  Roumania,  70,000 
(Bulgaria  and  Austria-Hungary  share  the  pillage 
of  these  four  territories);  dependent  territories 
of  Russia,  260,000;  Belgium,  29,000;  and  France, 
20,000;  making  a' grand  total  of  500,000  square 
kilometres. 

In  order  to  realize  as  clearly  as  possible  the  im- 
portance of  the  booty  wrung  by  Germany  from 
this  enormous  area,  we  may  establish  by  means  of 
examples  or  statistics  that  this  plunder  comes 
from  nine  principal  sources :  — 

Seizure  of  Human  Material.  —  Throughout 
these  500,000  square  kilometres  of  occupied  terri- 
tory, the  Germans  have  scientifically  enslaved 

18 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

42,000,000  human  beings,  who  furnish  a  vast 
amount  of  labor  —  this  labor  being  all  the  cheaper 
because,  as  we  shall  see,  the  slaves  are  robbed  in 
various  ways. 

Seizure  of  War-Material.  —  By  reason  of  their 
lightning  advances  in  Belgium,  France,  Serbia, 
and  Roumania  the  Germans  have  taken  posses- 
sion of  vast  stores  of  war-material:  cannon,  rifles, 
munitions,  wagons,  locomotives,  cars,  as  well  as 
thousands  of  kilometres  of  railway,  of  which  they 
make  full  use,  representing  a  certain  value  of 
billions  of  francs.  (The  Belgian  railway  system 
alone  is  worth  three  billions.) 

Seizure  of  Food-stuffs.  —  The  official  report  of 
April  12,  1917,  on  the  acts  committed  by  the  Ger- 
mans in  France  contrary  to  international  law, 
states:  'The  inhabitants,  subjected  as  they  were 
to  annoyances  of  every  sort,  watched  daily  the 
theft  of  such  food-stuffs  as  they  happened  to  pos- 
sess/ Everywhere  the  Germans  steal  horses, 
cattle,  domestic  animals,  grain,  potatoes,  food- 
products  of  all  kinds,  sugar,  alcohol,  all  of  which 
constitute  the  reserve  supply  of  the  occupied 
countries.  Their  harvests,  too,  are  appropriated 
through  the  cultivation  of  productive  lands  by 
means  of  labor  obtained  almost  without  cost  from 
the  enslaved  peoples. 

Theft  of  Raw  Materials.  -  -  Throughout  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  occupied  territories,  the 
Germans,  at  the  dictates  of  expediency,  have 

19 


PA  N  -GERM  A  NY 


seized  raw  materials:  coal  and  iron  ore,  copper, 
petroleum,  and  so  forth.  Metals  —  bronze,  zinc, 
lead,  copper,  tin  —  have  been  taken  from  private 
citizens,  as  well  as  textile  fabrics  —  wool,  cotton 
cloth,  and  the  like.  When  one  learns  that  from 
the  cities  of  the  North  of  France  alone  the  Ger- 
mans stole  550  million  francs'  worth  of  wool,  it  is 
easy  to  see  that  this  single  source  of  plunder  has 
been  worth  a  number  of  billions  to  them. 

Theft  of  Finished  Products.  —  Everywhere  in 
the  occupied  territories,  so  far  as  means  of  trans- 
portation permit,  motors,  steam-hammers,  ma- 
chinery, rolling-mills,  lathes,  presses,  drills,  elec- 
trical engines,  looms,  and  so  forth,  have  been 
taken  to  pieces  by  mechanics  and  transported  into 
Germany.  The  total  value  of  this  stolen  material 
in  Belgium  and  the  North  of  France  alone  —  the 
richest  industrial  districts  in  the  world  —  is  al- 
most incalculable. 

Theft  of  Personal  Property. --The  official 
French  report  previously  quoted  states:  'In  the 
shops,  officers  and  soldiers  made  free  with  what- 
ever pleased  their  fancy.  Every  day  the  people 
witnessed  the  theft  of  property  which  was  indis- 
pensable to  them.  At  Ham,  General  von  Fleck 
carried  off  all  the  furniture  of  M.  Bernot's  house, 
where  he  had  been  quartered.'  The  property 
thus  stolen  is  sent  to  Germany,  as  is  proved  by 
this  advertisement  in  the  Kolnische  Zeitung: 
'Furniture  moved  from  the  theatre  of  military 

20 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

operations  to  all  destinations/  From  this  source, 
war-booty  to  the  value  of  several  billions  has  al- 
ready been  divided  among  an  army  of  Germans. 

Seizure  of  Works  of  Art.  —  The  Germans  have 
stolen  countless  works  of  art,  '  in  order'  —  so  runs 
a  recent  official  note  of  their  government  —  '  that 
they  may  be  preserved  as  a  record  of  art  and  civil- 
ization. '  —  'It  would  be  impossible/  declares  Le 
Temps,  'to  find  a  more  cynical  admission  of  the 
thefts  committed  by  the  German  authorities  in 
our  museums  and  public  buildings/  If  one  re- 
members that  this  methodical  pillage  has  gone 
merrily  on  among  private  individuals,  drawing  on 
the  unlimited  stores  of  works  of  art  which  have 
been  accumulated  throughout  the  centuries  in 
Poland,  and  particularly  in  Belgium  and  France, 
it  must  certainly  be  apparent  that  the  value  of 
these  stolen  art  treasures  is  immense. 

War  Imposts.  —  Our  official  report  establishes 
that  'Requisitions  have  everywhere  been  contin- 
uous. Towns  that  have  had  to  meet  the  expenses 
of  troops  quartered  within  their  jurisdiction  have 
been  overwhelmed  by  huge  levies/ 

Belgium  is  staggering  under  an  annual  war  as- 
sessment of  480,000,000  francs.  Bucharest,  after 
its  capture  by  the  Germans,  was  forced  to  pay  a 
levy  amounting  to  about  1900  francs  per  capita 
of  the  population.  At  Craiova  the  levy  was  950 
francs  per  capita.  An  edict  forbids  the  circulation 
of  paper  money  unless  it  has  been  specially 

21 


PA N -  GERM A N Y 


stamped  by  the  Germans,  who  retain  30  per  cent 
of  its  nominal  value. 

In  April,  1917,  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  an- 
nounced that  the  leaders  of  the  Austro-German 
forces  of  occupation  in  Roumania  would  shortly 
call  for  an  obligatory  internal  loan  of  a  hundred 
million  francs.  In  Poland,  the  German  govern- 
ment has  just  issued  a  billion  marks  in  paper 
money  for  enforced  circulation.  These  are  only 
single  examples. 

Theft  of  Specie,  Jewels,  and  Securities.  —  In 
September,  1916,  the  Germans  seized  three  quar- 
ters of  a  billion  francs  from  the  National  Bank  of 
Belgium  in  Brussels,  which  was  subsequently 
transferred  to  Germany.  In  January,  1917,  on 
the  steamer  Prinz  Hendrick,  they  stole  a  million 
francs  from  a  Belgian  who  was  traveling  from 
England,  and  took  ten  million  francs'  worth  of 
diamonds  from  the  mail-bags.  In  the  village  of 
Vraignes,  on  March  18,  1917,  the  Germans,  be- 
fore evicting  the  inhabitants,  stole  from  them  the 
13,800  francs  they  had  in  their  possession.  At 
Noyon  —  we  learn  from  the  official  report  already 
quoted  —  the  Germans  broke  open  and  pillaged 
the  safes  of  banks  and  private  citizens  before  re- 
tiring from  the  town.  The  securities,  jewels,  and 
silver  plate  of  Noyon  represented  a  value  of  about 
eighteen  million  francs.  And,  as  I  have  said,  these 
are  only  random  incidents. 

Taking  into  consideration,  then,  the  present 

22 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

high  prices  of  food-products,  coal,  metal,  petro- 
leum, war-material,  machinery,  and  the  rest,  it 
can  be  seen  at  a  glance  that  each  one  of  the  nine 
sources  of  booty  just  enumerated,  on  which  the 
Germans  have  been  steadily  drawing,  in  some 
cases  for  as  much  as  three  years,  has  unquestion- 
ably yielded  the  value  of  several  billions  of  francs, 
-certain  of  them,  perhaps,  tens  of  billions. 
Hence  we  may  reasonably  conclude  that,  without 
fixing  a  definite  figure  for  the  yield  of  these  nine 
sources,  the  total  plunder  has  mounted  well  up 
in  the  tens  of  billions. 

Another  basis  for  calculating  the  worth  of  the 
invaded  territories  to  Germany  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  national  fortunes  of  these  countries,  ac- 
cording to  ante-bellum  statistics,  amounted  to 
about  155  billions  of  francs. 

We  shall  now  examine  the  six  other  elements 
of  Germany's  present  advantageous  situation  — 
those  which  result  from  the  domination  which  the 
war  has  enabled  her  to  exert  over  her  own  allies, 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey.  This 
domination,  which  amounts  practically  to  actual 
seizure,  has  permitted  her  to  fulfill  the  scheme  of 
Central  Pan-Germany  as  a  result  of  the  crushing 
of  Serbia. 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


II 

The  second  element  of  German  advantage: 
the  Pan-German  loans 

A  portion  of  the  approximate  sum  of  115  bil- 
lion francs  devoted  by  Germany,  up  to  the  end  of 
July,  1917,  to  the  carrying  on  of  the  war  has  en- 
abled her  to  burglarize  her  own  allies  by  taking 
advantage  of  the  extremely  bad  financial  situation 
which  faced  them  at  the  end  of  the  Balkan  wars. 
As  a  result  of  this  situation,  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  in  order  to  sustain  the 
present  long-drawn-out  struggle,  have  been  forced 
to  draw  on  the  credit  of  Berlin.  The  sum  total  of 
the  loans  made  by  Germany  to  her  allies  and  se- 
cured by  her  own  war  loans  cannot  yet  be  verified, 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  mounts  up  to  a 
respectable  number  of  billions. 

These  loans  have  worked  out  to  the  immense 
advantage  of  Germany,  for  the  following  reasons. 
Established  facts  prove  that,  without  the  assist- 
ance of  Austro-Hungarian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turk- 
ish troops,  and  without  the  numerous  products 
supplied  her  by  the  Orient,  Germany  would  have 
been  beaten  long  ago,  even  in  spite  of  the  Allies' 
blundering.  As  these  troops  and  resources  are  of 
priceless  value  to  Germany,  it  would  seem  that 
she  must  have  paid  dearly  for  them,  and  in  gold. 
However,  as  the  reserve  of  the  German  Imperial 

24 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

Bank  was  1,356,875,000  marks  in  July,  1914,  and 
2,527,315,000  in  February,  1917,  it  is  certain  that 
Germany  has  not  lent  gold  to  her  allies,  —  in  large 
quantities,  at  any  rate,  —  but  only  paper,  whose 
value  depends  solely  on  the  strength  of  German 
credit. 

In  reality,  therefore,  Germany,  simply  by  keep- 
ing a  printing-press  busy  turning  out  little  stamp- 
ed slips  of  paper,  has  obtained  troops,  food-stuffs, 
and  raw  materials  which  were  indispensable  to  her 
in  avoiding  defeat ;  and  at  the  same  time  she  has  so 
established  herself  as  a  creditor  as  to  give  her  the 
right  to  exact  final  payment  by  her  allies  for  ad- 
vances which  were  primarily  made  to  them  in  Ger- 
many's own  vital  interest. 

Now  these  obligations  weigh  so  heavily  on 
countries  like  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey,  already  in  sore  stress,  that  they  incur 
loans  which  no  one  of  these  three  countries  can 
ever  hope  to  pay  off  unless  a  victory  of  the  Allied 
democracies  should  shatter  the  financial  yoke  of 
Berlin. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  nature  of  these  loans 
and  their  consequences,  the  example  of  Turkey  is 
particularly  instructive.  '  Germany's  advances  to 
Turkey  in  no  way  represent  Turkish  war-expendi- 
ture. We  must  add  to  them  the  requisitions 
made  in  the  country  itself,  and  the  war-material 
purchased  in  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
which  is  not  yet  paid  for. ' 

25 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


At  the  beginning  of  1917  Djavid  Bey  arranged 
in  Berlin  for  a  new  loan  of  three  million  pounds, 
simply  to  enable  Turkey  to  pay  her  debts  to  the 
Krupp  firm,  as  well  as  the  advances  made  her  by 
the  different  groups  of  financiers  and  the  German 
Minister  of  Finance.  This  means,  therefore, 
that,  when  Germany  sends  arms  to  the  Turks  in 
order  that  they  may  use  them  to  consolidate  the 
Pan-German  scheme,  she  also  finds  a  means  of 
making  this  consignment  of  arms  serve  to  en- 
tangle the  Turks  still  more  hopelessly  in  the  finan- 
cial web.  'In  Pan-Germanist  circles,  there  has 
been  much  discussion  of  the  compensations  which 
Turkey  must  make  to  Germany  in  return  for  serv- 
ices rendered  in  the  course  of  the  war.  It  is  the 
unanimous  opinion  that  Germany,  without  gain- 
ing any  territorial  acquisitions  in  Turkey,  must 
have  controlling  rights  in  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
so  that  the  Pera-Galata  bridge  may  be  as  near 
Berlin  as  Constantinople.* 

What  has  taken  place  in  the  spheres  of  finance 
between  Berlin  and  Constantinople  has,  by  the 
very  nature  of  things,  been  duplicated  between 
Berlin  and  Sofia,  though  of  course  in  a  less  pro- 
nounced form.  Germany,  therefore,  by  means  of 
paper  loans  based  on  her  own  credit,  has  caused 
colossal  obligations  to  be  assumed  by  her  allies  — 
countries  representing  vast  areas  of  land :  Austria- 
Hungary  with  676,616  square  kilometres,  Bul- 
garia with  114,104,  and  Turkey  with  1,792,900,  or 

26 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

2,583,620  square  kilometres  in  all.  Now  these 
three  countries  are  precisely  the  ones  which  are 
indispensable  to  the  carrying  out  of  the  Central 
Pan-German  'Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf 
scheme;  the  loans,  therefore,  are  Pan-Germanist 
loans. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  although  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey  are  financially  encumbered  in  their  quality 
of  states,  the  exploitation  of  these  countries  by  the 
Germans  is  very  profitable.  Their  combined  na- 
tional fortunes  were  estimated,  before  the  war, 
at  about  269  billion  francs.  We  must  realize  also 
that,  although  these  loans  granted  by  Berlin  to 
her  allies  are  merely  paper  loans,  they  bind  Tur- 
key, Bulgaria,  and  Austria-Hungary  to  Germany 
as  closely  as  debtors  can  be  bound  to  a  creditor. 
None  of  these  three  countries  can  reasonably 
hope  to  get  funds  after  the  war  from  their  present 
adversaries,  who,  it  is  certain,  will  have  none  too 
much  money  for  their  own  needs;  and  so  the 
financial  situation  as  a  whole  combines  with  the 
enterprise  shown  by  the  Berlin  General  Staff  to 
strengthen  the  grip  which  Germany  has  obtained 
over  her  allies  through  loans. 

As  this  financial  dependence  of  the  three  vassal 
states,  with  its  tremendous  consequences,  is,  as  I 
have  said,  maintained  simply  by  means  of  a  print- 
ing-press and  little  slips  of  paper,  which  cost  very 
little  indeed;  and  since  Germany  receives  in  ex- 

27 


PA  N  -GERM A  N Y 


change  for  these  slips  of  paper  bearing  her  signa- 
ture, men,  food-stuffs,  and  supplies  which,  but 
for  the  action  of  the  Allies,  would  enable  her  to 
establish  Pan-Germany  as  mistress  of  Europe, 
we  may  safely  say  that  the  Pan-Germanist  loans 
floated  by  Berlin  at  her  allies'  expense  consti- 
tute a  powerful  element  of  military  advantage, 
which,  if  one  but  examines  the  conditions  of  its 
origin,  must  stand  out  as  the  most  profitable  and 
extraordinary  swindle  ever  perpetrated. 

Ill 

The  third  element  of  German  advantage:  the  value  of 
a  monopoly  in  exploiting  the  latent  resources  of 
the  Balkans  and  Asia  Minor 

The  figure  of  269  billions  of  francs  quoted  above 
takes  no  account  of  the  enormous  agricultural 
and  mineral  wealth,  as  yet  unexploited  and  unap- 
praised,  of  the  Balkans  and  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Now,  the  business  of  tapping  these  vast  reser- 
voirs is  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans,  as  a 
result  of  the  Pan-Germanist  loans. 

IV 

The  fourth  element  of  German  advantage:  the  value 
resulting  from  the  creation  of  an  economic  Pan- 
Germany 

Economic  Pan-Germany,  as  it  was  outlined  by 
List,  Roscher,  Rodbertus,  and  other  German  econ- 

28 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

omists,  may  be  defined  as  follows:  A  territory 
uniting  under  one  supreme  central  control  Cen- 
tral Europe,  the  Balkans,  and  Turkey — a  territory 
large  enough  to  include  military  and  economic  re- 
sources entirely  sufficient  to  provide  for  the  needs  of 
the  population  in  times  of  war;  and  to  assure  its 
rulers  in  times  of  peace  the  domination  of  the  world. 

The  seizure  by  Berlin  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bul- 
garia, and  Turkey — all  essential  elements  of  Cen- 
tral Pan-Germany  —  was  accomplished  in  three 
ways:  militarily,  by  the  supremacy  acquired  by 
the  German  General  Staff  over  the  troops  of  the 
vassal  states ;  financially,  by  means  of  the  paper 
loans  granted  by  Germany ;  and  diplomatically,  by 
the  treaties  signed  in  Berlin  on  January  1 1,  1917, 
establishing  the  strongest  sort  of  German  protec- 
torate over  the  Ottoman  Empire.  This  done,  the 
consolidation  of  Pan-Germany  was  quickly  under- 
taken by  Berlin  in  a  great  number  of  ways. 

Control  of  Customs.  —  As  the  establishment  of 
the  great  Pan-German  Zollverein  (Customs  Un- 
ion) was  not  to  be  accomplished  at  one  stroke,  the 
Kaiser's  government  set  about  preparing  the  nec- 
essary steps.  Numerous  conferences  held  at  Ber- 
lin and  attended  by  German,  Austrian,  and  Hun- 
garian statesmen  and  business  men,  resulted  in  the 
following  essential  provisions,  (i)  An  economic 
customs  agreement  of  long  duration,  which  would 
make  a  single  economic  unit  of  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary;  (2)  to  bring  this  about  gradually,  a 

29 


PA  N-  GERM A  N Y 


progressive  increase  of  duty  —  free  articles,  and 
a  unification  of  the  customs  charges  on  certain 
goods;  (3)  a  close  economic  union  between  Aus- 
tro-Germany  and  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  to  be  ar- 
ranged and  established  with  the  greatest  possible 
expedition. 

Ethnographic  Control.  —  Certain  nations  afford 
considerable  resistance  to  the  Hamburg— Persian 
Gulf  scheme.  The  Serbians,  who  are  morally  irre- 
ducible, are  an  obstacle  to  the  permanent  estab- 
lishment of  the  Pan-German  nexus  between  Hun- 
gary and  Bulgaria;  and  without  this  the  entire 
Pan-German  programme  falls  flat.  The  system- 
atic destruction  of  the  Serbian  people  has  been 
entrusted  to  the  Bulgars,  who,  under  pretext  of 
quelling  insurrections,  slaughter  not  only  the  Ser- 
bian men,  but  also  women  and  children,  down  to 
babies  at  the  breast.  In  the  Ottoman  Empire  the 
Armenians  happen  to  occupy  those  regions  which 
were  characterized  in  the  Reichstag  by  Herr  Del- 
briick  as  *  Germanic  India.'  Berlin  therefore  puts 
to  good  use  the  Turks'  inherited  taste  for  massa- 
cres of  Christians.  Already  more  than  one  million 
Armenians  have  been  got  out  of  the  way. 

Agricultural  Control.  —  The  food  crisis  in  Ger- 
many has  led  Berlin  to  proceed  with  the  greatest 
haste  toward  utilizing  the  rich  farming  districts 
which  the  fortunes  of  war  have  put  within  her 
grasp.  Hundreds  of  experts,  with  thousands  of 
agricultural  implements,  have  been  sent  to  Rou- 

30 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

mania,  Serbia,  and  Asia  Minor.  In  this  latter 
country,  two  cultural  centres  in  particular  have 
received  attention.  In  the  province  of  Adana  cot- 
ton-growing is  being  developed;  on  the  plains  of 
Anatolia  the  intensive  cultivation  of  grain  is  in 
progress.  These  energetic  efforts  have  had  a  two- 
fold result :  the  Turks  will  not  revolt  against  Ger- 
manic domination  —  because  of  starvation,  if  for 
no  other  reason;  and,  by  reason  of  the  increasing 
yield  of  Serbian,  Roumanian,  and  Turkish  lands, 
more  of  which  are  continually  being  brought  into 
service,  the  food-supply  of  the  Central  Empires 
becomes  more  and  more  completely  assured. 

Banking  Control.  — The  exploitation  of  Eastern 
Pan-Germany  calls  for  vast  capital.  The  Ger- 
man, Austro-Hungarian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turkish 
banks  have  formed  powerful  combinations.  As 
the  leaders  of  this  movement  in  Germany  we  find 
the  Deutsche  Bank,  the  Dresdner  Bank,  the 
Kolnische  Bankverein;  in  Austria-Hungary  the 
Vienna  Kredit-Anstalt  and  the  Hungarian  Bank 
of  Credit  in  Budapest. 

Economic  Control.  —  As  the  rapid  exploitation 
of  the  latent  resources  of  the  Balkans  and  Turkey 
is  the  principal  economic  object  of  the  Germans, 
they  have  just  established,  in  cooperation  with 
King  Ferdinand,  the  *  Institute  for  Furthering 
Economic  Relations  between  Germany  and  Bul- 
garia/ In  order  to  facilitate  the  Germanic  pene- 
tration of  Turkey,  ten  thousand  Turkish  boys  be- 


PA  N  -GERM A N Y 


tween  the  ages  of  twelve  and  eighteen  years  are  to 
come  to  Germany  for  their  technical  education. 
These  young  Turks,  living  in  German  families, 
learning  German,  and  saturating  themselves  with 
German  ideas,  will  soon  be  able  collaborators  with 
the  Teutons  themselves  in  germanizing  Turkey 
and  exploiting  the  numerous  concessions  which, 
if  the  war  turns  out  successfully  for  them,  will  be 
wrung  from  the  Ottoman  government  by  the  sub- 
jects of  the  Kaiser. 

Railway  Control.  —  The  railway  systems  of  Eu- 
ropean Pan-Germany  have  been  brought  to  the 
highest  degree  of  perfection.  In  Turkey,  German 
officers  are  absolutely  in  control  of  the  railroads. 
Out  of  the  2435  kilometres  which  separate  Con- 
stantinople from  Bagdad,  only  583  kilometres  of 
line  remain  to  be  constructed  —  and  this  distance 
is  traversed  by  automobile  roads.  As  for  the 
Turkish  railroads  belonging  to  French  and  Eng- 
lish companies,  the  German  government  has  sug- 
gested that  the  Turks  'purchase*  them.  One 
should  cherish  no  illusions  as  to  the  real  meaning 
of  this  word  'purchase/  It  means,  according  to 
Turco-German  methods,  that  the  expenses  in- 
volved in  this  purchase  should  be  set  down  against 
the  war  damages  which  the  Central  Powers  con- 
sider to  be  due  them  from  the  Allies. 

Canal  Control.  —  The  canal  project,  outlined  as 
far  back  as  April  26,  1895,  by  the  Pan-Germanist 
Dr.  G.  Zoepfl,  was  taken  up  and  begun  by  the 

32 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

Economic  Congress  of  Central  Europe,  which  met 
at  Berlin  on  March  19,  1917.  This  project  is 
made  up  of  the  following  elements:  (i)  Union  of 
the  Rhine  with  the  Danube  by  the  opening  up  to 
navigation  of  the  Main  and  of  the  canal  from 
the  Main  to  the  Danube.  (2)  Completion  of  the 
central  canal  joining  the  Vistula  and  the  Rhine. 
(3)  The  Oder-Danube  canal,  joining  the  Baltic 
and  Black  Sea.  (4)  Opening  to  navigation  of 
the  Rhine  as  far  as  Bale.  (5)  Union  of  the  Elbe 
with  the  Danube  by  means  of  the  river  Moldau. 
(6)  Union  of  the  Weser  with  the  Main  by  means  of 
the  Fulda-Werra.  (7)  Connection  of  the  Danube 
and  the  Vistula  by  means  of  canals.  (8)  Union 
of  the  Danube  with  the  Dniester  by  means  of 
the  Vistula.  (9)  Opening  to  navigation  of  the 
Save.  (10)  Opening  to  navigation  of  the  Morava 
and  the  Vardar  as  far  as  Saloniki.  The  Danube 
is  the  base  of  this  gigantic  programme  of  con- 
struction. 'The  Danube  means  everything  to 
us/  declared  General  von  Groener,  in  December, 
1916. 

This  rapid  sketch  of  the  preparations  now  going 
on  in  the  economic  sphere  of  Pan-Germany  will 
permit  any  clear-thinking  man  to  understand  the 
crushing  power  which  will  lie  in  this  formidable 
system  when  all  its  latent  resources  have  been  de- 
veloped by  the  Germans  to  the  profit  of  their  he- 
gemony. The  organization  of  Pan-Germany  is 

33 


PA N -GERM A N Y 


only  in  its  first  stages;  nevertheless,  the  concen- 
trated military,  economic,  and  strategic  strength 
which  it  has  already  put  at  the  disposal  of  Berlin 
is  so  great  that  it  permits  Germany  to  baffle  her 
far  more  numerous,  but  widely  scattered,  adver- 
saries. What,  then,  would  be  the  strength  of  a 
completely  organized  Pan-Germany?  It  is  unde- 
niable, in  fact,  that  a  methodical,  big-scale  devel- 
opment of  all  the  mineral,  vegetable,  animal,  and 
industrial  products  of  economic  Pan-Germany, 
together  with  the  low-cost  transportation  afforded 
by  a  complete  system  of  canals,  would  make  it 
possible  for  the  Germans  to  pay  high  wages  to 
their  own  workmen,  and  yet  at  the  same  time 
bring  about  such  a  reduction  of  net  prices  in  every 
line  of  industry  as  to  force  Pan-German  products 
on  the  whole  world  by  their  sheer  cheapness. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  then,  that  in  the  face  of  eco- 
nomic Pan-Germany's  overwhelming  methods 
any  economic  revival  on  the  part  of  the  European 
nations  now  allied  would  be  impossible.  The  eco- 
nomic ruin  of  the  Allies,  after  so  exhausting  and 
costly  a  war  as  this,  would  by  the  nature  of  things 
bring  about  their  political  subjection  to  Berlin. 
Besides,  there  is  not  a  country  in  the  world  which 
could  escape  the  clutches  of  economic  Pan-Ger- 
many on  the  one  hand,  or  the  consequences  of  the 
irremediable  ruin  of  the  Allies  on  the  other.  The 
fact  that  Pan-Germany  is  organizing  itself  is  an 
ominous  event  which  should  receive  the  concen- 

34 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

trated  attention  of  all  the  world's  free  peoples; 
for  it  places  in  German  hands  the  elements  of  such 
an  overwhelming  economic  power  as  has  no  prece- 
dent in  the  world's  history. 


The  fifth  element  of  German  advantage:  the  value  of 
military  Pan-Germany 

Berlin  relies,  above  all  else,  on  her  military  re- 
sources to  render  secure  for  all  time  that  economic 
Pan-Germany  which  is  destined  to  provide  her,  in 
peace-time,  with  a  permanent  means  of  acquiring 
wealth  and  world-dominion.  Military  Pan-Ger- 
many is,  therefore,  the  complement  and  the  pledge 
of  economic  Pan-Germany.  The  Kaiser's  success- 
ful seizure,  through  the  fortunes  of  war,  of  new 
sources  of  man-power  —  Austro-Hungarian,  Bul- 
garian, and  Ottoman  soldiery;  of  new  strategic 
points  or  regions  of  exceptional  importance,  lo- 
cated in  invaded  countries  or  in  those  of  his  own  al- 
lies, has  furnished  him  with  the  basis  of  military 
Pan-Germany.  In  1914,  Prussian  militarism  held 
sway  over  only  the  68  million  inhabitants  of  the 
German  Empire.  At  the  beginning  of  1 9 1 7,  it  had 
been  extended  by  consent  or  by  force  to  the  176 
million  people  of  Pan-Germany. 

This  result  —  evidently  the  consequence  of  an 
immense  extension  of  exclusive  influence  through- 
out Central  and  Eastern  Europe  —  has  permitted 

35 


PA N -GERM A N Y 


the  German  General  Staff  to  take  over  at  will 
certain  strategic  points  or  regions  of  the  greatest 
importance,  over  which  it  exerted  no  direct  influ- 
ence before  the  war.  Zeebrugge,  on  the  North 
Sea,  for  instance;  Trieste,  Pola,  and  Cattaro  on 
the  Adriatic;  the  Bulgarian  coasts  of  the  ^Egean; 
the  Ottoman  Straits;  the  Turkish,  Bulgarian,  and 
Roumanian  shores  of  the  Black  Sea,  have  always 
been  strategic  points  or  districts  of  exceptional 
value. 

This  value,  however,  has  become  vastly  greater 
now  that  these  points  or  districts  form  part  of 
a  single  military  system  under  the  directing  and 
organizing  power  of  the  Berlin  General  Staff.  At 
present,  these  essential  strategic  points  and  dis- 
tricts are  the  strongholds  of  the  Pan-German 
frontiers.  They  are,  in  fact,  connected  by  contin- 
uous fortifications,  defended  in  the  most  effective 
way  the  world  has  ever  known  by  an  intensive 
system  of  barbed-wire  entanglements,  deep-dug 
subterranean  shelters,  machine-guns,  and  heavy 
artillery.  The  internal  military  organization  of 
Pan-Germany  is  being  carried  forward  with  unin- 
terrupted speed.  Factories  of  war-material  have 
been  judiciously  distributed  throughout  the  whole 
territory,  with  the  double  object  of  utilizing  raw 
materials  near  their  source  of  origin,  thus  avoiding 
useless  transportation,  and  of  making  possible  the 
swift  dispatch  of  munitions  to  any  threatened 
sector  of  front.  For  this  reason  the  Krupp  firm, 

36 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

at  the  outbreak  of  war,  established  important 
branch  factories,  not  only  in  Bavaria,  but  also  in 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey. 

The  railway  system  and  strategic  automobile 
roads  in  Pan-Germany  have  been  developed  very 
swiftly — notably  in  the  Balkans  and  in  Turkey, 
where  the  need  was  relatively  great.  Back  of 
every  military  front  railroads  running  parallel 
with  that  front  have  been  constructed,  so  that  re- 
inforcements may  be  sent  to  any  given  point  with 
the  maximum  of  speed.  All  this,  taken  as  a  whole, 
has  converted  Pan-Germany  into  one  gigantic, 
extremely  powerful  fortress. 

A  new  phase  is  now  in  preparation.  The  Kai- 
ser's General  Staff,  not  content  with  holding  the 
high  command  of  all  forces  in  Pan-Germany,  is 
determined  to  standardize  as  far  as  possible  their 
arms,  their  munitions,  and  their  methods  of  in- 
struction. The  Deputy  Friedrich  Naumann  — 
one  of  the  sponsors  of  the  Mitteleuropa  idea  —  is 
plainly  smoothing  the  way  toward  this  end, 
which,  because  of  geographic  reasons,  most  inti- 
mately concerns  Austria-Hungary.  In  the  Voss- 
ische  Zeitung  he  has  just  outlined  a  scheme  of  '  full 
and  complete  harmony  of  the  Central  Empires  in 
so  far  as  military  matters  are  concerned.'  He 
boldly  adds  an  avowal  which  is  well  worth  remem- 
bering. 'Mitteleuropa  is  in  existence  to-day. 
Nothing  is  lacking  save  its  organs  of  movement 
and  action.  These  organs  can  be  provided  by  its 

37 


PA  N-GE  R  M  A  N  Y 


two  emperors,  since  they  have  at  their  disposal  the 
necessary  elements  for  the  creation  of  a  common 
army/ 

This  prophecy  merits  our  close  attention ;  for  it 
can  readily  be  seen  that,  if  the  unification  of  the 
Armies  of  the  two  Central  Empires  were  to  take 
place,  neither  Bulgaria  nor  Turkey,  on  whose  mili- 
tary resources  the  German  General  Staff  is  getting 
an  increasingly  firm  grip,  could  prevent  the  ab- 
sorption of  their  armed  forces  into  the  Pan-Ger- 
man system. 

As  for  the  military  strength  of  Pan-Germany, 
it  is  an  easy  matter  to  estimate  it.  Even  if  the 
Kaiser's  armies  were  to  withdraw  from  Russia, 
Poland,  Belgium,  and  France,  Pan-Germany 
would  still  include  150,000,000  people.  Now,  as 
Germany  has  mobilized  about  20  per  cent  of  her 
own  population  and  that  of  her  allies,  —  who  have 
become  vassals,  —  we  see  that  Central  Pan-Ger- 
many can  count  upon  approximately  30,000,000 
soldiers.  Prussian  militarism,  whose  destruction 
by  the  Allies  has  become  the  true,  legitimate,  es- 
sential aim  of  the  war,  has  therefore  become  far 
more  widespread,  through  the  carrying  out  of  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  scheme,  than  it  was  in 
1914.  It  is  proved  by  well-established  facts  that 
Berlin,  while  vigorously  pushing  a  peace  campaign 
destined  to  disunite  the  Allies,  is  doing  everything 
in  her  power  to  turn  Pan-Germany  into  a  fortress 
the  strength  of  which  is  unexampled  in  the  world's 

38 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

history.  In  any  case  it  is  undeniable  that,  as  mili- 
tary Pan-Germany  is  a  pledge  of  the  success  of 
economic  Pan-Germany,  its  establishment  consti- 
tutes an  important  element  of  advantage  for  the 
German  cause.  This  will  be  further  proved  when 
we  come  to  examine  the  two  final  elements  of  ad- 
vantage. 

VI 

The  sixth  element  of  German  advantage:  the  im- 
portance of  the  vast  economic  profits  which  accrue 
to  Berlin  at  the  expense  of  Russia  through  the 
establishment  of  Pan-Germany 

We  need  only  glance  at  the  map  to  realize  that 
a  really  free  Russian  republic  could  never  range 
itself  on  the  side  of  Pan-Germany.  It  is  self- 
evident  that,  if  Pan-Germany  were  to  succeed  in 
splitting  Europe  in  two,  her  economic  and  mili- 
tary pressure  toward  the  East  would  be  irresist- 
ible. The  countless  agents  whom  Berlin  already 
maintains  in  the  immense  territory  of  Russia 
would  find  their  work  becoming  easier  and  easier. 
Following  up  the  hypothesis,  then,  Russia,  suc- 
cumbing to  insoluble  financial  problems  and  un- 
ending internal  difficulties,  would  break  up,  from 
the  Baltic  to  the  Pacific,  into  a  series  of  anarchis- 
tic republics  —  all  of  which  is  according  to  the 
plans  of  Lenine,  who  is  a  creature  of  Berlin.  After 
that  there  would  be  nothing  to  prevent  German 
influence  from  becoming  the  controlling  force  in 

39 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


the  economic  exploitation  of  the  immense  natural 
riches  of  European  and  Asiatic  Russia. 

We  are  well  within  the  bounds  of  reason  in  pre- 
dicting such  a  possibility.  The  fact  that  German 
agents  have  already  succeeded  in  stirring  up  most 
serious  trouble  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  Russia  —  that  they  have  provoked  separatist 
movements  in  Finland,  Ukrainia,  and  the  Cauca- 
sus, and  that  all  China  is  seething  with  disturb- 
ances which  react  on  Asiatic  Russia  —  proves  to 
the  satisfaction  of  the  most  skeptical  that  the 
break-up  of  Russia  into  little  states  inevitably 
subject  to  the  political  and  economic  influence  of 
Berlin  would  be  an  inevitable  consequence  of  a 
successful  Pan-Germany. 

It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  the  huge  profits 
which  the  Germans  would  stand  to  gain  by  such  a 
state  of  affairs  —  a  direct  result  of  military  Pan- 
Germany  —  form  an  element  of  advantage  wor- 
thy of  being  considered  by  itself. 

VII 

The  seventh  element  of  German  advantage:  the  trans- 
fer to  Germany  of  at  least  twenty-one  billion  francs 
of  French  credit 

The  creation  of  military  and  economic  Pan- 
Germany  makes  possible  a  method  of  securing 
war-booty  planned  in  advance  by  the  Pan-Ger- 
manists,  which  may  be  stated  as  follows:  The 

40 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

transfer  to  Germany  of  funds  owed  to  one  of  her  ene- 
mies by  another  enemy,  or  by  one  of  her  own  allies. 

In  order  to  understand  this  method  of  extortion 
one  need  only  read  a  passage  from  Tannenberg' s 
book,  Greater  Germany,  published  in  French  trans- 
lation in  1916  by  the  firm  of  Payot.  This  work 
possesses  exceptional  interest  for  two  reasons: 
first,  it  appeared  in  Germany  in  1911 ;  its  publica- 
tion, therefore,  was  evidently  inspired,  as  in  many 
other  cases,  by  the  ruling  class  at  Berlin,  in  order 
to  prepare  the  German  people  for  war  by  promises 
of  colossal  booty;  second,  the  facts  of  the  case 
show  that  the  German  General  Staff,  ever  since 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  has  been  modeling  the 
political  conduct  of  the  war  on  the  exact  lines  laid 
down  by  Tannenberg,  who  may  be  said  to  have 
officially  declared  the  Pan-German  scheme  of  191 1. 

Now,  independent  of  the  35  billion  marks  — 
nearly  44  billion  francs  —  which  were  to  be  im- 
posed on  France  in  the  coming  war  by  way  of  reg- 
ular war  indemnity,  Tannenberg,  in  Article  5  of 
the  hypothetical  treaty,  outlined  the  following  ad- 
ditional extortion :  — 

'France  cedes  to  Germany  her  claim  to  the  12 
billion  marks  (15  billion  francs)  lent  by  her  to 
Russia.'  This  means  nothing  more  or  less  than  a 
cession  of  credit. 

On  page  308  of  Payot 's  edition,  Tannenberg  in- 
dicates as  follows  the  use  to  be  made  by  Germany 
of  these  Russian  debts  to  France:  — 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


'We  shall  not  be  able  to  give  thanks  to  Holy 
Russia  for  this  splendid  sum,  for  she  has  made 
such  vile  use  of  these  billions  that  to-day  almost 
nothing  remains.  There  is  no  question  of  reim- 
bursement. Russia  is  not  a  mortgaged  property 
subject  to  payment  of  interest,  which  can  be  sold 
when  this  interest  is  not  promptly  forthcoming  on 
the  day  it  is  due.  However,  we  shall  be  able  to 
collect  our  money  in  another  way,  simply  by  tak- 
ing in  exchange  for  these  credits  the  territories  of 
the  Poles  in  Posnania,  East  Prussia,  and  Upper 
Silesia;  of  the  Lithuanians  on  the  banks  of  the 
Niemen;  of  the  Letts  on  the  Duna;  of  the  Estho- 
nians  on  the  Embach  and  the  regions  bordering  on 
the  rivers  of  the  northern  coastal  country ;  of  the 
Czechs  in  Bohemia,  Austrian  Silesia,  and  Mora- 
via; of  the  Slavs  in  Southern  Ukrainia,  Carinthia, 
Styria,  Croatia,  Dalmatia,  Goerz,  and  Gradiska, 
in  so  far  as  they  come  within  the  southern  and 
eastern  limits  of  Greater  Germany. 

'This  procedure  enables  us  to  kill  three  birds 
with  one  stone.  Russia  rids  herself  of  the  burden 
of  debts  and  interest-paying  which  is  crushing  her; 
the  Slavs  of  the  West  and  South  become  citizens 
of  a  Slavic  country ;  and  we  Germans  obtain,  free 
of  debt  and  incumbrance,  the  much-needed  terri- 
tories for  colonization.' 

These  words  were  written  in  191 1 .  On  May  24, 
1917,  the  Berlin  Tdgliche  Rundschau  thus  exposed 
Germany's  future  attitude  toward  Russia: — 

42 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

'  If  we  reach  an  agreement  with  the  new  Rus- 
sian government,  or  with  the  government  which 
succeeds  it,  so  much  the  better;  but  in  making 
our  terms  we  shall  deliberately  turn  to  account 
the  internal  situation  of  the  ancient  empire  now 
in  revolution.  It  is  more  essential  to-day  than 
ever  before  that  we  should  push  our  claims  against 
Russia  for  indemnity  and  for  the  annexation  of 
that  territory  which  we  so  sorely  need  for  coloni- 
zation. ' 

The  similarity  between  this  programme  of  an- 
nexation and  indemnity,  written  so  recently,  and 
Tannenberg's  outline,  published  six  years  ago,  is 
indeed  striking. 

Let  us  now  see  how,  in  the  present  state  of  af- 
fairs, Tannenberg's  plan  for  a  transfer  of  credit 
could  be  worked  out.  Suppose  we  suggest  a  hy- 
pothesis. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  evident  that,  if  Russia 
should  continue  to  submit  to  anarchy  fostered  by 
German  agents,  her  financial  situation,  already 
perilous,  would  no  longer  permit  her  to  pay  the  in- 
terest on  her  bonds  held  abroad.  Again,  if  Pan- 
Germany,  now  momentarily  established,  con- 
tinues to  exist,  Berlin  will  be  able  to  take  over 
Russian  obligations  to  France  without  the  neces- 
sity of  a  formal  treaty.  In  fact,  the  tremendous 
pressure  against  Russia,  exerted  by  the  mere 
geographical  contact  of  Pan-Germany  as  she  lies 
athwart  Europe,  would  practically  render  unneces- 

43 


PA  N  -GERM A N Y 


sary  the  formal  cession  of  French  credit.  Berlin, 
taking  fullest  advantage  of  the  situation,  would 
then  say  to  Petrograd,  'We  consider  that  France 
owes  us  a  considerable  sum  by  way  of  war-in- 
demnity. We  are  unable  to  collect  this,  but  you 
Russians  also  owe  an  indemnity.  We  therefore 
assume  the  position  of  France  as  your  creditor, 
and,  as  the  strength  of  Pan-Germany  has  put  you 
practically  at  our  mercy,  we  demand  the  pay- 
ment of  your  debts  in  such  and  such  a  form/ 

What  resistance  could  disorganized  Russia 
make  to  this  claim,  presented  with  true  German 
cynicism? 

Russian  extremists  need  not  hope,  as  certain 
of  them  do,  to  avoid  paying  the  debts  contracted 
by  the  old  regime.  If  they  do  not  care  to  fulfill 
their  obligations  to  France,  which  is  working  hard 
to  sustain  the  Russian  Revolution,  they  will  have 
to  pay  those  same  debts  to  Berlin,  where  full  use 
would  be  made  of  them  to  exploit  the  Russian 
people. 

Moreover,  the  'purchase'  of  French-  and  Eng- 
lish-owned railroads  in  Turkey,  suggested  several 
months  ago  by  Berlin,  of  which  we  have  already 
spoken,  proves  convincingly  that  the  Germans 
intend  also  to  follow  out  the  system  of  transferring 
credits  in  cases  where  money  is  owed  by  Ger- 
many's allies  to  Germany's  enemies.  For  a  long 
period  great  numbers  of  Frenchmen  purchased 
the  state  obligations  of  Austria-Hungary,  Serbia, 

44 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Bulgaria,  Roumania,  and  Turkey.  It  is  impossi- 
ble to  give  the  exact  amount  of  French  money 
thus  invested  in  Pan-Germanized  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe,  for  the  securities  of  the  above- 
mentioned  countries  were  generally  floated  in 
several  foreign  financial  centres  at  once;  but  per- 
sons who  have  the  most  thorough  knowledge  of 
French  investments  make  a  minimum  estimate  of 
six  billion  francs.  As  for  the  French  money  in- 
vested in  Roumania  and  Serbia  it  will  vanish  into 
thin  air  as  soon  as  the  Austro-German  conquests 
are  consolidated.  As  for  investments  in  Austria- 
Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  the  assumption 
by  Germany  of  French  credits  —  supposing  peace 
to  be  concluded  on  the  basis  of  the  present  war- 
map  —  would  be  easily  accomplished  if  she  rea- 
soned as  follows  with  her  allies: — 

1  France  now  owes  you  war  indemnities  which 
you  cannot  collect.  By  putting  them  down 
against  the  obligations  owed  by  you  to  France, 
you  cancel  this  debt.  However,  we  Germans  have 
lent  you  during  the  war  great  sums,  and  furnished 
you  with  supplies  without  which  you  could  never 
have  continued  the  struggle.  Since  you  cannot 
meet  these  obligations  we  shall  secure  ourselves, 
in  part  at  least,  by  assuming  France's  position  as 
your  creditor.' 

On  the  whole,  if  the  present  state  of  things 
were  to  continue,  Berlin,  by  the  process  of  trans- 
ferring credit,  would  be  able  to  cause  France  the 

45 


PA  N  -GERM A  N Y 


very  considerable  loss  of  about  15  billion  francs 
owed  her  by  Russia,  and  6  billions  owed  by  Ger- 
many's vassal  states  —  a  total  of  at  least  21 
billions.  Now  that  the  Pan-German  scheme  has 
for  the  moment  been  accomplished,  we  can  truth- 
fully say  that  21  billions  of  French  money,  at  the 
lowest  estimate,  represented  by  Russia,  Austrian, 
Hungarian,  Serbian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turkish  se- 
curities, have  been  virtually  Pan-Germanized. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  NECESSITY  FOR  A  DECISION 

IN  the  preceding  chapters  I  have  pointed  out 
that  the  advantages  which  Germany  has  already 
gained  through  the  war,  or  has  assured  for  her- 
self in  the  future,  if  the  present  situation  remains 
essentially  unchanged,  consist  of  seven  chief 
elements.  Before  we  arrive  at  final  conclusions 
concerning  these  elements,  let  us  establish  the 
following  facts :  — 

i.  In  three  years  of  war,  Germany  has  spent 
on  the  war  1612  francs  per  capita  of  her  popula- 
tion. France,  in  the  same  period,  has  spent  2200 
francs  per  capita  —  that  is  to  say,  608  francs,  or 
the  immense  figure  of  38  per  cent,  more  than  Ger- 
many. 

If  the  formula ' without  indemnity*  be  adopted, 
with  respect  to  the  expenses  of  the  war,  far 
indeed  from  serving  the  cause  of  the  Right,  it 
would  result  in  this  unspeakable  iniquity:  each 
Frenchman  who  desired  peace  would  have  to  bear 
a  financial  burden  heavier  by  more  than  a  third 
than  that  of  each  German  and  loyal  subject  of 
the  Kaiser  who  loosed  the  dogs  of  war.  There- 
fore this  enormous  difference  —  38  per  cent  — 
in  the  per  capita  war-expenses  between  France 

47 


PA N -GERM A N Y 


and  Germany  would  in  itself  suffice  to  make  the 
economic  —  and  hence  the  political  —  downfall  of 
France,  swift,  complete,  inevitable,  and  beyond 
recall. 

2.  Unquestionably  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria, 
and  Turkey,  as  separate  slates,  have  been  ruined 
by  their  war-expenses,  but  this  ruin  is  all  to  the 
advantage  of  Germany,  as  it  throws  her  vassals 
into  a  condition  of  absolute  financial  dependence. 
As  a  result,  if  Pan-Germany  is  to  continue  to 
exist,  the  Berlin  government  must  be  the  unchal- 
lenged controller  of  all  the  financial  combinations 
on  which  the  peace  and  well-being  of  Pan-Ger- 
many depend.    Now  these  combinations  evident- 
ly can  serve  only  to  strengthen  the  German  hege- 
mony. 

No  parallel  situation  is  to  be  found  among  the 
Entente  powers.  The  ruin  of  Russia,  for  example, 
would  simply  make  the  ruin  of  France  more  inevi- 
table, unless  a  decisive  victory  of  the  Allies  were  to 
rob  Germany  of  her  iniquitous  spoils  and  at  the 
same  time  guarantee  to  France  the  legitimate  rep- 
aration which  alone  can  save  her  from  irretriev- 
able financial  disaster. 

3.  If  Germany  can  still  continue  to  float  new 
internal  loans  with  comparative  ease,  it  is  because 
her  wholesale  territorial  and  Pan-German  seizures 
are  considered  by  her  people  as  new  pledges  of  the 
credit  of  the  German  state  as  the  heart  of  Pan- 
Germany. 

48 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

4.  France,  which  has  spent  in  three  years  of  war 
2500  francs  per  capita  of  her  population,  has  suf- 
fered only  loss:  20,000  square  kilometres  of  her 
territory  have  been  invaded,  and  given  over  to 
undreamed-of  spoliation  at  German  hands.  Ger- 
many, on  the  other  hand,  which  has  spent  only 
1691  francs  per  capita  for  the  war,  has  occupied 
500,000  square  kilometres  of  foreign  soil,  bur- 
glarized her  own  allies,  and  piled  up  huge  profits 
from  the  war. 

The  diversity  of  these  profits  is  so  great,  and 
the  mortgage  that  they  have  placed  on  the  future 
is  so  heavy,  that  no  figures  will  convey  the  sum- 
total  of  these  advantages;  but  enough  has  been 
said  to  show  that  the  aggregate  is  enormous.  If 
one  deducts  the  115  billions  of  francs  devoted  by 
Germany  to  the  war  from  the  total  represented  by 
all  the  elements  of  advantage  already  enumerated, 
one  begins  to  realize  that  Germany  has  really 
wrung  from  the  war  present  and  future  profits 
which  can  be  computed  only  in  hundreds  of  bil- 
lions of  francs.  This  war,  therefore,  has  brought 
Germany  boundless  material  gain,  such  as  no  war 
in  history  has  ever  brought  to  one  people.  It  is 
equally  certain,  on  the  other  hand,  that  Germany 
can  utilize  her  advantages  only  on  the  express 
condition  of  maintaining  certain  indispensable 
conditions  of  the  situation  on  which  they  are 
based.  We  shall  now  see  to  what  minimum  these 
conditions  may  be  reduced. 

49 


PA  N  -GERM  A N Y 


Our  table  shows  that  out  of  the  seven  elements 
of  advantage  won  by  Germany  from  the  war,  the 
last  six  —  that  is,  those  in  the  second  group  - 
are  altogether  independent  of  the  first,  except  for 
one  small  detail  relating  to  the  national  fortunes 
of  the  territories  occupied  by  Germany  to  the 
southeast  —  that  is,  in  Albania,  Montenegro, 
Roumania,  and  Serbia. 

If,  therefore,  the  formula,  *  peace  without  an- 
nexations and  indemnities,  'were  actually  adopted, 
Germany,  by  withdrawing  from  Belgium  and 
France  to  the  west,  Russian  Poland  to  the  east, 
and  Montenegro,  Albania,  Roumania,  and  Serbia 
to  the  southeast,  would  renounce  her  first  element 
of  advantage,  represented  by  the  value  of  the  in- 
vaded territories  —  that  is,  about  155  billion 
francs.  From  this,  however,  must  be  deducted 
the  tens  of  billions'  worth  of  plunder  carried  out 
of  the  invaded  territories  during  these  three 
years,  consisting  either  of  products  already  used 
up  by  the  Germans,  or  of  material,  metals,  and 
securities  which  have  already  been  removed  to 
Germany.  Her  renunciation  of  this  first  element 
of  advantage  would  therefore  be  rendered  rela- 
tively incomplete  were  the  formula  adopted. 

We  should  note  also  that  there  are  excellent 
reasons  why  Germany's  renunciation  could  never 
apply  in  reality  to  the  territories  invaded  by  her 
to  the  southeast  —  to  Serbia,  at  all  events. 

The  six  elements  of  German  advantage  forming 

50 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

the  second  group  of  our  table  are  infinitely  more 
important  to  Berlin  than  the  first  element  — 
which  is  in  any  case  partially  assured  by  the  'no 
indemnity'  formula,  as  we  have  seen.  Although 
they  are  less  directly  apparent  to  the  Allies,  the 
six  elements  of  the  second  group  are  nevertheless 
real,  for  they  depend  on  incontrovertible  military, 
economic,  and  geographic  facts.  Now  these  six 
elements,  big  with  possibilities  for  the  future,  de- 
pend entirely  on  the  covert  but  certain  seizure 
which  the  war  has  enabled  Germany  to  make  of 
her  own  allies.  But  this  seizure  was  possible  only 
as  a  result  of  Serbia's  destruction.  Serbia,  there- 
fore, formed  the  geographic  bulkhead  which  Ger- 
many had  to  batter  down  before  her  influence 
could  predominate  over  Bulgaria  and  Turkey. 
The  destruction  of  Serbia  was  the  sine  qua  non 
of  the  establishment  of  Central  Pan-Germany, 
which  assures  the  Kaiser  of  the  six  principal  ele- 
ments of  advantage  from  the  war.  Moreover,  it 
is  undeniable  that  the  essential  prop  of  Central 
Pan-Germany  has  been  furnished  by  the  Berlin- 
Bagdad  Railroad,  of  which  the  most  important 
branch,  that  of  Belgrade-Nish-Pirot,  runs  across 
Serbia.  Now,  that  Germany  is  fighting  for  the 
Berlin-Bagdad  line,  Count  Karoly,  an  ally  of  Ber- 
lin, admitted,  speaking  on  December  12,  1916, 
in  the  Hungarian  Chamber.  (See  Le  Journal  de 
Geneve,  December  30,  1916.) 

To  sum  up,  then,  German  victory  and  the 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


fruition  of  her  most  important  war-advantages 
depend  directly  on  the  maintenance  of  Central 
Pan-Germany,  made  up  of  Germany,  Austria- 
Hungary,  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey.  Now 
this  maintenance  is  based  on  two  prime  condi- 
tions. 

1.  The  continuance  of  Serbia's  state  of  subjec- 
tion to  Austro-Germany. 

2.  The  preservation  of  the  new  economic  and 
military  lines  of  communication  between  Berlin 
on  the  one  side  and  Vienna,  Budapest,  Sofia,  and 
Constantinople  on  the  other.    These  are,  indeed, 
the  bonds  which  have  enabled  Berlin  to  reduce  to 
practical  slavery  the  Poles,  Czechs,  Jugo-Slavs, 
and  Roumanians,  —  the  adversaries  of  Pan-Ger- 
many,—  and  then,  without  changing  any  names 
or  long-established  frontiers,  to  make  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Bulgaria  vassal-states  of  Berlin, 
and,  consequently,  active  elements  of  Central 
Pan-Germany. 

Finally,  if  the  present  order  of  things  in  Central 
Europe  is  preserved,  Germany  can  maintain  the 
Hamburg-Bagdad  line.  This  would  be  assured 
by  the  adoption  of  the  formula,  '  peace  without 
indemnities  and  annexations.'  This  is  easily 
proved. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  even  if  Germany  were 
to  withdraw  in  the  East  and  West,  the  stipulation 
'no  indemnities'  would  permit  her  to  give  back 
the  territories  stolen  from  Russia,  France,  Bel- 

52 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

gium,  and  Roumania  in  a  condition  of  complete 
economic,  physical,  and  moral  collapse:  in  a  word, 
sucked  dry.  By  reason,  too,  of  the  principle  of 
1  no  indemnities, '  the  reconstruction  of  these  dev- 
asted  countries  would  be  another  cause  of  finan- 
cial exhaustion  for  France,  Russia,  Belgium,  and 
Roumania,  already  overburdened  with  the  costs 
of  the  war.  But,  even  assuming  that  the  Ger- 
mans withdraw  from  these  occupied  territories  to 
the  East  and  West,  —  although  at  present  there 
is  no  reason  for  seriously  considering  such  an 
eventuality,  —  no  one  in  his  senses  could  believe 
that  they  would  give  up  Serbia  unless  forced  to  do 
so  by  the  most  ruthless  methods;  for  Serbia,  by 
reason  of  her  geographic  position,  is  absolutely 
essential  to  the  existence  of  Central  Pan-Ger- 
many, on  which,  in  turn,  Germany's  vast  advan- 
tages depend. 

Of  course,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  that  Germany 
would  give  her  signature  to  treaties  of  settlement, 
even  involving  Serbia.  But  treaties  signed  by 
Germany  have  no  value  whatever.  *  We  snap  our 
fingers  at  treaties, '  said  the  Grand  Duke  of  Meck- 
lenburg-Schwerin  to  Mr.  Gerard,  American  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin.  Besides,  even  supposing  that 
Berlin  were  party  to  a  treaty  concerning  Serbia, 
this  treaty  might  allow  Serbia  to  exist  in  theory, 
but  not  in  fact.  We  must  look  the  situation  in  the 
face:  Serbia  is  one  great  graveyard.  Her  pop- 
ulation has  been  systematically  butchered  by  the 

53 


PA  N  -  GERM A N Y 


Bulgarians,  with  German  approval.  Serbia  is  ut- 
terly ruined:  the  Bulgaro-Austro-Germans  have 
taken  everything. 

Now  the  principle  '  no  indemnities '  would  keep 
Serbia  in  this  terrible  and  irremediable  state  of 
misery.  It  is  evident  that  under  these  conditions 
the  Serbian  state  would  be  hopelessly  crippled. 
If,  therefore,  Austria-Germany  were  to  say  to  the 
Allies,  'Very  well ;  in  conformity  with  the  formula 
"no  annexations,  no  indemnities, "  we  are  willing 
to  recognize  Serbia's  dependence  by  treaty, '  who 
would  be  deceived  by  this  sinister  and  portentous 
joke?  Who  could  believe  in  the  sincerity  of  a  prop- 
osition which,  on  the  face  of  it,  is  rendered  im- 
possible of  fulfillment  by  the  'no  indemnities' 
clause.  And  what  guaranty  would  the  Allies 
hold  that  Germany,  Austria,  and  Bulgaria  would 
withdraw  from  Serbia  at  the  same  time,  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  such  a  withdrawal,  if  bona  fide, 
would  imply  Berlin's  renunciation  of  the  whole 
Central  Pan-German  scheme  and  its  vast  attend- 
ant profits? 

To  suppose  such  a  thing  possible  implies  a  com- 
plete ignorance  of  the  Germanic  spirit  as  it  has 
manifested  itself  since  the  beginning  of  history. 
Besides,  declarations  made  by  the  Germans  them- 
selves show  that  they  will  never  recede  from  their 
position  as  regards  Serbia.  As  early  as  Decem- 
ber, 1916,  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  prepared  its 
readers  in  advance  for  the  '  pacifist '  tactics  about 

54 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

to  be  employed  —  tactics  which  are  now  being 
tried  out  with  the  help  of  the  Russian  anarchists, 
the  Kienthal  Socialists,  and  the  Pope. 

'Certainly,'  said  the  Frankfort  paper,  'if  we 
are  to  make  a  lasting  profit  from  the  military 
situation,  both  in  its  favorable  and  in  its  less  ad- 
vantageous aspects,  it  is  essential  that  special 
questions  should  be  severally  considered  in  their 
relation  to  the  whole.  To-day  our  point  of  view 
should  be  as  follows :  in  the  East,  the  formulation 
of  definite  demands,  and  in  the  West,  negotiations 
on  a  flexible  basis.  This  is  not  a  programme  but 
a  general  line  of  action.  "  Negotiation  "  is  by  no 
means  a  synonym  for  "renunciation." 

This  last  sentence  should  be  read  and  pondered 
over  by  all  the  Allies.  Here  we  find  an  absolutely 
clear  statement  as  regards  the  fate  of  Serbia, 
whose  restoration,  by  means  indicated  later,  is 
the  one  thing  which  can  save  the  world  from 
the  consequences  of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf 
scheme. 

On  August  8,  1917,  at  a  banquet  given  at  Lon- 
don for  M.  Pachitch,  the  Serbian  Premier,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  acknowledged  in  decisive  terms 
Great  Britain's  obligations  to  Serbia  —  obliga- 
tions which  are  practically  those  of  the  whole 
Entente. 

'What  I  have  already  said  in  the  name  of  the 
British  Government  regarding  Belgium,  I  here  re- 
peat in  the  name  of  the  same  Government  regard- 

55 


PA  N  -GERM A N Y 


ing  Serbia.  The  first  condition  of  peace  must  be 
its  complete  and  unrestricted  restoration.  I  have 
not  come  here  to  make  a  speech.  I  have  simply 
come  to  say  that,  no  matter  how  long  the  war 
should  last,  Britain  has  pledged  her  honor  that 
Serbia  shall  emerge  from  the  conflict  independent 
and  completely  restored.  Moreover,  it  is  not 
only  a  matter  of  honor.  The  security  of  civiliza- 
tion is  directly  involved  here.  In  the  West,  Bel- 
gium has  blocked  Germany's  way,  and  Serbia  in 
the  East  has  been  the  check  of  the  Central  Pow- 
ers. She  must  continue  to  mount  guard  over  the 
gateway  to  the  East/ 

To  this  the  Berlin  Kreuzzeitung  made  reply,— 

'Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  said  that  the  integral 
restoration  of  Serbia  was  an  essential  condition  of 
peace  and  that  British  honor  was  pledged  to  this 
restoration.  The  war-aims  of  England  and  those 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria  are  in  absolute 
opposition  on  this  point. ' 

The  Hamburger  Fremdenblatt,  speaking  for  Ger- 
many as  well,  added,  - 

'Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  have  crushed 
Serbia.  They  alone  will  decide  what  disposition 
is  to  be  made  of  King  Peter's  former  realm. ' 

There  can  be  no  illusion  here.  The  formula 
'  peace  without  annexations  and  indemnities '  can- 
not apply  to  Serbia,  which  is  the  keystone  of  Pan- 
Germany. 

We  now  see  that,  even  if  the  withdrawal  of  Ger- 

56 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

many  from  the  territories  of  Belgium,  France,  and 
Russia  now  held  by  her  were  to  take  place,  Cen- 
tral Pan-Germany  would  remain  essentially  in- 
tact ;  and  her  commercial  competition  alone  would 
suffice  to  bring  about  the  economic  ruin  of  France, 
England,  and  Russia.  The  last-named  countries 
would  be  staggering  under  their  colossal  war- 
debts,  with  no  offsetting  compensation,  whereas 
Germany,  thanks  to  six  great  elements  of  advan- 
tage, would  find  her  war-losses  more  than  counter- 
balanced by  her  profits.  What  chance  would  the 
Allied  powers,  exhausted  by  a  deadly  peace,  have 
against  the  thirty  million  soldiers  of  Pan-Germany, 
when  Berlin,  refreshed  by  a  short  respite,  should 
choose  to  renew  her  hold  over  those  western  ter- 
ritories which  she  had  temporarily  relinquished  ? 

Is  it  not  plain  what  depths  of  deception  lie  be- 
neath that  formula,  '  peace  without  annexations 
and  indemnities/  which  the  Russian  Socialists, 
ignorant  of  the  vast  advantages  accruing  to  Ger- 
many from  the  war,  have  adopted  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  Berlin's  Leninist  agents?  Let  us  look  at 
the  facts,  not  at  the  words.  If  the  formula  '  peace 
without  annexations  and  indemnities'  is  accept- 
able to  the  Germans,  it  is  simply  because  this  for- 
mula, in  the  opinion  of  Berlin,  will  assure  the 
maintenance  of  Central  Pan-Germany,  which,  in 
turn,  pledges  to  Germany  the  domination  of 
Europe  and  the  fulfillment  of  all  other  elements  of 
the  Pan-German  scheme. 

57 


PA  N  -GERM  A  NY 


Now,  if  Central  Pan-Germany  were  to  survive, 
thus  assuring  to  Germany  all  its  vast  attendant 
advantages,  and  leaving  the  Allies  to  face  their 
incalculable  war-losses,  could  such  a  peace  prop- 
erly be  called  a  'white  peace'?  Could  a  peace 
which  gave  Germany  the  domination  of  Europe 
be  called  a  '  drawn  game,'  a  '  peace  without  annex- 
ations or  indemnities'?  What  sort  of  'limping 
peace '  (paix  boiteuse)  would  permit  Prussian  mili- 
tarism to  hold  sway  over  the  150  million  people 
of  Pan-Germany  instead  of  the  68  millions  of 
1914,  and  put  30  million  soldiers  at  Berlin's  dis- 
posal? What  one  of  the  exhausted  states  of 
Europe  could  lift  a  hand  under  such  conditions? 
This  would  be  no  paix  boiteuse;  it  would  be  the 
peace  of  slavery. 

If  the  Allies  are  to  understand  the  crucial  situa- 
tion which  lies  before  them,  they  must  realize 
that,  as  Lloyd  George  said,  'The  security  of  civi- 
lization is  directly  involved  in  the  independence 
of  Serbia. '  But  the  independence  of  Serbia  can 
never  be  assured  so  long  as  Germany  practically 
exercises  hegemony  over  the  50  million  people 
of  Austria-Hungary,  for  the  Austro-German  unit 
of  118  million  inhabitants,  all  subject  to  Berlin, 
is  geographically  the  mistress  of  the  Balkans.  The 
pledge  of  Serbia's  independence,  therefore,  does  not 
lie  in  Serbia,  but  north  of  the  Danube.  This  pledge 
involves  the  liberation  of  the  peoples  under  Haps- 
burg  domination,  —  the  Poles,  Czecho-Slovaks, 

58 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Jugo-Slavs,  and  Roumanians,  —  which  alone  can 
permit  the  creation  of  a  barrier  sufficiently  strong 
to  block  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  line,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  annul  the  vast  advantages  that  the 
definite  establishment  of  the  formidable  economic 
and  military  Pan-German  scheme  would  assure  to 
the  Kaiser  and  his  people. 

Now  it  is  much  easier  to  devise  the  destruction 
of  Pan-Germany  than  is  generally  supposed.  This 
fact  will  become  plain  as  soon  as  the  Allies  as  a 
whole  realize  that  the  freedom  of  the  nationalities 
subject  to  the  Hapsburgs  should  not  only  be  an 
object  of  the  Entente  victory,  but  also  a  means  to 
that  victory.  This,  however,  is  a  matter  which 
needs  greater  elaboration  than  I  can  give  it  at 
this  point.  It  is  discussed  at  length  in  the  con- 
cluding chapters  of  this  volume. 

In  a  word,  the  solution  of  the  Central  European 
problem  means  everything  for  the  Allies.  So  long 
as  it  shall  remain  unsolved,  victory  will  be  out 
of  their  reach.  On  the  other  hand,  when  this  one 
point  has  been  settled,  all  the  other  special  war- 
aims  of  each  of  the  Allies  can  be  fulfilled  with 
ease. 

Assuming  now  that  the  problem  of  Central 
Europe  has  been  solved,  could  it  be  said  that  the 
resulting  peace  would  be  'without  annexations 
and  indemnities'?  Plainly  not:  for  this  peace,  if 
it  is  to  break  up  forever  the  autocracies  of  the 
Central  Empires,  must,  for  reasons  of  nationality, 

59 


PA  N-  GERM  A  N  Y 


change  the  existing  frontiers,  which  have  made 
Austro-German  imperialism  possible.  It  might 
involve  also  certain  legitimate  reparations.  Can 
it  be  said  that  peace  on  the  terms  of  the  Allies 
would  be  a  'white  peace'  —  a  'drawn  game'? 
Again  we  must  say  no;  for  such  a  peace  would 
bring  incalculable  benefits  to  the  world :  the  end  of 
Prussian  militarism,  together  with  the  possibility 
of  organizing  the  society  of  nations  under  other 
and  better  conditions.  Neither  could  it  be 
called  a  'paix  boiteuse,'  for  the  destruction  of 
Prussian  militarism  would  insure  to  the  world  a 
long  term  of  rest  after  the  present  awful  struggle. 

The  formulae  '  peace  without  indemnities  or  an- 
nexations,'  'white  peace,'  'drawn  game'  and 
'  paix  boiteuse1  have  therefore  no  more  connection 
with  reality  in  the  event  of  an  Allied  victory  than 
in  that  of  a  German  victory.  The  truth  in  a  nut- 
shell is  that,  by  virtue  of  the  prime  importance  of 
the  Central  European  problem,  either  the  Allies 
will  win  victory  through  the  destruction  of  Pan- 
Germany,  or  else  the  Germans,  thanks  to  Central 
Pan-Germany  and  its  economic  and  military  ad- 
vantages, will  reduce  all  Europe  to  slavery. 
These  are  the  two  phases  of  the  dilemma. 

In  any  case,  the  fact  that  expressions  without 
any  practical  application,  and  hence  absurd,  are 
constantly  made  use  of  in  many  Allied  organs  of 
public  opinion  in  the  discussion  of  peace,  proves 
beyond  doubt  that  certain  Allied  circles,  poisoned 

60 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

by  the  influence  of  Lenine  or  Kienthal,  have  lost 
their  sense  of  realities.  With  such  insidious  ene- 
mies as  the  Germans,  this  involves  a  real  danger 
for  that  moral  resistance  of  the  Allies  which  is  so 
invaluable.  The  Americans,  through  their  prac- 
tical common  sense,  can  be  of  the  greatest  service 
in  helping  the  European  Allies  to  set  it  at  naught. 

President  Wilson,  by  his  message  to  Russia  and 
his  Flag  Day  address,  has  already  done  much  for 
the  common  cause  by  clearly  setting  forth  the 
concrete  difficulties  to  be  overcome  by  the  Allies 
if  they  are  to  live  at  liberty.  Mr.  Gompers  has 
done  the  same  by  his  firm  stand  regarding  the 
Stockholm  conference.  By  energetically  oppos- 
ing the  pernicious  Socialist  theoreticians,  he  has 
supported  those  real  Socialists  in  France,  England, 
and  Russia  who  understand  the  vital  importance 
of  killing  Prussian  militarism. 

May  all  true  Americans  continue  to  speak  as 
these  two  men  have  done!  The  common  sense  of 
their  opinions,  spread  broadcast  among  the  Euro- 
pean Allies,  will  help  us  to  neutralize  the  deadly 
action  of  those  among  us  who  have  become  intoxi- 
cated by  theories.  The  cause  of  the  Allies  is  an 
ideal,  but  the  triumph  of  this  ideal  can  never  be 
insured  by  words;  it  can  be  compassed  only  by 
the  accurate  knowledge  of  military  and  economic 
realities. 


CHAPTER   IV 
THE  ALLIES  AND  PAN-GERMANISM 

IT  is  now  twenty  years  that  I  have  worked  tire- 
lessly to  tear  the  veil  from  the  Pan-German 
scheme,  which  my  investigations  in  all  parts  of 
the  world  have  enabled  me  to  unearth.  In  spite 
of  the  positive  and  abundant  proofs  of  its  exist- 
ence which  I  have  been  publishing  for  nineteen 
years,  I  was  unable  to  persuade  the  responsible 
authorities  in  France,  Russia,  or  England,  that  a 
formidable  peril  was  swiftly  and  more  swiftly 
drawing  near.  Paris  and  London  were  steeped  in 
blind  pacifist  delusions.  As  for  Petrograd,  the 
sinister  Teutonic  influences  which,  until  only  yes- 
terday, were  at  work  on  the  highest  personages, 
prevented  the  great  Russian  people  from  knowing 
the  real  nature  of  Germany's  projects. 

If  the  Europeans  most  directly  interested  in 
knowing  the  truth  were,  until  the  very  outbreak 
of  hostilities,  completely  hoodwinked  as  to  the 
true  intentions  of  William  II,  it  is  only  natural 
that  Americans  should  take  some  time  to  realize 
the  staggering  facts  concerning  the  fantastic  and 
odious  plan  of  world-domination  so  toilsomely 
built  up  by  the  government  at  Berlin.  In  peace 
times,  too,  the  affairs  of  old  Europe,  especially  the 

62 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

intricate  tangle  of  Austro-Hungarian  and  Balkan 
politics,  had  no  practical  interest  for  so  vast  and 
remote  a  nation  as  the  United  States.  This  was 
particularly  true  of  her  Western  citizens.  To-day, 
however,  Americans  as  well  as  French,  British, 
Russians,  and  Italians,  are  faced  with  the  obliga- 
tion of  mastering  the  problems  of  Central  Euro- 
pean affairs;  for,  without  exaggeration,  it  is  on 
the  proper  solution  of  these  problems  that  the  in- 
dependent existence  of  the  United  States  depends. 
As  events  have  justified  the  views  I  have  held 
for  a  score  of  years,  I  trust  my  American  readers 
will  hold  this  fact  in  my  favor.  If  I  should  seem 
to  run  counter  to  the  ideas  they  now  hold,  they 
should  realize  that  I  do  so  deliberately,  in  order  to 
save  priceless  time  and  better  serve  their  own  legi- 
timate interests. 


The  present  situation  in  Europe  is  due  to  two 
factors:  first,  the  almost  complete  fulfillment  by 
the  Germans  of  a  plan  which  they  had  long  been 
preparing  with  the  utmost  care;  second,  the  re- 
peated mistakes  of  the  Allies  in  their  carrying  on 
of  the  war  —  mistakes  which  alone  have  permit- 
ted the  Germans  to  consummate  their  plan  almost 
without  opposition. 

The  Pan-Germanist  programme  of  1911  called 
for  the  establishment  of  Prussian  hegemony  over 
a  territory  of  nearly  4,015,000  square  kilometres 

63 


PA  N  -  GERM  A  N  Y 


—  in  other  words,  besides  actual  conquest  in  the 
East  and  West,  it  meant  the  indirect,  yet  effective 
seizure  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  Balkan  States, 
and  Turkey.    At  the  beginning  of  1917  —  before 
the  capture  of  Bagdad  by  the  English  and  the 
strategic  retreat  of  the  German  troops  in  the  West 

—  the  programme  had  been  realized  to  the  extent 
of  3,600,000  square  kilometres  —  that  is,  in  nine- 
tenths  of  its  entirety. 

The  basic  explanation  of  this  achievement  lies 
partly  in  the  fact  that,  if  the  Germans  are  outlaws 
they  are  very  intelligent  outlaws,  perfectly  trained 
for  the  task  of  seizing  the  booty  on  which  they 
have  set  their  hearts;  partly  in  the  fact  that  the 
leaders  of  the  Allies,  intelligent  and  animated  by 
the  best  intentions  though  they  are,  have  been 
quite  unenlightened  as  to  the  multiple  realities  of 
the  European  tangle,  a  thoroughgoing  knowledge 
of  which  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  conduct 
of  the  terrible  war  in  progress. 

The  proof  of  this  ignorance  lies  in  the  recog- 
nized truth  that  the  heads  of  the  European  states 
now  in  league  against  Germany  were,  without  ex- 
ception, taken  by  surprise  when  war  broke  out. 
Posterity  will  look  on  this  fact  with  amazement. 
The  governments  of  the  Allies  were  no  better  pre- 
pared to  direct  the  war  intellectually  than  were 
their  generals  to  carry  it  on  materially.  Now,  the 
intellectual  prosecution  of  this  war  presents  un- 
precedented difficulties:  it  calls  uncompromisingly 

64 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

for  a  detailed  knowledge,  not  only  of  matters  mili- 
tary and  naval,  but  of  geographic,  ethnographic, 
economic,  and  political  questions  which,  by  reason 
of  the  scale  of  the  present  conflict,  react  profound- 
ly on  all  military  operations  of  general  scope.  As 
a  result  of  this  interpenetration  of  all  the  various 
problems,  the  world-conflict  is  not,  as  many  peo- 
ple still  believe,  a  purely  military  struggle,  in 
which  the  mere  machinery  of  war  plays  a  decisive 
role.  In  spite  of  appearances,  mind  —  that  is,  the 
intellectual  element  —  dominates  the  material 
element  which,  though  indispensable,  can  attain 
full  effectiveness  only  when  it  is  employed  in  fur- 
therance of  a  definite  plan  of  action,  backed  by 
clear  thinking ;  and  such  a  plan  can  never  be  form- 
ulated unless  the  ethnographic,  psychological, 
economic,  and  geographic  factors  capable  of  af- 
fecting every  great  movement  of  a  general  strate- 
gic nature  are  calculated  as  carefully  as  the  purely 
military  factors.  By  reason  of  the  potency  of 
these  many  factors  —  invisible,  but  very  real  and 
powerful  —  it  may  be  said :  *  This  war  is  not  a 
mere  war  of  armaments  —  it  is  a  war  of  political 
science/ 

It  is  because  the  strategists  of  Berlin  have  long 
recognized  this  conception  of  modern  warfare;  it 
is  because  they  have  at  their  fingers*  ends  a  docu- 
mentation of  political  science,  slowly  accumulated 
and  of  unquestionable  worth,  that  they  are  in  a 
position  to  meet  endless  problems  as  they  present 

65 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


themselves,  and  to  achieve  successes  against  the 
Allies  which,  on  the  surface,  appear  incomprehen- 
sible. 

As  for  the  leaders  of  the  Allies,  it  seems  as  if 
many  of  them  are  not  alive  to  the  element  of  polit- 
ical science  in  the  war,  even  at  the  present  mo- 
ment. The  reason  is  simple.  The  same  men  who 
ignored  the  realities  of  Pan-Germanism  before  the 
war  are,  naturally  enough,  unable  to  grasp  the 
politico-scientific,  geographic,  economic,  ethno- 
graphic, and  psychological  realities  of  all  Europe 
now  that  the  conflict  has  burst  on  us.  In  the 
realm  of  the  intellectual  there  can  be  no  improvi- 
sation. To  master  the  politico-scientific  elements 
necessary  for  the  prosecution  of  this  war,  there  is 
need  of  minds  trained  by  the  unremitting  applica- 
tion of  fifteen  or  twenty  years.  Among  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Entente  no  man  is  to  be  found  who  has 
bent  his  will  to  such  intellectual  effort;  and  the 
pressing  problems  brought  forth  by  each  day  give 
no  time  for  minute,  deliberate  study  by  the  men 
who  have  succeeded  to  the  seats  of  power  since 
war  began. 

II 

The  capital  mistakes  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  committed  by  the  Entente  proceed  directly 
from  the  defective  equipment  of  its  leaders  which 
I  have  just  pointed  out.  They  explain  the  differ- 
ence in  the  results  obtained  by  the  two  groups  of 

66 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

belligerents,  although  the  courage  and  self-sacri- 
fice of  the  Allies'  soldiers  are  as  great  as  those  of 
the  Germans.  They  explain,  too,  why  the  three 
hundred  millions  of  the  Allies  —  this  takes  no  ac- 
count of  their  colonial  resources  or  of  the  support 
drawn  from  trans-oceanic  neutrals — have  not  yet 
succeeded  in  defeating  Germany,  which  entered 
the  war  with  a  population  of  sixty-eight  millions 
and  one  ally,  Austria-Hungary,  of  whose  thirty 
million  people  three  quarters  were  directly  antag- 
onistic to  Berlin. 

These  capital  mistakes  made  by  the  Allies  are 
as  follows.  They  believed  that  a  friendly  agree- 
ment with  Bulgaria  was  possible,  although  that 
country  was  treaty-bound  to  Berlin  and  Constan- 
tinople long  before  the  war.  They  cherished  illu- 
sions concerning  King  Constantine,  who,  above  all 
else,  was  brother-in-law  of  the  Kaiser.  They  or- 
ganized the  Dardanelles  expedition,  which  should 
never  have  been  attempted.  Even  if  this  opera- 
tion had  been  judged  technically  feasible,  its  futil- 
ity would  have  been  apparent  if  the  Allies  had 
realized — and  it  was  their  arch-error  not  to  realize 
-  that  the  strategic  key  to  the  whole  European 
war  was  the  Danube.  The  mere  occupation  by 
the  Allies  of  the  territory  stretching  from  Monte- 
negro through  Serbia  to  Roumania,  would  have 
resolved  all  the  essential  problems  of  the  conflict. 
Cut  off  from  the  Central  Empires,  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey,  whose  arsenals  were  depleted  by  the  Bal- 

67 


PA  N  -GERM A N Y 


kan  disturbances  of  1912-1913,  would  have  found 
it  impossible  to  make  a  strong  stand  against  the 
Allies.  Turkey,  who  had  been  imprudent  enough 
to  defy  them,  would  have  been  obliged  to  open  the 
Straits  within  a  very  short  time,  for  sheer  lack  of 
munitions  to  defend  them.  This  opening  of  the 
Straits  would  have  been  effected  by  a  strong  pres- 
sure by  the  Allies  on  the  south  of  Hungary.  More- 
over, by  the  same  action  the  Central  Empires 
would  have  been  barred  from  reinforcements  and 
supplies  from  the  Orient.  Germany,  finding  her- 
self cut  off  on  land  in  the  South  as  she  was  block- 
aded by  sea  in  the  North,  would  have  been  obliged 
to  come  to  terms. 

Unhappily,  the  general  staffs  of  the  Allies  in  the 
West  were  not  prepared  to  grasp  the  politico-sci- 
entific character  of  the  war,  especially  the  cardinal 
importance  of  the  economic  factor.  This  igno- 
rance remained  unenlightened  until  Roumania  was 
crushed  in  1916.  As  a  result,  for  twenty-seven 
months  the  Balkans  were  looked  on  by  the  leaders 
in  the  West  as  being  of  only  secondary  military 
importance.  During  these  twenty-seven  months 
the  Allies  were  obsessed  by  the  idea  that  they 
would  vanquish  Germany  on  the  Western  front 
by  a  war  of  attrition.  This  conviction  delayed 
the  Saloniki-Belgrade  expedition,  and  when  it 
was  finally  undertaken,  it  was  on  too  small  a  scale 
to  insure  success.  Such  a  grave  error  would  never 
have  been  committed  by  the  Allied  strategists  if 

68 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

they  had  fully  realized  that  the  principal  objective 
of  the  Pan-German  scheme,  for  the  attainment  of 
which  Germany  was  primarily  fighting,  was  the 
seizure  of  the  Orient.  This  point  of  view,  how- 
ever, was  for  a  long  time  ignored,  in  spite  of  the 
tireless  efforts  made  by  a  few  to  demonstrate  its 
vital  importance. 

The  Austro-Germans,  profiting  by  this  basic 
mistake  of  the  civil  and  military  chiefs  of  the  En- 
tente, were  able  in  October-November,  1915,  to 
join  hands  with  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  over  the 
corpse  of  Serbia.  From  that  time  on,  the  General 
Staff  at  Berlin  has  been  profiting  by  this  situation, 
improving  it  and  consolidating  it  by  seizing  half 
of  Roumania  toward  the  close  of  1 9 1 6.  The  direct 
result  of  the  mistakes  of  the  Allies,  coupled  with 
the  methodical  procedure  of  Berlin,  has  been  the 
realization  of  nine  tenths  of  Pan-Germany. 

This  Pan-Germany  is  composed  of  two  ele- 
ments. First,  the  great  occupied  territories  taken 
by  Germany  from  Belgium,  France,  Russia,  Ser- 
bia, and  Roumania.  Second,  the  practical  seizure 
effected  by  her  at  the  expense  of  her  own  allies: 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey;  for,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Quadruple  Alliance  is  nothing 
but  a  great  illusion  carefully  fostered  by  the  Kai- 
ser for  the  purpose  of  concealing  the  true  situa- 
tion from  the  neutrals  —  particularly  the  United 
States,  which  was  then  in  that  category.  If  one 
wishes  to  see  things  as  they  are,  one  must  realize 

69 


PA  N  -  G  ER  MA  N  Y 


that  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  are 
not  the  allies  —  that  is,  the  equals  —  of  Germany. 
These  three  states  are  practically  the  vassals  of 
Berlin,  in  whose  sight  they  count  for  scarcely  more 
than  Saxony  or  Bavaria.  The  principal  proof  of 
this  state  of  affairs  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  Kaiser 
wields  an  uncontested  supremacy  from  Hamburg 
to  the  British  front  at  Bagdad. 

Since  the  beginning  of  hostilities  there  has  been 
a  formidable  extension  of  Prussian  militarism.  At 
first,  it  held  in  its  grasp  only  the  sixty-eight  mil- 
lion people  of  the  German  Empire.  By  April, 
1915,  it  had  extended  and  organized  its  influence 
among  the  thirty  millions  of  Austro-Hungarians, 
who  until  that  time  had  taken  orders  from  their 
own  independent  military  chiefs.  After  October- 
November,  1915,  —  the  date  of  Serbia's  downfall, 
—  the  Prussian  system  reached  out  to  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey.  By  taking  account  of  these  exten- 
sions and  adding  together  the  populations  of  the 
territories  occupied  by  Germany,  together  with 
those  of  her  infatuated  allies,  one  finds  that  to-day 
Prussian  militarism  no  longer  controls  sixty-eight 
million  souls,  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but 
about  one  hundred  and  seventy-six  million  Euro- 
pean and  Ottoman  subjects. 

This  is  the  brutal,  overwhelming  fact  which 
Americans  must  face  if  they  wish  to  learn  the  sole 
solution  of  the  war  which  will  assure  to  them,  as 
well  as  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  a  durable  peace. 

70 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 


The  following  figures  will  show  how  the  three 
groups  of  the  population  of  Pan-Germany  were 
divided  at  the  beginning  of  1917:  — 


1.  THE  MASTERS 

Germans 

2.  THE  VASSALS 

Magyars 

Bulgars 

Turks 

3.  THE  SLAVES 

French 

Belgians 

Alsatians,  Lorrainers 

Danes 

Poles,  Lithuanians, 

Ruthenians 

Czechs 

Jugo-Slays 

Roumanians 

Italians 

Armenians 

Levantines 

Ottoman  Greeks 

Arabs 

Total 


73,000,000 

10,000,000  "I 

5,000,000  [     21,000,000 
6,000,000  J 


(about)  3,000,000  " 

7,500,000 

1,500,000 

200,000 

22,000,000 

5,500,000 
8,500,000 

82,000,000 

11,000,000 
8,000,000 
800,000 

2,000,000 

2,000,000 

2,000,000 
8,000,000  , 

176,000,000 


To  sum  up,  seventy- three  million  Germans  rule 
over  twenty-one  million  vassals  and  eighty-two 
million  slaves,  —  Latin,  Slavic,  Semitic,  belonging 
to  thirteen  different  nationalities,  —  who  are 
bearing  the  most  cruel  and  unjustifiable  yoke  that 
the  world  has  ever  known. 

It  is  undeniable,  moreover,  that  each  extension 
of  Prussian  militarism  over  a  new  territory  has  en- 
abled Germany  to  prolong  the  struggle  by  obtain- 
ing new  supplies  of  food,  new  reinforcements  to 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


press  into  her  service  and  territory  to  exploit,  new 
civil  populations,  whose  labor  is  made  use  of  even 
in  works  of  a  military  nature.  As  a  result,  the 
technical  problem  now  confronting  the  Allies  in 
Europe  is,  through  the  mistakes  of  their  former 
leaders,  infinitely  more  complicated  than  at  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities. 

To-day  Berlin,  by  means  of  Prussian  terrorism 
methodically  and  pitilessly  employed,  disposes  of 
the  military  and  economic  resources  of  one  hun- 
dred and  seventy-six  million  people,  occupying  a 
strategic  position  in  the  centre  of  Europe  which  is 
all  to  her  profit.  It  is  this  very  state  of  things, 
founded  on  the  slavery  of  eighty-two  millions  of 
human  beings,  which  is  intolerable. 

in 

Many  times,  and  rightly,  the  Allies  have  de- 
clared that  it  was  not  their  object  to  exterminate 
the  German  people  and  bring  about  their  political 
extinction.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  just  and  es- 
sential to  proclaim  that  Pan-Germany  must  be 
destroyed.  On  this  depends  the  liberty,  not  only 
of  Europe,  but  of  the  whole  world.  This  is  the 
point  of  view  which,  in  the  crisis  of  to-day,  should 
prevail  with  Americans,  for  the  following  reasons. 
Suppose  that  Pan-Germany  were  able  to  maintain 
itself  in  its  present  position.  It  cannot  be  denied 
that  its  territory  contains  considerable  latent  mili- 
tary and  economic  resources,  as  well  as  strategic 

72 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

positions  of  world-significance,  like  the  Darda- 
nelles. If  these  resources  were  freely  exploited 
and  developed  to  their  highest  pitch  by  the  relent- 
less organizing  spirit  of  Berlin,  Prussianized  Pan- 
Germany,  dividing  Europe  in  two,  would  domi- 
nate the  Continent,  uncontestably  and  indefinitely, 
by  means  of  her  crushing  strength.  France,  Rus- 
sia, England,  Italy,  ceasing  to  exist  as  great  pow- 
ers, could  only  submit  to  Germany's  will.  And 
Berlin,  mistress  of  Europe,  would  soon  realize,  not 
merely  the  Hamburg-Bagdad  and  Antwerp-Bag- 
dad railways,  but  the  Brest— Bagdad  line  as  well ; 
for  Brest  has  long  been  coveted  secretly  by  the 
Pan-Germanists,  who  would  make  of  it  the  great 
military  and  commercial  transatlantic  port  of 
Prussianized  Europe. 

Moreover,  if  Germany  achieved  the  ruin  of  the 
Allies,  it  is  entirely  probable  that  the  General 
Staff  of  William  II  would  launch  a  formidable  ex- 
pedition against  the  United  States  without  delay, 
in  order  to  allow  her  no  time  to  organize  herself 
against  the  Prussian  tyranny  hypothetically  dom- 
inating Europe.  Even  if  Berlin  felt  it  necessary 
to  defer  this  step,  Americans  would  none  the  less 
be  forced  to  prepare  for  the  inevitable  struggle  and 
to  serve  an  apprenticeship  to  militarism  which 
would  be  odious  to  them.  If  Americans',  then,  see 
things  as  they  really  are,  and  perceive  the  dangers 
to  which  they  are  pledging  their  future,  they  will 
be  convinced  that  they,  as  much  as  Europeans, 

73 


PA N -GERM A N Y 


have  a  vital  interest  in  the  annihilation  of  Pan- 
Germanism.  In  a  word,  it  is  clear  that  any  peril 
accruing  to  the  United  States  from  Europe  can 
arise  only  from  so  formidable  a  power  as  Pan-Ger- 
many, and  not  from  a  Germany  kept  within  her 
legitimate  frontiers,  and  forced  to  behave  herself, 
by  the  balance  of  other  powers. 

We  must  also  realize  that  the  moral  considera- 
tions at  stake  are  a  matter  of  the  liveliest  interest 
to  the  United  States.  Can  republican  America 
allow  the  feudal  spirit  which  kindled  the  torch  of 
this  war  to  triumph  over  the  world?  This  spirit 
is  made  up  of  the  following  elements :  the  feudal- 
ism of  the  Prussian  Junkers,  chief  prop  and  stay 
of  the  Hohenzollerns;  the  feudalism  of  the  great 
Austrian  land-owners;  the  feudalism  of  the  Mag- 
yar grandees,  whose  caste-spirit  is  precisely  the 
same  as  that  of  the  Prussian  lordlings;  and  the 
Turkish  feudalism  of  Enver  Bey  and  his  friends. 
In  other  words,  this  four-ply  feudal  spirit  which  is 
the  basis  of  Pan-Germany  is  in  radical  and  abso- 
lute opposition  to  the  democratic  spirit  of  the 
modern  world.  Granting  for  a  moment  that  Ger- 
many were  victorious,  Russia,  after  a  frightful 
reign  of  anarchy,  would  be  forced  to  submit  once 
more  to  the  yoke  of  autocracy.  As  for  the  peoples 
of  Western  Europe,  reduced  to  worse  than  slavery, 
they  could  only  renounce  their  dearest  ideals  - 
the  ideals  for  which  they  have  shed  their  blood  for 
centuries. 

74 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

The  present  war,  then,  is  manifestly  a  struggle 
d,  outrance  between  democracy  and  feudalism.  To 
Americans  as  well  as  to  Europeans  falls  the  task, 
not  only  of  preserving  their  corporeal  independ- 
ence, but  of  saving  our  common  civilization.  This 
can  be  accomplished  only  by  the  destruction  of 
Pan-Germanism. 

It  is  plain  that  Berlin,  failing  so  far  to  crush  the 
Allies  completely,  is  bending  every  effort  to  main- 
taining Pan-Germany  in  its  present  position,  so 
that,  after  peace  is  declared,  it  may  crystallize  and 
swiftly  develop  its  full  power.  When,  in  Decem- 
ber, 1916,  President  Wilson  requested  the  bellig- 
erents to  make  known  the  causes  for  which  they 
were  fighting,  the  government  of  Berlin  issued  no 
definite  statement.  The  reason  for  this  attitude 
is  plain.  If  Berlin  still  hopes  to  enforce  her  out- 
rageous pretensions  by  her  immense  military 
power,  she  cannot  possibly  put  down  her  terms  in 
black  and  white,  in  a  document  subject  to  general 
perusal,  without  instantly  calling  down  on  her 
head  the  blazing  reprobation  of  the  civilized 
world. 

The  Allies,  on  the  contrary,  replied  to  Mr.  Wil- 
son's question  easily  and  with  precision. 

The  universal  attention  drawn  to  this  reply 
has  entailed  advantages  and  disadvantages.  By 
the  very  nature  of  things,  the  Allies  definitely  an- 
nounced that  the  smaller  nationalities  in  Turkey, 
Austria-Hungary,  and  the  Balkans  must  be  set 

75 


PA  N  -  GERM A N Y 


free,  thus  implying  a  radical  opposition  to  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  idea.  This  has  enabled 
Berlin,  for  one  thing,  to  bind  her  accomplices  at 
Vienna,  Budapest,  Sofia,  and  Constantinople  more 
closely,  if  possible,  to  her  cause,  and  also  to  gal- 
vanize for  a  still  longer  period  the  forces  of  the 
German  people,  who  are  resolved  to  endure  the 
bitterest  suffering  in  order  to  insure,  after  peace 
comes,  the  immense  advantages  accruing  from 
the  fait  accompli  of  Pan-Germanism. 

By  way  of  compensation  for  this,  the  publicity 
given  the  reply  of  the  Allies  has  accomplished 
two  excellent  ends.  First  of  all,  it  has  permitted 
every  one  to  see  that  the  common  purpose  of  the 
Allies  is  to  solve  the  Central  European  problem, 
which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  not  only  of  European, 
but  of  universal  interest,  since  such  a  solution 
puts  a  quietus  on  German  dreams  of  world-dom- 
ination. This  publicity,  too,  has  made  it  possible 
to  compare  the  principles  invoked  by  the  Allies  in 
their  peace-terms  with  those  of  President  Wilson, 
proclaimed  in  his  message  to  the  Senate  on  Janu- 
ary 22,  1917,  and  to  establish  the  fact  that  these 
principles  are  identical. 

IV 

The  reason  for  this  harmonious  point  of  view 
lies  in  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of  nationality 
by  the  Allies  and  by  President  Wilson  as  the  fun- 
damental basis  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  Eu- 

76 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

rope  of  to-morrow.  Because  of  this  point  in  com- 
mon, it  is  evident  that  the  war  measures  of  the 
Allies  and  the  pacific  endeavors  of  Mr.  Wilson 
have  in  view  the  same  general  geographic  solu- 
tions of  the  problem  of  organizing  Europe  on  the 
lines  of  a  durable  peace.  This  is  a  fact  of  the  ut- 
most importance,  as  I  tried  to  show  with  the  aid 
of  maps  in  an  article  in  L1  Illustration,  of  Febru- 
ary 27,  1917.  Allies  and  Americans,  then,  may 
join  hands  and  press  resolutely  ahead,  —  especi- 
ally since  the  Russian  Revolution  has  come  to 
pass,  —  for,  with  a  common  ideal,  their  general 
practical  solutions  for  meeting  this  formidable 
crisis  cannot  but  be  identical. 

In  order  to  understand  fully  the  seriousness  of 
the  situation,  one  must  distinguish  clearly  be- 
tween the  moral  position  of  the  Allies  and  the 
strategic  positions  of  the  two  groups  of  belliger- 
ents. The  moral  position  of  the  Allies  is  excellent. 
After  Washington  and  Peking  broke  with  Berlin, 
and  especially  after  the  magnificent  revolution 
in  Russia,  after  Bagdad  fell  and  a  fraction  of  the 
invaded  French  territory  was  won  back,  the 
spirit  of  the  Allies  was  all  that  could  be  desired. 
But  even  while  recognizing  the  excellence  of  this 
moral  strength  and  its  potentialities  of  success, 
we  must  first  of  all  consider  the  general  strategic 
situation.  The  events  of  this  war  have  plainly 
shown  that,  unfortunately,  brute  force  in  the 
service  of  the  lowest  passions  can  prevail  over 

77 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


the  holiest  rights,  the  purest  aspirations.  Since 
August,  1914,  incontestable  rights  have  been  vio- 
lated, and  noble  nations  martyrized. 

Let  us  face  the  cruel  truth  and  say:  the  Allies 
may  yet  be  completely  vanquished  if  certain  de- 
velopments come  about,  or  if  new  strategic  mis- 
takes are  added  to  those  portentous  ones  which 
nearly  lost  them  the  fight,  in  spite  of  the  righteous- 
ness of  their  cause  and  their  immense,  if  badly  em- 
ployed, latent  resources.  If  we  wish,  then,  really 
to  understand  the  crisis  of  to-day  and  the  mighty 
peril  which  still  menaces  the  world's  liberty,  we 
must  not  shrink  from  meeting  the  realities  of  the 
military  situation.  We  must  be  ready  to  face  the 
most  serious  developments  that  can  be  conceived. 
Such  an  attitude  implies,  not  pessimism,  but  that 
readiness  for  the  worst  which  lies  at  the  root  of 
military  wisdom. 

Let  us  now  accept  the  following  facts.  The 
troops  of  France  are  beginning  to  be  exhausted. 
The  iniquitous  administration  of  the  Tsar  had 
seriously  compromised  the  provisioning  of  the 
Russian  army  with  food  and  munitions.  In  that 
vast  country,  where  conditions  were  ripe  for  ideal- 
istic extremists  to  guide  the  revolution  toward 
pacifism  or  anarchy,  there  are  alarming  symp- 
toms of  the  prevalence  of  the  latter  condition. 
The  swarming  agents  of  Germany  are  working 
there  without  respite.  If  their  efforts  shall  finally 
succeed,  the  strength  of  Russia  will  swiftly  dis- 

78 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

solve.  This  would  practically  insure  a  German 
victory,  for,  with  the  Russian  armies  demoralized, 
all  the  forces  of  Pan-Germany  could  be  flung 
against  the  Franco- British  front.  Moreover,  if, 
from  the  moral  standpoint,  the  Berlin  govern- 
ment is  universally  to  be  despised,  the  same  can- 
not be  said  about  her  general  technical  military 
ability,  whose  elements  are  as  follows. 

Berlin  is  incontestably  mistress  of  Pan-Ger- 
many —  that  is,  she  has  absolute  disposal  of  vast 
resources  in  men  and  in  the  manifold  products  of 
a  great  territory  with  a  population  of  one  hun- 
dred and  seventy-six  millions.  The  Kaiser's 
Great  General  Staff,  whose  intellectual  resource- 
fulness cannot  be  questioned,  is  quick  to  make  the 
most  of  every  lesson  taught  by  the  war.  The 
annual  levies  of  men  from  the  various  territories 
of  Pan-Germany  certainly  outnumber  the  losses 
sustained  each  year  by  her  troops.  It  is  therefore, 
in  my  opinion,  a  grave  error  to  assume,  as  the 
Allies  have  done,  that  the  Germans  can  be  beaten 
by  mere  attrition  of  their  forces.  By  organizing 
under  one  uniform  system  the  soldiery  furnished 
by  the  many  different  countries  of  Pan-Germany, 
Prussian  militarism  has  unquestionably  given  its 
troops  a  cohesion  and  a  unity  unknown  to  the 
vassal -allies  of  Germany  before  the  war.  This 
state  of  affairs  has  undoubtedly  added  to  the 
military  effectiveness  of  the  vast  armies  which 
take  their  orders  from  Berlin. 

79 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


The  German  military  authorities  most  advan- 
tageously employed  the  respites  given  them  by 
the  strategic  errors  of  the  Allies.  Never  have  the 
broad  lines  of  trenches,  the  far-flung  battle  fron- 
tiers, been  more  powerfully  guarded  than  now. 
Never  have  the  Germans  had  more  abundant 
stores  of  munitions.  Never  has  the  network  of 
railways  covering  the  length  and  breadth  of  Pan- 
Germany  been  so  complete.  Never  has  the  Great 
General  Staff,  making  full  use  of  its  central  posi- 
tion, been  better  able  to  concentrate  on  any  front 
with  lightning  speed.  For  these  reasons,  it  is  my 
opinion  that  we  may  safely  say  that  never  before 
has  the  Berlin  government,  from  a  military  point 
of  view,  been  so  strong.  The  various  statistics 
which  justify  such  a  conclusion  are,  I  think,  to  be 
relied  on.  Even  supposing  them  to  be  exaggerat- 
ed, it  is  much  better  to  run  the  risk  of  overesti- 
mating the  enemy's  strength  than  to  underesti- 
mate it.  Many  of  the  Allies'  mistakes  sprang  from 
neglect  of  this  axiom. 


CHAPTER  V 
MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


AS  a  prelude  to  the  further  consideration  of  cer- 
tain aspects  of  the  world-war,  I  should  like,  if  I 
may,  to  quote  a  few  paragraphs  which  I  printed 
early  last  summer,  by  way  of  forecast,  and  which 
events  have  not  wholly  belied. 

Let  us  now  attempt  to  forecast  the  German 
military  plans  for  1917.  For  some  weeks  persist- 
ent reports  have  been  telling  of  their  tremendous 
preparations  for  hurling  an  offensive  against  the 
Russian  front.  As  for  the  Franco- British  front  in 
the  West,  it  was  stated  that  the  General  Staff  at 
Berlin  would  be  glad  to  hold  things  stationary  on 
that  side  until,  after  winning  the  victory  on  which 
they  count  in  the  East,  they  are  free  to  devote 
their  attentions  to  the  occidental  theatre.  This 
project,  of  course,  cannot  be  confirmed;  but  the 
voluntary  shortening  of  the  western  line  by  the 
Germans  would  lend  color  to  its  probability. 
Moreover,  such  a  plan  would  coincide  perfectly 
with  the  present  interests  of  Berlin,  with  the 
habitual  methods  of  the  Kaiser's  General  Staff, 
with  the  broad  Pan-Germanist  scheme,  and  with 
the  personal  preferences  of  Marshal  von  Hin- 

81 


PA  N  -GERM  A  NY 


denburg.  It  is  natural  also  that  the  Germans 
should  avail  themselves  of  the  sinister  and  undeni- 
able effects  of  the  Russian  imperial  administra- 
tion on  the  army  and  civil  population  of  the  coun- 
try before  the  new  government  at  Petrograd  has 
time  to  repair  the  all-too-abundant  harm  that 
has  been  wrought. 

We  must  cherish  no  illusions.  As  long  as  it  can 
dispose  of  the  vast  resources  of  Pan-Germany, 
which,  to  my  thinking,  are  still  taken  too  lightly 
by  the  Allies;  while  the  results  of  the  Russian 
Revolution  are  still  uncertain ;  while  the  reorgani- 
zation of  the  Muscovite  armies  still  remains  un- 
completed, the  government  at  Berlin,  in  spite  of 
its  serious  problems  connected  with  the  food- 
supply,  is  still  convinced  that  it  can  win  a  decisive 
military  victory  by  dealing  with  its  adversaries 
one  by  one.  And  so  we  should  foresee  that  the 
German  General  Staff  will  meet  its  problems  in 
succession. 

It  seems  probable,  then,  that  it  will  follow  the 
basic  principles  of  warfare  and  concentrate  all  the 
forces  at  its  disposal  against  the  weakest  front. 
This,  without  question,  is  the  Roumano- Russian 
line.  Its  great  extent,  together  with  the  formid- 
able development  of  the  German  railway  system, 
—  infinitely  superior  to  that  of  the  Russians,— 
makes  it  easier  to  introduce  the  element  of  surprise, 
which  is  of  capital  importance  for  swift,  decisive 
victory.  The  Russians,  too,  are  certainly  less  well 

82 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

provided  with  munitions  of  war  than  the  Franco- 
British  troops;  and  the  Germans  have  succeeded 
in  further  weakening  them  by  means  of  the  ter- 
rible explosions  recently  engineered  by  their  spies 
at  Archangel.  As  a  result  of  the  execrable  ad- 
ministration of  the  former  government,  the  food 
situation  in  Russia  is  most  critical,  while  the  rev- 
olutionists are  not  yet  sure  of  the  reorganization 
of  the  military  forces.  The  Germans,  therefore, 
have  an  unquestionable  interest  in  profiting  with- 
out delay  by  this  state  of  affairs. 

A  vigorous  offensive  on  the  Eastern  front  is 
also  in  harmony  with  the  Pangermanist  plan, 
which  for  twenty-five  years  has  looked  forward  to 
the  seizure  by  Germany  of  Riga,  Little  Russia, 
and  Odessa.  And  a  German  success  in  the  south 
of  Russia  would  be  big  with  economic,  naval, 
military,  and  moral  consequences  of  world-im- 
port. The  Germans  would  become  masters  of  the 
rich  and  boundless  wheat-lands  of  Little  Russia, 
which,  from  the  midst  of  their  food-problems, 
they  watch  with  greedy  eyes.  The  capture  of 
Odessa  and  the  complete  conquest  of  the  Black 
Sea,  by  means  of  transports  (sent  in  large  num- 
bers down  the  Danube,  thus  permitting  surprise 
attacks  at  vital  points),  would  end  in  the  loss  of 
the  Crimea  and,  probably,  the  fall  of  the  Caucasus 
into  the  hands  of  the  Turco-Germans.  The  Brit- 
ish, then,  could  no  longer  hold  out  at  Bagdad. 
Freed  by  such  successes  from  all  immediate  fear 

83 


PA N -GERM A N Y 


of  Russia,  the  Germans  could  then  turn  in  enor- 
mous strength  against  the  Balkan  front  of  the 
Allies.  Under  these  hypothetical  conditions,  one 
may  assume  that  the  Allied  army  north  of  Salon- 
iki,  demoralized  by  the  Russian  reverses,  would 
be  taken  prisoners  or  driven  into  the  sea. 

These  various  operations  in  the  East  vigorous- 
ly taken  in  hand,  as  the  General  Staff  at  Ber- 
lin knows  so  well  how  to  do,  would  require  four  or 
five  months  for  their  execution.  This  interval  of 
time,  combined  with  the  depressing  moral  effect 
brought  about  by  the  supposed  German  victories, 
would  act,  as  it  were,  as  an  automatic  preparation 
for  the  final  Teutonic  offensive  on  the  Western 
front.  It  must  be  remembered  that  during  these 
four  or  five  months  the  submarine  warfare,  pur- 
sued more  and  more  ruthlessly,  would  consider- 
ably impede  neutral  navigation  and  decimate  the 
tonnage  of  the  Franco- British  merchant  marine. 
The  food-problems  and  the  war-expenditure  of  the 
Allies  would  be  enormously  increased.  Even  if 
their  pressure  has  forced  the  Kaiser  to  evacuate 
a  considerable  portion  of  France  and  Belgium, 
the  importance  of  this  retreat  would  be  only  rela- 
tive, for  it  would  be  temporary.  Following  our 
hypothesis,  then,  if  Russia  were  beaten,  the  army 
of  Saloniki  driven  into  the  sea,  and  the  food  crisis 
in  the  West  intensified,  the  moral  depression  and 
discouragement  among  the  soldiers  and  civilians 
of  France  would  be  most  profound.  Under  the 

84 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

given  material  and  psychological  conditions,  the 
concentration  of  all  the  Pan-German  forces  on 
the  Western  front  would  probably  permit  them  to 
break  through.  This  would  spell  ruin  for  France 
and  for  England  as  well,  and  assure  that  decisive 
German  victory  which  would  mean  the  mastery  of 
Europe. 

If  this  theoretical  German  plan  is  to  be  accom- 
plished in  1917,  however,  the  general  technical 
situation  in  Europe  must  remain  much  as  it  stands 
at  present.  No  new  power  capable  of  making  it- 
self felt  on  the  battle-field  must  come  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  Allies.  It  is  necessary,  then,  that  the 
scheme  be  carried  out  in  1917,  before  the  Russian 
Revolution,  which  is  essentially  favorable  to  the 
Allies,  has  time  to  repair  the  damage  done  by  the 
former  regime,  and  before  the  United  States, 
realizing  that  it  is  to  their  vital  interest  to  take 
part  directly  and  without  delay  in  the  war  on  the 
Continent,  are  ready  to  do  so  effectively. 

The  tactics  of  Berlin,  after  being  forced  to  a 
diplomatic  rupture  with  Washington,  consist  in 
doing  everything  to  avoid  actual  blows  with  the 
United  States,  while  keeping  up  a  vigorous  sub- 
marine campaign,  and  in  making  frantic  efforts 
to  effect  a  miscarriage  of  American  military  pre- 
paration —  especially  as  regards  sending  rein- 
forcements to  Europe.  In  pursuance  of  this 
scheme,  Berlin  instructed  Vienna  to  send  Wash- 
ington a  dilatory  answer  concerning  submarine 

85 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


warfare,  in  order  to  avoid  a  diplomatic  break  and 
thus  gain  time.  This  procedure  was  specifically 
intended  to  make  America  believe  that  Austro- 
Hungary  can  act  independently  of  Germany. 
And  so,  by  virtue  of  this  delusion,  William  II  veils 
the  existence  of  that  Pan-Germany  whose  reality, 
for  the  sake  of  his  plans,  must  not  be  revealed 
until  the  latest  possible  moment. 

II 

If  the  programme  for  1917,  which  we  have  good 
reason  to  attribute  to  the  Germans,  were  sub- 
stantially carried  out  (and,  after  all,  this  is  not 
impossible),  in  six  to  eight  months  the  United 
States  would  find  themselves  face  to  face  with 
a  Germany  controlling  the  resources,  not  only  of 
the  present-day  Pan-Germany,  but  of  all  Europe. 
And,  Americans,  do  not  think  your  turn  would  be 
long  in  coming.  Do  not  take  it  for  granted  that 
the  German  people,  worn  out  by  the  endless  hor- 
rors of  war,  would  cry  to  their  masters,  '  Peace  at 
any  price ! '  The  German  people,  as  I  know  them, 
filled  with  enthusiasm  by  a  victory  that  would  be 
without  parallel  in  the  history  of  the  world,  mad- 
dened by  incalculable  plunder,  would  follow  the 
lead  of  their  Emperor  more  blindly  than  ever. 
The  pride  and  ambition  of  the  Kaiser  and  his 
General  Staff  are  so  prodigious  that,  unless  all 
signs  fail,  they  would^give  the  United  States  no 
chance  to  organize  against  a  Prussianized  Europe. 

86 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

In  eight  or  ten  months,  after  new  advances  had 
been  made  to  Japan,  who  would  be  isolated  by  the 
defeat  of  her  allies  in  Europe,  and  with  the  aid 
of  the  German- Mexicans  and  German- Americans 
whose  mission,  as  every  one  knows,  is  to  paralyze 
by  every  possible  means  the  military  organization 
of  the  United  States,  it  would  be  possible  to  look 
for  ruthless  action  against  America  by  the  Pan 
germanized  forces  of  Europe. 

The  prediction  of  such  extraordinary  eventuali- 
ties will  no  doubt  seem  fantastic  and  improbable 
to  many  of  my  American  readers.  I  beg  them, 
nevertheless,  to  consider  them  seriously.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  if  we  consider  all  that  has  been 
achieved  by  the  Germans  since  August,  1914,  the 
events  which  I  have  forecast  are  much  less  amaz- 
ing than  those  indicated  by  me  in  1901,  when,  in 
my  book  V Europe  et  la  Question  d'Autriche  au 
Seuil  du  XXe  Si&cle,  I  unmasked  the  Pan-Ger- 
man plot,  which  was  then  looked  on  as  a  mere 
phantasmagoria  —  although  as  a  matter  of  fact 
it  was  so  real  that  it  now  stands  almost  completely 
fulfilled. 

You  Americans,  then,  should  learn  your  lesson 
from  the  past.  Your  own  best  interest  lays  on 
you  the  obligation  to  face  facts  which  may  at 
present  seem  improbable,  and  to  prepare  your- 
selves without  losing  a  day  for  meeting  the  grav- 
est perils.  As  the  situation  now  stands,  a  delay 
in  making  a  decision  may  involve  disastrous  re- 

87 


PA  N  -  GERM  A N Y 


suits.  For  instance,  the  three  weeks  of  parleying 
indulged  in  by  the  Allies  before  deciding  to  send 
troops  to  Serbia  were  of  the  utmost  significance. 
Those  three  lost  weeks  simply  prevented  the 
Allies  from  achieving  victory,  and  resulted  in  an 
unthinkable  prolongation  of  the  war. 

The  surest,  the  most  economical  way  for  Amer- 
icans to  avoid  excessive  risks  is  to  prepare  at  once 
for  the  severest  kind  of  struggle,  on  the  hypothe- 
sis that  the  Allies  may  sustain  grave  reverses. 
Everything  favors  concerted  action  by  the  United 
States  and  the  Allies.  Their  material  and  moral 
interests  are  identical,  and,  in  doing  away  with 
autocracy,  Russia  removed  the  well- justified  dis- 
trust felt  in  the  United  States  for  the  land  of  the 
Tsars.  As  we  have  seen,  a  German  victory  over 
Russia,  involving  the  fall  of  Saloniki  and,  later, 
the  breaking  of  the  Western  front,  would  be  un- 
questionably the  most  dangerous  eventuality 
imaginable  for  the  future  security  of  the  United 
States.  American  interest  therefore  demands, 
not  only  that  support  should  be  given  France 
and  Great  Britain,  but  that  the  United  States 
should  hasten  to  help  the  Russians,  who  will  prob- 
ably be  called  on  first  to  meet  the  onslaught. 

On  reflection,  perhaps,  Americans  may  even 
find  it  worth  while  to  give  further  thought  to  an 
idea  which,  a  few  months  ago,  would  have  seemed 
preposterous  to  them.  Since  President  Wilson 
cherishes  the  ideal  of  the  brotherhood  of  nations, 

88 


THE    DISEASE     AND     CURE 

-a  noble  conception,  but  one  which  can  be 
realized  only  after  Prussian  militarism  is  ground 
in  the  dust,  after  the  Hapsburgs  and  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  have  gone  the  way  of  the  Romanoffs,  — 
why  should  not  this  world-crisis  provide  an  op- 
portunity for  intimate  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan? 

Even  if  Americans  were  to  admit  the  necessity 
of  so  doing,  it  will  be  long  before  they  are  in  the 
position  to  throw  into  the  European  conflict  those 
reinforcements  which,  by  exercising  a  decisive 
influence,  would  hasten  the  end  of  the  mad 
slaughter.  At  the  present  moment  Japan  alone, 
outside  of  Europe,  has  at  her  disposal  a  trained 
army  capable  of  taking  the  field  at  once.  Every- 
thing considered,  President  Wilson  might  well  de- 
cide that  the  interests  of  humanity  called  for  the 
intervention  of  Japan  in  Europe.  If  he  succeeded 
in  convincing  Tokyo  of  this,  he  would  stand  out 
as  the  great,  decisive  figure  of  the  war.  From  the 
technical  point  of  view,  it  is  certain  that  victory 
for  the  Allies  calls  for  a  simultaneous  concentric 
attack  on  all  the  fronts  of  Pan-Germany.  For 
that  reason,  Japanese  troops  on  the  Russian  line, 
at  Bagdad,  Alexandretta,  and  Saloniki,  would 
furnish  the  Eastern  positions  of  the  Allies  with 
the  supplementary  strength  that  they  need  to 
achieve  decisive  results  and  so  hasten  the  end  of 
the  whole  war. 

Let  me  again  urge  my  point  that  the  line  of 

89 


PA  N  -  GERM A N Y 


action  morally  and  materially  most  profitable  to 
the  United  States  is  that  which,  by  achieving 
the  total  destruction  of  Pan-Germany  and  Prus- 
sian militarism,  will  terminate  the  horrible  car- 
nage once  for  all.  This  is  the  moral  pointed  by  the 
past.  If  the  Allies  had  undertaken  the  Saloniki- 
Belgrade  expedition  in  the  beginning  of  1915,  the 
war  would  have  ended  a  year  ago.  If  you,  Amer- 
icans, had  cast  your  lot  with  us  a  year  ago,  it 
would  be  ending  about  now.  If  you  act  to-day, 
with  all  your  energies,  and  especially  if  you  com- 
pass the  Japanese  intervention,  you  will  save 
the  lives  of  millions  of  men  who,  without  your 
military  and  diplomatic  support,  will  surely  be 
sacrificed. 

The  real  problem  for  America  is  clearly  to  dis- 
cern Pan-Germany  lurking  beneath  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  to  de- 
cide to  strike  this  Pan-Germany  quick  and  hard. 
This  is  the  one  and  only  way  to  foil  the  odious 
Prussian  militarism  which  threatens  the  liberty 
of  the  world. 


CHAPTER  VI 
PAN-GERM  ANY*  s  STRENGTH  AND  WEAKNESS 

IN  April  last,  when  it  was  generally  believed  in 
Paris  that  the  Revolution  at  Petrograd  made  cer- 
tain the  end  of  German  influence  over  the  vast 
former  Empire  of  the  Tsars,  I  wrote  the  study 
referred  to  on  page  81  and  reprinted  here  as 
Chapters  IV  and  V.1  I  then  said,  [In  Russia] 
'Where  conditions  were  ripe  for  idealistic  extrem- 
ists to  guide  the  revolution  toward  pacifism  or 
anarchy,  there  are  alarming  symptoms  of  the 
prevalence  of  the  latter  condition.  The  swarm- 
ing agents  of  Germany  are  working  there  without 
respite.  If  their  efforts  succeed,  the  strength  of 
Russia  will  swiftly  dissolve. ' 

Unhappily,  events  have  justified  this  word  of 
caution  in  only  too  full  measure.  The  efforts  of 
the  Allies  to  reorganize  the  forces  of  Russia  have 
thus  far  met  with  small  success.  It  is  a  task  to 
which  their  duty  and  their  interests  alike  make  it 
imperative  for  them  to  devote  themselves  with 
their  utmost  strength.  But  we  must  cherish  no 
illusions.  The  rebuilding  of  the  forces  of  Russia 
must  inevitably  be  a  long,  arduous,  and  doubt- 
ful undertaking.  It  is  advisable,  therefore,  to 

^ee  Atlantic  Monthly,  June,  1917,  p.  721, 
91 


PA N -  GERM A N Y 


consider,  at  the  same  time,  if  there  is  not  some 
method  of  making  up  for  the  Russian  default  by 
bringing  into  play,  to  further  the  victory  of  the 
Entente,  certain  powerful  forces  which  the  Allies 
have  not  thus  far  even  thought  of  employing. 

Now,  these  forces  and  this  method  do  exist; 
but  in  order  to  enforce  clearly  their  reality,  their 
importance,  and  the  way  to  make  use  of  them,  I 
must,  in  the  first  place,  call  attention  to  a  funda- 
mental and  enduring  error  of  the  Allies,  set  forth 
the  extraordinary  credulity  with  which  they  allow 
themselves  to  be  ensnared  in  the  never-ending  in- 
trigues of  Berlin,  and  describe  the  principal  shifts 
which  Germany  employs,  with  undeniable  clever- 
ness, to  annul  to  an  extraordinary  degree  the  effect 
of  the  Allies'  efforts.  These  essential  causes  of 
mistaken  judgment  being  eliminated,  we  shall  then 
be  able  to  understand  what  the  existing  forces  are 
which  will  enable  the  Entente  to  make  up  with 
comparative  rapidity  for  the  Russian  default,  and 
to  contribute  with  remarkable  efficiency  to  the 
destruction  of  Pan-Germany. 


THE    FUNDAMENTAL   AND    ENDURING    ERROR    OF 
THE    ALLIES 

For  three  years  past  events  have  notoriously 
proved  that  the  concrete  Pangermanist  scheme, 
developed  between  1895  and  1911,  has  been  fol- 

92 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

lowed  strictly  by  the  Germans  since  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities.  Now,  the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente 
is  devised  as  if  there  were  no  Pangermanist 
scheme. 

This  is  the  source  of  all  the  vital  strategical  and 
diplomatic  errors  of  the  Entente  —  consequences 
of  the  failure  to  understand  the  German  military 
and  political  manoeuvring.  Here  is  proof  derived 
from  recent  events  —  one  of  many  which  it  would 
be  possible  to  allege. 

When  it  was  announced  a  few  weeks  ago  that 
Austria  would  play  an  apparently  preponderating 
part  in  the  reconstitution  of  Poland,  a  very  large 
number  of  newspapers  in  the  Entente  countries 
decided  that '  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  the  Aus- 
trian policy  has  carried  the  day  in  Poland.'  A 
similar  deduction  has  led  Allied  readers  to  believe 
that  Vienna  has  prevailed  over  Berlin.  The  re- 
sult has  been  to  strengthen  the  faith  of  those  who 
deem  it  possible  to  impose  terms  on  Berlin  through 
the  channel  of  Vienna,  and  even  to  induce  Austria 
to  conclude  a  separate  peace.  Now,  to  convey 
such  an  impression  as  this  to  Allied  public  opin- 
ion is  to  lead  it  completely  astray.  If  the  Haps- 
burgs  are  playing  an  apparently  predominant 
part  in  Poland  it  is  solely  because  that  part,  as  we 
are  about  to  prove,  is  assigned  to  them  by  the 
Pangermanist  scheme. 

In  the  pamphlet,  Pan-Germany  and  Central 
Europe  about  1950,  published  in  Berlin  in  1895, 

93 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


which  contains  the  whole  Pangermanist  plan,  we 
find  the  following :  - 

'Poland  and  Little  Russia  [the  kingdom  to  be 
established  at  Russia's  expense]  will  agree  to  have 
no  armies  of  their  own,  and  will  receive  in  their 
fortresses  German  or  Austrian  garrisons.  In  Po- 
land, as  well  as  in  Little  Russia,  the  postal  and 
telegraph  services  and  the  railways  will  be  in  Ger- 
man hands. ' 

For  twenty-two  years  the  Pangermanist  scheme 
has  been  followed  up.  Tannenberg,  in  his  book, 
Greater  Germany,  which  appeared  in  1911,  —  a 
work  whose  exceptional  importance  has  been  dem- 
onstrated by  events,  and  which,  in  all  probability, 
was  inspired  officially,  —  prophesies  very  dis- 
tinctly, - 

1  The  new  kingdom  of  Poland  is  made  up  of  the 
former  Russian  portion,  of  the  basin  of  the  Vistula, 
and  of  Galicia,  and  forms  a  part  of  the  new  Austria. ' 

These  most  unequivocal  words  appeared,  it  will 
be  admitted,  three  years  before  the  war.  Now  Le 
Temps  of  September  7,  1917,  said  on  the  authority 
of  the  Polish  agency  at  Berne,  which  is  subsidized 
by  Austria  and  publishes  news  communicated  to 
it  by  the  government  of  Vienna,  — 

'  Germany  would  take  such  portion  of  Russian 
Poland  as  she  needs  to  rectify  her  "strategic 
frontiers:"  This  portion  would  include  almost  a 
tenth  of  Russian  Poland.  The  rest  would  be  an- 
nexed to  Austria.  The  Emperor  Charles  would 

94 


THE    DISEASE     AND     CURE 

thereupon  issue  a  decree  of  annexation  of  Russian 
Poland  to  Galicia,  under  the  title  of  Kingdom  of 
Poland.  .  .  .  The  dual  monarchy  would  then  be- 
come triple,  and  the  first  result  of  this  readjust- 
ment would  be  to  compel  all  Poles  to  undergo  mili- 
tary service  in  the  Austrian  armies.  All  the  dep- 
uties representing  Galicia  would  automatically 
leave  the  Austrian  Reichsrath,  to  enter  the  new 
Polish  Parliament,  which  would  give  the  German 
parties  in  the  Austrian  Parliament  a  certain  ab- 
solute majority/ 

This  result  of  the  present  action  of  Viennp.  and 
Berlin,  foreshadowed  by  the  Temps  apparently 
for  the  near  future,  has  been  in  view  for  twenty- 
two  years.  In  fact,  in  the  fundamental  pamphlet 
of  1895,  already  quoted,  it  is  said  that '  Galicia  and 
the  Bukowina  will  be  excluded  from  the  Austrian 
monarchy.  They  will  form  the  nucleus  of  the  king- 
doms of  Poland  and  Little  Russia  .  .  .  which,  how- 
ever, may  be  united,  by  the  personal  link  of  the 
sovereign,  to  the  reigning  house  of  Hapsburg. ' 

So  it  is  that,  very  far  from  having  forced  any- 
thing on  Germany  in  relation  to  Poland,  Charles  I 
of  Hapsburg  has  shown  that  he  submits  with  do- 
cility to  the  Pangermanist  decrees,  since  he  gives 
his  entire  adh.esion  to  the  carrying  into  effect  of 
the  plan  followed  at  Berlin  from  1895  to  1914  — 
for  nineteen  years  before  hostilities  began!  The 
actual  fact,  therefore,  is  the  direct  antithesis  of 
what  the  .conclusions  of  many  Allied  newspapers 

95 


PA  N  -  GERM A N Y 


have,  of  course  in  absolute  good  faith,  permitted 
their  readers  to  believe.  Now  everything  goes  to 
show  that  this  error  arises  solely  from  a  technical 
ignorance  of  the  Pangermanist  scheme,  of  which 
the  guiding  spirits  of  the  Entente  seem  to  have  no 
more  conception  than  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  Allied  press.  However,  if  they  wish  for  vic- 
tory, the  Allies  must  inevitably  act  in  systematic 
opposition  to  the  Pangermanist  scheme.  They 
cannot  therefore  dispense  with  the  necessity  of 
becoming  thoroughly  familiar  with  it. 

Nor  is  there  any  more  reliable  guide,  since  the 
events  that  have  taken  place  for  three  years  past 
have  demonstrated  the  absolute  accuracy  of  the 
Pangermanist  outgivings  anterior  to  the  war. 
Knowing  what  the  Germans  are  going  to  do,  we 
can  deduce  therefrom  the  best  means  of  opposing 
it.  If  this  method  had  been  followed,  no  serious 
error  would  have  been  committed  by  the  Allies. 
They  would  have  understood  that  Germany  was 
making  war  in  behalf  of  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  enterprise,  —  which  was  intended  to  supply 
her  with  the  instruments  of  world -domination ; 
that,  consequently,  the  Danube  front,  which  the 
Allies  held,  must  be  retained  at  whatever  cost, 
which  would  have  been,  comparatively  speaking, 
very  easy,  if  they  had  recognized  in  time  this  im- 
perative necessity. 

Now,  if  the  Allies  had  retained  their  hold  of  the 
Danube  front,  the  war  would  have  been  over 

96 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

nearly  two  years  ago.  It  is,  in  fact,  solely  because 
they  did  not  grasp  the  necessity  of  thus  holding  it, 
that  the  Germans  have  been  able  to  carry  out 
their  Eastern  plan  and  to  constitute  the  Pan- 
Germany  which  must  now  be  destroyed  in  order 
to  avoid  the  defeat  of  civilization,  and  eventual 
slavery.  To  effect  this  destruction  is  infinitely 
easier  than  is  generally  believed,  on  the  condition 
that  the  most  is  made  of  the  causes  tending  to  the 
internal  dissolution  of  Pan-Germany.  But,  to 
understand  these  available  causes,  familiarity 
with  the  Pangermanist  scheme  is  indispensable. 
It  is  urgently  necessary,  therefore,  to  put  an  end 
to  this  intolerable  condition,  namely,  that,  while 
the  Allies  have  an  extraordinary  opportunity  to 
become  accurately  acquainted  with  the  whole  pro- 
gramme of  procedure  at  Berlin,  as  contained  in  a 
multitude  of  German  documents,  —  that  is  to 
say,  the  real  objects  of  Germany  in  the  war,  — 
while  they  have  this  opportunity,  they  go  on  act- 
ing and  arguing  as  if  that  programme  did  not 
exist.  It  is  this  condition  which  proves  most  clear- 
ly the  extraordinary  and  enduring  credulity  which 
the  Allies  exhibit  in  face  of  the  endless  German 
intrigues. 

II 

THE  CREDULITY  OF  THE  ALLIES 

The  heads  of  the  Allied  governments,  moved 
by  the  best  intentions  but  completely  taken  by 

97 


PA  N  -GERM  A N Y 


surprise  by  the  war,  are  carrying  it  on  far  too 
much  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  procedure 
of  times  of  peace  —  negotiations,  declarations, 
speeches.  Notably  in  the  gigantic  palaver  into 
which  Maximalist  Russia  has  developed,  men 
fancy  that  they  have  acted  when  they  have  talk- 
ed. The  events  of  three  years  of  war  prove  con- 
clusively that  the  Boches,  turning  to  their  profit 
the  predilection  of  the  Allied  leaders  for  verbal 
negotiations  and  manifestations,  —  a  predilection 
complicated  by  ignorance  of  the  Pangermanist 
scheme,  —  have  succeeded  in  nullifying  to  an  ex- 
traordinary degree  the  effect  of  the  sacrifices  of  the 
Entente. 

Until  the  Russian  Revolution,  Berlin  brought 
to  bear  on  the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente  those 
allies  of  Germany  who  were  then  regarded  by  the 
Entente  as  neutrals.  Indeed,  the  declarations  of 
Radoslavoff,  confirmed  by  the  recently  published 
Greek  White  Book,  have  conclusively  established 
the  fact  that  the  agreements  between  Germany, 
Bulgaria,  Turkey,  and  King  Constantine,  in  con- 
templation of  this  war,  antedated  the  opening  of 
hostilities  —  that  certain  ones  of  them  go  back  as 
far  as  April,  1914.  Now,  it  is  known  that  the  En- 
tente diplomacy  had  no  knowledge  of  this  situa- 
tion, and  that  it  allowed  itself  to  be  hoodwinked 
for  three  months  by  the  Turks,  for  thirteen  months 
by  the  Bulgarians,  for  thirty  months  by  the  King 
of  Greece,  the  Kaiser's  brother-in-law,  and  even, 

98 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

to  a  certain  degree,  down  to  a  very  recent  period, 
by  Charles  I  of  Hapsburg,  certain  Allied  diplo- 
matists having  persisted  in  coddling  the  chimera 
of  a  peace  with  Austria  against  Germany. 

Unhappily,  to  solve  the  present  problems, 
which  are,  above  all,  technical,  the  best  intentions, 
or  even  the  most  genuine  natural  intelligence,  are 
insufficient.  It  is  necessary  to  know  how,  and  one 
cannot  know  how  without  having  learned.  The 
Allied  Socialists  who  have  placed  themselves  in 
the  spotlight  have  shown  themselves  to  be,  gen- 
erally speaking,  utopists,  entirely  ignorant  of 
Germany,  of  the  German  mind,  of  geography, 
ethnography,  and  political  economy,  pinning 
their  faith,  before  all  else,  to  formulas,  and  know- 
ing even  less  than  the  official  diplomats  of  the 
technique  of  the  multifold  problems  imposed  by 
war  and  peace.  As  the  anti- Prussian  German, 
Dr.  Rosemeier,  has  stated  it  so  fairly  in  the  New 
York  Times,  these  idealists,  by  reason  of  their 
radical  failure  to  grasp  the  inflexible  facts,  are 
doing  as  much  harm  to  the  world  in  general  as  the 
Russian  extremists  and  their  German  agents. 

It  is  undeniable  that  Berlin  has  found  it  easy 
to  profit  by  the  state  of  mind  of  the  idealistic 
Socialists  of  the  Entente  by  causing  its  own  So- 
cial Democrats  to  put  forth  the  soi-disant l  demo- 
cratic' peace  formulas,  which  for  some  months 
past  have  been  infecting  the  Allied  countries  with 
ideas  that  are  most  pernicious  because  they  are 

99 


PA  N  -  GERM A N Y 


impossible  of  realization.  Despite  the  efforts  of 
realist  Socialists,  men  like  Plekhanoff,  Kropot- 
kin,  Guesde,  Compere-Morel,  Gompers,  and  their 
like,  the  Stockholm  lure,  notwithstanding  its  clum- 
siness, has  helped  powerfully  to  lead  Russia  to 
the  brink  of  the  abyss,  and  hence  to  prolong  the 
war  and  the  sacrifices  of  the  Allies.  In  France 
and  England  a  few  Socialists  have  been  so  gen- 
uinely insane  as  to  say  that  the  occupations  of 
territory  by  Germany  are  of  slight  importance; 
that  we  can  begin  to  think  about  peace ;  that  Ger- 
many is  already  conquered  morally,  and  so  forth. 
In  view  of  such  results,  due  to  the  astounding 
credulity  of  the  idealistic  Socialists  of  the  Entente, 
it  is  quite  natural  that  Germany  should  pursue 
her  so-called  'pacifist'  manoeuvres. 

Late  in  1916,  the  Frankfort  Gazette  advised  its 
readers  of  the  spirit  in  which  these  intrigues  were 
to  be  conducted  by  Berlin.  'The  point  of  view 
is  as  follows:  to  put  forward  precise  demands  in 
the  East,  and  in  the  West  to  negotiate  on  bases 
that  may  be  modified.  Negotiation  is  not  synony- 
mous with  renunciation. ' 

This  last  sentence  summarizes  the  whole  of 
German  tactics.  All  the  proposals  of  Berlin  have 
but  a  single  object:  to  deceive  and  sow  discord 
among  the  Allies  by  means  of  negotiations  which 
would  be  followed  by  non-execution  of  the  terms 
agreed  upon,  Germany  retaining  the  essential 
positions  of  to-day's  war-map  which  would  as- 

100 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

sure  her,  strategically  and  economically,  the  domi- 
nation of  Europe  and  the  world. 

Now,  it  is  an  astounding  fact  that  the  warnings 
given  by  the  Germans  themselves  —  the  occupa- 
tion of  more  than  500,000  square  kilometres  by 
the  Kaiser's  troops,  the  burglarizing  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  by  the  govern- 
ment of  Berlin  —  have  not  yet  availed  to  prevent 
a  considerable  proportion  of  the  Allies  from  con- 
tinuing to  be  enormously  deceived.  At  the  very 
moment  when  the  German  General  Staff  is 
strengthening  the  fortifications  of  Belgium,  es- 
pecially about  Antwerp,  there  are  those  among 
the  Allies  who  seriously  believe  that,  by  opening 
negotiations,  they  will  succeed  in  inducing  Ger- 
many to  evacuate  that  ill-fated  country  and  to  re- 
pair the  immense  damage  that  she  has  inflicted 
on  her. 

There  are  those  who  wonder  what  the  objects 
of  the  war  on  Germany's  part  can  be,  when  the 
occupations  of  territory  by  Germany,  correspond- 
ing exactly  to  the  Pangermanist  scheme  dating 
back  twenty- two  years,  make  these  objects  as 
clear  as  day. 

There  are  those  who  attach  importance  to  such 
declarations  as  the  German  Chancellor  may 
choose  to  make,  when  every  day  that  passes  forces 
us  to  take  note  of  monumental  and  never-ending 
German  lies  and  of  the  unwearying  duplicity  of 
Berlin. 

101 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


There  are  those  who  are  willing  to  listen  to 
talk  about  a  peace  by  negotiation,  when  the  facts 
prove  that  Germany  respects  no  agreement,  that 
a  treaty  signed  by  Berlin  is  of  no  value,  and  that, 
furthermore,  it  is  the  Germans  themselves  who 
so  declare.  At  the  very  outbreak  of  the  war  Maxi- 
milian Harden  said,  'A  single  principle  counts  - 
Force. '  And  the  Frankfort  Gazette  printed  these 
words :  *  Law  has  ceased  to  exist.  Force  alone  reigns, 
and  we  still  have  forces  at  our  disposal. '  To  Mr. 
Gerard,  United  States  Ambassador  to  Germany, 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin  said, 
'  We  snap  our  fingers  at  treaties. ' 

After  such  facts  and  such  declarations,  the 
persistent  credulity  of  a  certain  fraction  of  the 
Allies  is  a  profoundly  distressing  thing,  for  which 
the  remedy  must  be  found  in  a  popular  documen- 
tary propaganda,  thoroughly  and  powerfully  pre- 
pared. 

The  pacifist  German  intrigues  are  manifest 
enough.  We  can  particularize  six  leading  exam- 
ples, employed  by  Berlin,  either  separately  or  in 
combination. 

Ill 

THE  SIX  LEADING  PACIFIST  GERMAN  INTRIGUES 

I.  A  separate  peace  between  Germany  and  one  of 
the  Entente  Allies.    The  Alsace-Lorraine  coup 

It  is  evident  that  the  defection  of  one  of  the 
principal  Allies  would  inevitably  place  all  the 

102 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

others  in  a  situation  infinitely  more  difficult  for 
continuing  the  struggle.  If  we  assume  such  a 
defection,  the  Germans  might  well  hope  to  nego- 
tiate concerning  peace  on  the  basis  of  their  pres- 
ent conquests. 

That  is  why  they  have  multiplied  proposals  for 
a  separate  peace  with  the  Russians.  At  Berlin 
they  are  especially  apprehensive  of  a  continuance 
of  the  war  by  Russia  because  of  the  inexhaustible 
reserves  of  men  possessed  by  the  former  Empire  of 
the  Tsars.  The  time  will  probably  come  when 
they  will  attempt  also  to  lure  Italy  from  the  coali- 
tion by  offering  her  the  Trentino,  and  if  necessary, 
Trieste,  at  Austria's  expense,  this  last-named  ces- 
sion, however,  being  destined,  in  the  German  plan, 
to  be  temporary  only. 

The  desire  to  break  up  the  coalition  at  any 
cost  is  so  intense  among  the  Germans,  that  we 
must  anticipate  that,  at  the  psychological  mo- 
ment, they  will  even  go  so  far  as  to  offer  to  restore 
Alsace-Lorraine  to  France.  As  for  the  sincerity  of 
such  an  offer,  these  words  of  Maximilian  Harden, 
written  early  in  1916,  enable  us  to  estimate  it:  — 

'If  people  think  in  France  that  the  reestab- 
lishment  of  peace  is  possible  only  through  the 
restitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  if  necessity 
compels  us  to  sign  such  a  peace,  the  seventy  millions 
of  Germans  will  soon  tear  it  up. ' 

Moreover,  nothing  would  be  less  difficult  for 
Germany,  thanks  to  the  effective  forces  of  Cen- 

103 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


tral  Pan-Germany,  than  to  seize  Alsace-Lorraine 
again,  very  shortly,  having  given  it  up  momen- 
tarily as  a  tactical  manoeuvre. 

2.  A  separate  peace  between  Turkey,  Bulgaria,  or 
Austria-Hungary,  and  the  Entente 

A  particularly  astute  manoeuvre  on  the  part  of 
Berlin  consists  in  favoring,  under  the  rose,  not 
perhaps  a  formally  executed  separate  peace,  but, 
at  least  (as  has  already  taken  place),  semi-official 
negotiations  for  a  separate  peace  between  her 
own  allies  named  above  and  the  Entente. 

The  particular  profit  of  this  sort  of  manoeuvre 
in  relation  to  the  definitive  consummation  of  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  scheme,  is  readily  seen  if 
we  imagine  the  Allies  signing  a  treaty  of  peace 
with  Turkey,  for  instance.  In  such  a  hypothesis 
the  Allies  could  treat  only  with  the  liegemen  of 
Berlin  at  Constantinople,  for  all  the  other  Turk- 
ish parties  having  any  political  importance  what- 
soever have  been  suppressed.  Now,  if  the  Allies 
should  treat  with  the  Ottoman  government,  reek- 
ing with  the  blood  of  a  million  Armenians,  Greeks, 
and  Arabs,  massacred  en  masse  as  anti-Germans 
and  friends  of  the  Entente,  the  following  results 
would  follow  from  this  negotiation:  the  Entente, 
agreeing  not  to  punish  the  unheard-of  crimes  com- 
mitted in  Turkey,  would  renounce  its  moral  plat- 
form :  it  could  no  longer  claim  to  be  fighting  in  the 
name  of  civilization.  The  Turkish  government, 

104 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

which  is  notoriously  composed  of  assassins,  would 
be  officially  recognized;  and  thus  the  self-same 
group  of  men  who  sold  the  Ottoman  Empire  to 
Germany  would  be  confirmed  in  power  —  the 
group  whose  leader,  Talaat  Pasha,  declared  in  the 
Ottoman  Chamber  in  February,  1917,  4We  are 
allied  to  the  Central  Powers  for  life  and  death!' 
The  control  by  Germany  of  the  Dardanelles,  a 
strategic  position  of  vast  and  world-wide  impor- 
tance, guarded  by  her  accomplices,  would  be  con- 
firmed ;  the  numerous  conventions  signed  at  Ber- 
lin in  January,  1917,  which  effectively  establish 
the  most  unrestricted  German  protectorate  over 
the  whole  of  Turkey,  would  accomplish  their  full 
effect  during  a  Pan-German  peace. 

The  Bulgarian  intrigues  for  a  so-called  separate 
peace  with  the  Allies  have  been  at  least  as  numer- 
ous as  those  of  the  Turks  of  the  same  nature.  In 
reality,  the  Bulgarian  agents  who  were  sent  to 
Switzerland  to  inveigle  certain  semi-official  agents 
of  the  Entente  into  negotiations,  were  there  by 
arrangement  with  Berlin  for  the  purpose  of  sound- 
ing the  Allies,  in  order  to  determine  to  what  de- 
gree they  were  weary  of  the  war.  The  Bulgarians 
have  never  been  really  disposed  to  conclude  peace 
with  the  Entente  based  on  compromise  upon 
equitable  conditions.  They  desire  a  peace  which 
will  assure  them  immense  acquisitions  of  territory 
at  the  expense  of  the  Greeks,  the  Roumanians, 
and,  especially,  the  Serbians,  for  at  Sofia  they 

105 


PA  N-GERM  A  N  Y 


crave,  above  all  things,  direct  geographical  con- 
tact with  Hungary.  Thus  the  great  Allied  Powers 
could  treat  with  the  Bulgarians  only  by  being 
guilty  of  the  monstrous  infamy  of  sacrificing  their 
small  Balkan  allies,  and  of  assenting  to  a  terri- 
torial arrangement  which  would  permit  Bulgaria 
to  continue  to  be  the  Pangermanist  bridge  be- 
tween Hungary  and  Turkey  over  the  dead  body 
of  Serbia  —  an  indispensable  element  in  the  func- 
tioning of  the  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  scheme, 
and  hence  of  Central  Pan-Germany. 

Now,  this  is  precisely  the  one  substantial  re- 
sult of  the  war  to  which  Bulgaria  clings  above  all 
else.  So  it  is  that  a  peace  by  negotiation  —  in 
reality  a  peace  of  lassitude  —  between  the  Allies 
and  Bulgaria,  would  simply  give  sanction  to  this 
state  of  affairs. 

In  the  same  way,  such  a  peace  with  Austria- 
Hungary  could  but  give  definitive  shape  to  the 
Hamburg-Persian  Gulf  scheme.  From  the  finan- 
cial and  military  standpoint,  the  monarchy  of 
the  Hapsburgs,  considered  as  a  state,  is  to-day 
absolutely  subservient  to  Germany.  The  reign- 
ing Hapsburg,  whatever  his  private  sentiments, 
can  no  longer  do  anything  without  the  consent  of 
the  Hohenzollern.  Any  treaty  of  peace  signed  by 
Vienna  would  be,  practically,  only  a  treaty  of 
which  the  conditions  were  authorized  by  Berlin. 
There  must  be  no  illusion.  Nothing  less  than  the 
decisive  victory  of  the  Allies  will  avail  to  make 

106 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Germany  loosen  her  grip  upon  Austria-Hungary, 
for  that  grip  is  to  Germany  the  substantial  result  of 
the  war.  In  truth  it  is  that  grip  which,  by  its 
geographic,  military,  and  economic  consequences, 
assures  Berlin  the  domination  of  the  Balkans,  and 
of  the  East,  hence  of  Central  Pan-Germany,  hence 
of  Hamburg-Persian  Gulf,  and  the  vast  conse- 
quences which  derive  therefrom. 

Let  us  make  up  our  minds,  therefore,  that  all 
the  feelers  toward  a  separate  peace  with  Turkey, 
Bulgaria,  and  Austria-Hungary,  which  have  been 
put  forth  and  which  will  hereafter  be  put  forth, 
have  been  and  will  be  simply  manoeuvres  aimed  at  a 
so-called  peace  by  negotiation,  which  would  cloak, 
not  simply  a  German,  but  a  Pan-German  peace. 

3.  The  democratization  of  Germany 

Certain  Allied  groups  having  apparently  made 
up  their  minds  that  the  *  democratization '  of  Ger- 
many would  suffice  to  put  an  end  automatically 
to  Prussian  militarism  and  to  German  imperial- 
ism, it  was  concluded  at  Berlin  that  a  consider- 
able number,  at  least,  of  their  adversaries,  being 
weary  of  the  war,  might  be  willing  to  content 
themselves  with  a  merely  formal  satisfaction  of 
their  demands,  in  order  to  have  an  ostensibly 
honorable  excuse  for  bringing  it  to  an  end.  That 
is  why,  with  the  aim  of  leading  the  Allies  off  the 
scent  and  inducing  them  to  enter  into  negotia- 
tions, Berlin  devoted  herself  during  the  first  six 

107 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


months  of  1917,  with  increasing  energy,  to  the 
farce  called  'the  democratization  of  Germany.' 
Meanwhile  the  most  bigoted  Pangermanists  put 
the  mute  on  their  demands.  They  ceased  to  utter 
the  words  'annexations'  or  'war-indemnities.' 
They  talked  of  nothing  but  'special  political  ar- 
rangements' -  -  a  phrase  which  in  their  minds  led 
to  the  same  result  but  had  the  advantage  of  not 
embarrassing  the  peace-at-any-price  men  in  the 
Allied  countries.  The  device  of  democratization 
of  Germany  was  complementary  to  the  Stock- 
holm trick,  which,  as  we  know,  was  intended  to 
convince  the  Russian  Socialists  that  Russia  had 
no  further  advantage  to  expect  from  continuing 
the  war,  since  Germany  in  her  turn,  was  about  to 
enter  in  all  seriousness  upon  the  path  of  democ- 
racy —  and  so  forth. 

We  must  acknowledge  that  many  among  the 
Allied  peoples  allowed  themselves  to  be  ensnared 
for  the  moment  by  this  manoeuvre,  and  honestly 
believed  that  Germany  was  about  to  reform,  of 
her  own  motion  and  radically.  But  when  the 
German  tactics  had  achieved  the  immense  result 
of  setting  anarchy  loose  in  Russia,  —  a  state  of 
affairs  which  was  instantly  made  the  most  of  in  a 
military  sense  by  the  Staff  at  Berlin,  —  the  farce 
of  the  democratization  of  Germany  was  aban- 
doned. Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  was  sacrificed  to 
the  necessity  of  dropping  a  scheme  which  he  had 
managed,  and  Michaelis  —  Hindenburg's  man, 

108 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

and  therefore  the  man  of  the  Prussian  military 
party  and  of  the  Pangermanists —  succeeded  him. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Germans  have,  for  all 
time,  had  such  an  inveterate  penchant  for  rapine 
that  they  are  quite  capable  of  setting  up  a  great 
military  republic  and  submitting  readily  enough 
to  Prussian  discipline,  with  a  view  to  starting 
afresh  upon  wars  for  plunder. 

We  must  bear  this  truth  constantly  in  mind: 
if  the  Hohenzollerns  have  succeeded,  in  accord- 
ance with  Mirabeau's  epigram,  in  making  war 
'the  national  industry/  it  is  because,  ever  since 
the  dawn  of  history,  the  Germans  have  always 
subordinated  everything  to  their  passion  for  lu- 
crative wars.  The  same  is  true  of  them  to-day. 
Especially  in  the  last  twenty  years  the  secret 
propaganda  of  the  Berlin  government  has  con- 
vinced the  masses  that  the  creation  of  Pan-Ger- 
many will  assure  them  immense  material  benefits. 
It  is  because  this  conviction  is  so  firmly  rooted 
among  them  that  substantially  the  entire  body 
of  Socialist  workingmen  are  serving  their  Kaiser 
without  flinching,  and  are  willing  to  endure  the 
horrors  of  the  present  conflict  so  long  as  it  may 
be  necessary  and  so  long  as  they  are  not  conquered 
in  the  field. 

4.  Peace  through  the  International 

This  is  another  of  the  tricks  conceived  at  Ber- 
lin. In  reality  the  .International,  having  always 

109 


PA  N-GERM A  N  Y 


followed  the  direction  of  the  German  Marxists, 
has  been  the  chief  means  employed  for  thirty 
years  to  deceive  the  Socialists  of  the  countries  now 
in  alliance  against  Germany  by  inducing  them 
to  believe  that  war,  thanks  to  the  International 
alone,  could  never  again  break  out.  In  a  report 
on  'the  international  relations  of  the  German 
workingmen's  unions'  (1914),  the  Imperial  Bu- 
reau of  Statistics  was  able  to  proclaim  as  an  un- 
deniable truth: '  In  all  the  international  organiza- 
tions German  influence  predominates. ' 

The  conference  at  Stockholm,  initiated  by  Ger- 
man agents,  and  that  at  Berne,  upon  which  they 
are  now  at  work,  are  steps  which  German  union- 
ism is  taking  to  reestablish  over  the  workingmen 
of  all  lands  the  German  influence,  which  has  van- 
ished since  the  war  began.  The  idea  now  is  to 
force  the  proletariat  of  the  whole  world  into  sub- 
jection to  the  guiding  hand  of  Germany.  The  ob- 
ject officially  avowed  is  to  rehabilitate  the  Inter- 
national in  the  interest  of  democracy.  In  reality, 
it  is  proposed,  above  all  else,  to  replace  in  the  front 
rank  the  struggle  between  classes  in  the  Allied 
countries,  in  order  to  destroy  the  sacred  unity 
that  is  indispensable  to  enable  the  most  divergent 
parties  to  wage  war  vigorously  against  Panger- 
manist  Germany.  As  the  Berlin  government  is 
well  aware  that  it  has  nothing  to  fear  from  its  own 
Socialists,  the  vast  majority  of  whom,  even  when 
they  disown  the  title  of  Pangermanists,  are  parti- 

110 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

sans  of  Central  Pan-Germany,  the  profit  of  the 
manoeuvre  based  on  the  International  would  in- 
ure entirely  to  Germany,  who  would  retain  her 
power  of  moral  resistance  unimpaired,  while  the 
Allied  states,  once  more  in  the  grip  of  the  bitterest 
social  discord,  would  find  their  offensive  powers 
so  diminished  by  this  means  that  peace  would  in 
the  end  be  negotiated  on  the  basis  of  the  present 
territorial  occupations  of  Germany. 

5.  The  armistice  trick 

All  the  schemes  hitherto  discussed,  whether 
employed  singly  or  in  combination,  are  intended, 
first  and  last,  to  assist  in  playing  the  armistice 
trick  on  the  Allies.  This  is  based  upon  an  astute 
calculation,  still  founded  on  the  weariness  of  the 
combatants,  which  is  so  easily  understood  after 
a  war  as  exhausting  as  that  now  in  progress.  At 
Berlin  they  reason  thus  —  and  the  reasoning  is 
not  without  force: '  If  an  armistice  is  agreed  upon, 
the  Allied  troops  will  say,  "They're  talking,  so 
peace  is  coming,  and,  before  long,  demobiliza- 
tion." Under  these  conditions  our  adversaries 
will  undergo  a  relaxation  of  their  moral  fibre. ' 

The  Germans  would  ask  nothing  more.  They 
would  enter  upon  peace  negotiations  with  the  fol- 
lowing astute  idea.  If,  hypothetically,  the  Allies 
should  make  the  enormous  blunder  of  discussing 
terms  of  peace  on  bases  so  craftily  devised,  Ger- 
many, being  still  intrenched  behind  her  fronts 

in 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


which  had  been  made  almost  impregnable,  would 
end  by  saying, '  I  am  not  in  accord  with  you.  After 
all  is  said,  you  cannot  demand  that  I  evacuate 
territory  from  which  you  are  powerless  to  expel 
me.  If  you  are  not  satisfied,  go  on  with  the  war/ 
Inasmuch  as,  during  the  negotiations,  every- 
thing essential  would  have  been  done  by  German 
agents  to  accentuate  the  moral  relaxation  of  the 
country  which  was  most  exhausted  by  the  conflict, 
as  they  succeeded  in  doing  in  Russia  in  the  first 
months  of  the  Revolution,  the  immense  military 
machine  of  the  Entente  could  not  again  be  set  in 
motion  in  all  its  parts.  The  result  would  be  the 
breaking  asunder  of  the  anti-German  coalition, 
and,  finally,  the  conclusion  of  peace  substantially 
on  the  basis  of  existing  conquests.  Thus  Berlin's 
object  would  be  attained. 

6.  The  'status  quo  ante1  trick 

The  last  of  the  German  schemes,  and  the  most 
dangerous  of  all,  is  that  concealed  under  the  for- 
mula, '  No  annexations  or  indemnities '  —  a  for- 
midable trap,  which,  as  I  have  pointed  out  in 
earlier  chapters,  has  for  its  object  to  confirm 
Germany  in  the  possession  of  the  gigantic  advan- 
tages which  she  has  derived  from  the  war,  and 
which  would  assure  her  the  domination  of  the 
world,  leaving  the  Allies  with  their  huge  war- 
losses,  whose  inevitable  economic  after-effects 
would  suffice  to  reduce  them  to  a  state  of  absolute 
servitude  with  respect  to  Berlin, 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  BEST  WAY  TO  CRUSH  PAN-GERMANY 
i 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  VASSALS  OF  BERLIN 

IN  the  wholly  novel  plan  which  I  am  about  to 
set  forth,  the  United  States  may  play  a  prepon- 
derating and  decisive  part;  but  by  way  of  pre- 
amble I  must  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
United  States  is  not,  in  my  judgment,  as  I  write 
these  lines,  in  a  position  to  give  its  full  effective 
assistance  in  the  conflict,  because  it  is  not  officially 
and  wholeheartedly  at  war  with  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  —  states  in  thrall  to 
Berlin  and  constituent  parts  of  Pan-Germany. 
This  situation  is,  I  am  fully  convinced,  unfavor- 
able to  the  interests  of  the  Allies,  and  it  paralyzes 
American  action,  for  these  reasons. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Germany  can  no  longer 
carry  on  the  war  against  the  Entente  save  by 
virtue  of  the  troops  and  resources  which  are 
placed  at  her  disposal  by  Austria-Hungary,  Bul- 
garia, and  Turkey.  If  the  Allies  wish  to  conquer 
Germany,  their  chief  adversary,  it  is  necessary 
that  they  understand  that  they  must  first  of  all 
deprive  Prussian  militarism  of  the  support  — 
apparently  secondary,  but  really  essential  — 

113 


PA  N-GER  M  A  N  Y 


which  it  receives  from  its  allied  vassals.  It  is, 
furthermore,  eminently  desirable  that  it  should  be 
recognized  in  the  United  States  that  Turkish, 
Bulgar,  Magyar,  and  Austrian  imperialism  are 
bases  of  Prussian  imperialism,  and  that  in  order 
to  establish  a  lasting  peace,  the  disappearance  of 
these  secondary  imperialisms  is  as  necessary  as 
that  of  Prussian  imperialism  itself.  Moreover, 
the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and 
Turkey  are  not  officially  at  war  with  the  United 
States  enables  Berlin  to  maintain  connections  in 
America  of  which  we  may  be  sure  that  she  avails 
herself  to  the  utmost. 

This  situation  is  propitious  also  for  that  Ger- 
man manoeuvre  which  consists  in  making  people 
think  that  a  separate  peace  is  possible  between 
Turkey,  or  Bulgaria,  or  Austria-Hungary  on  the 
one  side  and  the  powers  of  the  Entente  on  the 
other.  However,  as  the  game  to  be  played  is  com- 
plicated and  difficult,  good  sense  suggests  that  we 
proceed  from  the  simple  to  the  complex,  and 
hence  that  we  strike  the  enemy  first  of  all  in  his 
most  vulnerable  part.  Now,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is 
mainly  in  the  territory  of  the  three  vassals  of 
Germany  that  the  new  plan  which  I  am  about  to 
set  forth  can  be  carried  out  in  the  first  instance, 
without,  however,  causing  any  prejudice — far, 
far  from  it,  —  to  the  invaluable  assistance  which 
the  Americans  are  preparing  to  bring  to  the  Allies 
on  the  Western  front.  For  all  these  reasons,  it 

114 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

seems  desirable  that  American  public  opinion 
should  admit  the  imperious  necessity  of  a  situation 
absolutely  unequivocal  with  regard  to  the  govern- 
ments of  Constantinople,  Sofia,  Vienna,  and  Bud- 
apest, which  are  vassals  of  Berlin  and  by  that 
same  token  substantial  pillars  of  Pan-Germany. 

II 

DESTRUCTION  OF  PAN-GERMANY  BY  INTERNAL 
EXPLOSION 

I  believe  that  I  have  demonstrated,  in  earlier 
chapters  of  this  book  that,  because  of  the  advan- 
tages, economic  and  military,  which  the  existence 
of  Central  Pan-Germany  guarantees  to  Germany 
for  both  present  and  future,  the  essential,  vital 
problem  that  the  Allies  have  to  solve  —  a  problem 
which  sums  up  all  the  others  —  is,  how  to  destroy 
this  Central  Pan-Germany. 

It  is  infinitely  easier  to  destroy  than  is  gener- 
ally supposed  among  the  Allies,  because  it  con- 
tains potent  sources  of  dissolution.  The  Allied 
leaders  seem  not  to  have  bestowed  upon  this  situ- 
ation the  extremely  careful  attention  which  it  de- 
serves. In  any  event,  down  to  the  present  time 
they  have  not  sought  to  take  advantage  of  a  state 
of  affairs  which  is  eminently  favorable  to  them. 

To  understand  this  situation,  and  how  it  may 
be  utilized  at  once,  we  must  set  out  from  the  fol- 
lowing starting-point.  Of  about  176,000,000 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


inhabitants  of  Pan-Germany  in  1917,  about 
73,000,000  Germans,  with  the  backing  of  only 
21,000,000  vassals,  —  Magyars,  Bulgars,  Turks, 
—  have  to-day  reduced  to  slavery  the  immense 
number  of  82,000,000  allied  subjects  —  Slavs, 
Latins,  or  Semites,  belonging  to  thirteen  different 
nationalities,  all  of  whom  desire  the  victory  of  the 
Entente,  since  that  alone  will  assure  their  libera- 
tion. In  addition,  a  considerable  portion  of  Ger- 
many's vassals  would,  under  certain  conditions, 
gladly  throw  off  the  yoke  of  Berlin. 

Among  the  176,000,000  people  of  Pan-Ger- 
many we  distinguish  the  following  three  groups. 

Group  I.  Slaves  of  the  Germans  or  of  their  vas- 
sals capable  of  immediate  action  favorable  to  the 
Entente  —  say,  63,000,000,  made  up  as  follows:— 

(a)  In  Turkey,  — 

Arabs  8,000,000 

Generally  speaking  the  Arabs  detest  the  Turks. 
A  portion  of  them  have  risen  in  revolt  in  Arabia, 
under  the  leadership  of  the  King  of  Hedjaz. 

(b)  In  Central  Europe,  — 

Polish-Lithuanians  22,000,000 

Ruthenians  5,500,000 

Czechs  8,500,000 

Jugo-Slavs  1 1 ,000,000 

Roumanians  8,000,000 

55,000,000 
116 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURB 

There  are,  then,  in  Central  Europe  alone,  55,- 
000,000  people  determinedly  hostile  to  German- 
ism, forming  an  enormous,  favorably  grouped 
mass,  occupying  a  vast  territory,  commanding  a 
part  of  the  German  lines  of  communication,  and 
comparatively  far  from  the  fronts  where  the 
bulk  of  the  German  military  forces  is. 

Moreover,  at  the  present  crisis,  these  55,000,- 
ooo  human  beings,  subjected  to  the  most  heart- 
less German  and  Bulgarian  terrorism,  are  coming 
to  understand  better  and  better  that  the  only 
means  of  escape  from  a  ghastly  slavery,  from 
which  there  is  no  appeal,  is  to  contribute  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  to  the  victory  of  the 
Entente.  The  insurrectionary  commotions  that 
have  already  taken  place  in  Poland,  Bohemia, 
and  Transylvania,  prove  what  a  limitless  devel- 
opment these  outbreaks  might  take  on  if  the  Allies 
should  do  what  they  ought  to  do  to  meet  this 
psychological  condition.  It  is  clear  that,  if  these 
55,000,000  slaves  of  Central  Europe  should  re- 
volt in  increasing  numbers,  this  result  would 
follow  first  of  all :  the  default  of  Russia  would  be 
supplied.  Indeed,  the  Germans,  being  harassed 
in  rear  of  their  Eastern  fronts,  would  be  consider- 
ably impeded  in  their  military  operations  and  in 
their  communications.  Under  such  conditions 
the  attacks  of  the  Allies  would  have  much  more 
chance  of  success  than  they  have  to-day. 

117 


PA  N-GERM A  N  Y 


Group  2.  Slaves  of  the  Germans  or  of  their  vas- 
sals, who  cannot  stir  to-day,  being  too  near  the 
military  fronts,  but  whose  action  might  follow 
that  of  the  first  group  —  nearly  16,000,000,  made 
up  as  follows :  — 

(a)  In  Turkey,  - 

Ottoman  Greeks  2,000,000 

Armenians  1,000,000 


3,000,000 

(b)  On  the  Western  front,  - 

French  3,000,000 

Belgians  7,500,000 

Alsatians  and  Lorrainers  1,500,000 

Italians  800,000 


12,800,000 

Group  j.  Vassals  of  Germany,  possible  rebels 
against  the  yoke  of  Berlin  after  the  uprising  of 
the  first  group  —  about  9,000,000. 

Of  10,000,000  Magyars,  there  are  —  a  fact  not 
generally  known  among  the  Allies  —  9,000,000 
poor  agricultural  laborers  cynically  exploited  by 
one  million  nobles,  priests,  and  officials.  These 
9,000,000  Magyar  proletarians  are  exceedingly 
desirous  of  peace.  As  they  did  not  want  the  war, 
they  detest  those  who  forced  it  on  them.  They 
would  be  quite  capable  of  revolting  at  the  last 
moment  against  their  feudal  exploiters,  if  the 

118 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Allies,  estimating  accurately  the  shocking  social 
conditions  of  these  poor  Magyars,  were  able  to 
assure  them  that  the  victory  of  the  Entente  would 
put  an  end  to  the  agiarian  and  feudal  system 
under  which  they  suffer. 

Is  not  this  a  state  of  affairs  eminently  favorable 
to  the  interests  of  the  Allies?  Would  not  the  Ger- 
mans in  our  place  have  turned  it  to  their  utmost 
advantage  long  ago  ?  Does  not  common  sense  tell 
us  that  if,  in  view  of  the  pressure  on  their  bat- 
tle fronts,  the  Allies  knew  enough  to  do  what  is 
necessary  to  induce  the  successive  revolts  of  the 
three  groups  whose  existence  we  have  pointed  out, 
a  potent  internal  element  in  the  downfall  of  Pan- 
Germany  would  become  more  and  more  potent, 
adding  its  effects  to  the  efforts  which  the  Allies 
have  confined  themselves  thus  far  to  putting 
forth  on  the  extreme  outer  circumference  of  Pan- 
Germany? 

Let  us  inquire  how  this  assistance  of  the  88,000,- 
ooo  persons  confined  in  Pan-Germany  in  their 
own  despite  can  be  obtained  and  made  really 
effective. 

Let  us  start  with  an  indisputable  fact.  The 
immense  results  which  the  German  propaganda 
has  achieved  in  barely  five  months  in  boundless 
Russia,  with  her  182,000,000  inhabitants,  where 
it  has  brought  about,  in  Siberia  as  well  as  in  Eu- 
rope, separatist  movements  which,  for  the  most 
part,  —  I  speak  of  them  because  I  have  traveled 

119 


PAN-GERMANY 


and  studied  much  in  Russia,  —  would  never  have 
taken  place  but  for  their  artificial  agitation,  — 
these  results  constitute,  beyond  dispute,  a  strik- 
ing demonstration  of  what  the  Allies  might  do  if 
they  should  exert  themselves  to  act  upon  races 
radically  anti-Boche,  held  captive  against  their 
will  in  Pan-Germany.  Assuredly,  in  the  matter 
of  propaganda,  the  Allies  are  very  far  from  being 
as  well  equipped  as  the  Germans  and  from  know- 
ing how  to  go  about  it  as  they  do.  But  the  Ger- 
mans and  their  vassals  are  so  profoundly  detested 
by  the  people  whom  they  are  oppressing  in  Pan- 
Germany;  these  people  understand  so  fully  that 
the  remnant  of  their  liberty  is  threatened  in  the 
most  uncompromising  way;  they  are  so  clearly 
aware  that  they  can  free  themselves  from  the 
German-Turkish-Magyar  yoke  only  as  a  result 
of  this  war  and  of  the  decisive  victory  of  the  En- 
tente, that  they  realize  more  clearly  every  day 
that  their  motto  must  be,  '  Now  or  never. ' 

Considering  this  state  of  mind,  so  favorable  to 
the  Allies,  a  propaganda  on  the  part  of  the  En- 
tente, even  if  prepared  with  only  moderate  skill, 
would  speedily  obtain  very  great  results.  Fur- 
thermore, the  desperate  efforts  which  Austria- 
Hungary,  at  the  instigation  of  Berlin  and  with 
the  backing  of  the  Stockholmists  and  the  Pope, 
was  making  to  conclude  peace  before  its  threat- 
ening internal  explosion,  show  how  precarious 
German  hegemony  in  Central  Europe  still  is. 

120 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

The  Austro-Boches  are  so  afraid  of  the  extension 
of  the  local  disturbances  which  have  already 
taken  place  in  Poland  and  Bohemia,  that  they 
have  not  yet  dared  to  repress  them  root  and 
branch.  Those  wretches,  to  fortify  themselves 
against  these  anti-German  popular  commotions, 
resort  to  famine.  At  the  present  moment,  not- 
ably in  the  Jugo-Slav  districts  and  in  Bohemia, 
the  Austro-Germans  are  removing  the  greatest 
possible  quantity  of  provisions  in  order  to  hold 
the  people  in  check  by  hunger.  But  this  hateful 
expedient  itself  combines  with  all  the  rest  to  con- 
vince these  martyrized  peoples  of  the  urgent  ne- 
cessity of  rising  in  revolt  if  they  prefer  not  to  be 
half  annihilated  like  the  Serbs. 

To  make  sure  of  the  constant  spread  and  cer- 
tain effectiveness  of  the  latent  troubles  of  the 
oppressed  Slavs  and  Latins  of  Central  Europe, 
there  is  need  on  the  part  of  the  Allies,  first  of  moral 
suasion,  then  of  material  assistance. 

To  understand  the  necessity  and  the  usefulness 
of  the  first,  it  must  be  said  that,  despite  all  the 
precautions  taken  by  the  Austro-Boche  authori- 
ties, the  declarations  of  the  Entente  in  behalf  of 
the  oppressed  peoples  of  Central  Europe  become 
known  to  these  latter  comparatively  soon,  and 
that  these  declarations  help  greatly  to  sustain 
their  morale.  For  example,  President  Wilson's 
message  of  January  22,  1917,  in  which  he  urged 
the  independence  and  unification  of  Poland,  and 

121 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


his  '  Flag  Day'  speech,  on  June  15,  in  which  he  set 
forth  the  great  and  intolerable  peril  of  the  Ham- 
burg-Persian Gulf  scheme,  manifestly  strength- 
ened the  determination  of  the  Poles,  the  Czechs, 
and  the  Jugo-Slavs  to  free  themselves  at  whatever 
cost  from  the  fatal  yoke  of  Vienna  and  Berlin. 
In  addition,  the  constantly  increasing  power  of 
the  aeroplane  enables  the  Allies  to  spread  impor- 
tant communications  broadcast  over  enemy  terri- 
tory. 

First  of  all,  it  is  essential  that  the  three  races 
which,  by  reason  of  their  geographical  situation 
and  their  ethnographical  characteristics  are  in- 
dispensable in  any  reconstitution  of  Central  Eu- 
rope based  on  the  principle  of  nationalities,  and 
who  consequently  have  a  leading  part  to  play  in 
the  centre  of  the  Pan-Germany  of  to-day,  should 
be,  one  and  all,  absolutely  convinced  that  the  vic- 
tory of  the  Entente  will  make  certain  their  com- 
plete independence.  The  Poles  have  received 
this  assurance  on  divers  occasions,  notably  from 
President  Wilson,  and  very  recently  from  M. 
Ribot,  commemorating  in  a  dispatch  to  the 
Polish  Congress  at  Moscow  'the  reconstitution 
of  the  independence  and  unity  of  all  the  Polish 
territories  to  the  shores  of  the  Baltic.'  But  the 
11,000,000  Jugo-Slavs  and  the  8,500,000  Czechs 
have  not  yet  received  from  the  leaders  of  the  En- 
tente sufficiently  explicit  and  repeated  assurances. 

There  are  two  reasons  why  this  is  so.    In  the 

122 


THE     DISEASE    AND     CURE 

first  place,  the  absolutely  chimerical  hope  of 
separating  Austria-Hungary  from  Germany  has 
obsessed,  down  to  a  very  recent  date,  certain 
exalted  personages  of  the  Entente,  who,  having 
never  had  an  opportunity  to  study  on  the  spot 
the  latest  developments  in  Austria,  still  believe 
in  the  old  classic  formula,  '  If  Austria  did  not  ex- 
ist, we  should  have  to  create  it. '  In  the  second 
place,  certain  other  personages  of  the  Entente  in- 
cline to  the  belief  that,  in  order  to  obtain  a  swift 
victory,  the  problem  of  Central  Europe  is  a  prob- 
lem to  be  avoided.  Now,  as  to  this  point,  the  few 
men  who  unquestionably  know  Austria  well  — 
for  example,  the  Frenchmen  Louis  L6ger,  Ernest 
Denis,  M.  Haumant,  Auguste  Gauvain,  and 
others,  and  the  Englishmen,  Sir  Arthur  Evans, 
Seton-Watson,  Wickham  Steed,  and  others - 
are  unanimous  in  beingfas^completely  convinced 
as  I  myself  am  that  the  breaking-up  of  the  mon- 
archy of  the  Hapsburgs  is  indispensable  to  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  lasting  peace  —  and  further- 
more, such  a  breaking-up  as  a  result  of  the  revolt 
of  the  oppressed  peoples  is  one  of  the  most  power- 
ful instruments  in  the  hands  of  the  Entente  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  victorious  close. 

In  fact,  there  are  certain  quasi-mechanical 
laws  which  should  guide  in  the  reconstruction  of 
a  Europe  that  can  endure.  Now,  without  a  free 
Bohemia  and  Jugo-Slavia  it  is  impossible  —  im- 
possible, I  insist  —  that  Poland  should  be  really 

123 


PAN-GERMANY 


free,  that  Serbia  and  Roumania  should  be  re- 
stored, that  Russia  should  be  released  from  the 
grip  of  Germany,  that  Alsace-Lorraine  should 
be  restored  permanently  to  France,  that  Italy 
should  be  protected  from  German  domination  in 
the  Adriatic,  in  the  Balkans,  and  in  Turkey,  that 
the  United  States  should  be  warranted  against 
the  world-wide  results  of  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  enterprise.  Bohemia  is  the  central  point  of 
the  whole.  With  its  circle  of  mountains,  it  is  the 
indispensable  keystone  of  the  European  edifice, 
rebuilt  upon  the  basis  of  the  principle  of  nation- 
alities. Whosoever  is  master  of  Bohemia  is  mas- 
ter of  Europe.  It  must  be,  therefore,  that  liberty 
shall  be  master  of  Bohemia. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  undeniable  that  the 
successive  uprisings  of  8,500,000  Czechs  and 
11,000,000  Jugo-Slavs,  taking  place  concurrently 
with  that  of  22,000,000  Poles,  is  absolutely  in  line 
with  the  present  military  interests  of  the  En- 
tente. Therefore,  for  the  Allies  to  assume  an  at- 
titude of  reserve  toward  the  Czechs  and  Jugo- 
slavs is  as  contrary  to  the  democratic  principles 
they  invoke  as  to  their  most  urgent  strategic  in- 
terests. But  this  mistake  has  been  frequently 
made,  solely  because  the  exceptional  importance 
of  Bohemia  has  not  yet  been  fully  grasped.  Mr. 
Asquith,  in  his  speech  of  September  26  last, 
furnishes  an  example  of  this  regrettable  reserve 
with  respect  to  the  Czechs  —  a  reserve  which  is 

124 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

diminishing,  no  doubt,  but  which  still  exists.  He 
said :  — 

'  If  we  turn  to  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  we 
see  purely  artificial  territorial  arrangements, 
which  are  repugnant  to  the  wishes  and  interests  of 
the  populations  directly  concerned,  and  which, 
so  long  as  they  remain  unchanged,  will  constitute 
a  field  fertile  in  new  wars.  There  are,  first,  the 
claims  of  Roumania  and  Italy,  so  long  overdue; 
there  is  heroic  Serbia,  which  not  only  must  be  re- 
stored to  her  home,  but  which  is  entitled  to  more 
room  in  which  to  expand  nationally ;  and  there  is 
Poland.  The  position  of  Greece  and  the  South 
Slavs  must  not  be  forgotten.' 

Thus,  while  Mr.  Asquith  manifests  the  best  in- 
tentions toward  the  oppressed  peoples  of  Central 
Europe,  he  does  not  even  mention  the  Czechs, 
that  is,  Bohemia.  Now,  in  reality,  all  the  prom- 
ises that  the  Entente  can  make  concerning  Po- 
land, Serbia,  Roumania,  and  Italy,  are  not  cap- 
able of  lasting  fulfillment  unless  Bohemia  is  set 
free,  for  Bohemia  dominates  all  Central  Europe. 
Furthermore,  Mr.  Asquith's  silence  as  to  the  fate 
of  Bohemia  may  be  a  legitimate  cause  of  uneasi- 
ness to  the  Czechs,  who  are  now  doing  the  im- 
possible to  contend  with  Germanism,  despite  the 
shocking  terrorism  which  lies  so  heavy  upon  them. 
So  we  may  say,  that  Mr.  Asquith  would  have  serv- 
ed the  interest  of  the  Entente  more  effectively  if 
he  had  emphatically  named  Bohemia  and  the 

125 


PA  N-GERM  A  N  Y 


Czechs  who  are  so  much  in  need  of  being  sup- 
ported and  encouraged  by  the  Allies,  whom  they 
regard  as  their  liberators. 

The  misconceptions  that  have  led  to  the  ignor- 
ing of  the  claims  of  the  Central  European  Slavs, 
and  of  their  extreme  importance  in  the  solution 
of  the  war-problem,  will  soon  prove  themselves 
an  even  heavier  load  to  carry  than  those  commit- 
ted in  Bulgaria  and  Greece.  To  put  an  end  to 
these  vagaries,  it  is  necessary  that  henceforth 
the  leaders  of  the  Entente  should  earnestly  en- 
courage, at  least  the  Poles,  Czechs,  and  Jugo- 
slavs —  that  is  to  say,  about  42,000,000  slaves  of 
Berlin  in  Central  Europe.  The  encouragement  of 
these  peoples  as  a  single  body  is  indispensable,  for, 
although  the  Boches  are  able  to  control  the  local 
and,  so  to  say,  individual  insurrectionary  move- 
ments, on  the  contrary,  because  of  the  vast  area 
which  a  general  insurrection  of  the  42,000,000 
would  involve,  its  repression  by  the  Austro- 
Boches  would  be  practically  impossible.  The  ex- 
ample of  a  successful  general  uprising  would  cer- 
tainly induce  a  similar  movement  by  the  balance 
of  the  88,000,000  human  beings  who  are  vitally 
interested  in  the  destruction  of  Pan-Germany. 
To  bring  about  this  result,  then,  the  first  essential 
thing  to  be  done  is  for  the  leaders  of  the  Entente 
to  put  forth  a  most  unequivocal  declaration,  giv- 
ing the  Poles,  Czechs,  and  Jugo-Slavs  assurance 
that  the  victory  of  the  Entente  will  make  certain 

126 


THE    DISEASE    AND      CURE 

their  complete  liberation.  It  is  impossible  to  see 
what  there  is  to  hinder  such  a  declaration.  Its 
effects  would  soon  be  discerned  if  it  were  enthusi- 
astically supported  by  the  Allied  press  and  by  the 
Allied  Socialists,  who,  let  us  hope,  will  finally 
realize  that,  while  it  is  impossible  to  bring  about 
a  revolution  against  Prussian  militarism  in  Ger- 
many, it  can  very  easily  be  effected  in  Austria- 
Hungary. 

But,  some  one  will  say,  a  revolution  is  not  pos- 
sible without  material  resources.  Naturally,  I 
shall  discuss  this  point  only  so  far  as  the  interests 
of  the  Entente  will  allow  me  to  do  it  publicly. 
In  the  first  place  I  will  call  attention  to  the  fact 
that,  by  reason  of  the  immensity  of  the  territory 
they  occupy,  simple  passive  resistance  on  the 
part  of  the  oppressed  races  of  Central  Europe, 
provided  that  it  is  offered  in  concert  and  accom- 
panied by  certain  essays  in  the  way  of  sabotage 
and  strikes,  which  are  easy  enough  to  practice 
without  any  outside  assistance,  would  create  al- 
most inextricable  difficulties  for  the  Austro-Ger- 
mans. 

But  there  is  something  much  better  to  be  done. 
At  first  sight,  it  seems  very  difficult  for  the  Allies 
to  bear  effective  material  aid  to  the  oppressed  peo- 
ples of  Pan-Germany,  because  they  are  surround- 
ed by  impregnable  military  lines.  In  fact,  by  com- 
bining the  results  of  the  tremendous  development 
of  the  aviation  branch  made  possible  by  the  ad- 

127 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


hesion  of  the  United  States,  with  certain  technical 
resources  which  are  available,  the  Entente  can, 
comparatively  quickly  and  easily,  supply  the 
Poles  and  the  rest  with  material  assistance  which 
would  prove  extraordinarily  efficacious. 

I  am  not  writing  carelessly.  I  have  studied  for 
twenty  years  these  down -trodden  races  and  the 
countries  in  which  they  live.  I  know  about  the 
material  resources  to  which  I  refer.  If  I  do  not 
describe  them  more  explicitly,  it  is  because  no 
one  has  yet  thought  of  employing  them,  and  in 
such  matters  silence  is  a  bounden  duty.  But  I 
am,  of  course,  at  the  disposition  of  the  American 
authorities  if  they  should  wish  to  know  about  the 
resources  in  question,  and  to  study  them  seriously. 
I  am  absolutely  convinced  that,  if  employed 
with  due  method,  determinedly,  and  scientifically, 
in  accordance  with  a  special  technique,  these  re- 
sources, after  a  comparatively  simple  prepara- 
tion, —  much  less  in  any  event  than  those  which 
have  been  made  in  other  enterprises,  —  would 
lead  to  very  important  results  which  would  contri- 
bute materially  to  the  final  decision.1 

1  To  the  editor,  M.  Cheradame  has  written  with  less  reserve  on 
this  vital  subject;  but  it  seems  best  to  put  in  print  at  this  time  no 
more  than  the  suggestion  indicated.  —  The  Editor  of  the  Atlantic 
Monthly. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
POLITICAL  STRATEGY 

GERMANY  is,  to  all  intent,  mistress  of  Central 
Europe  and  the  Balkans,  of  Turkey,  and  of 
Russia.  As  I  write  these  lines  (in  December, 
1917),  the  last  part  of  the  German  scheme  which 
I  set  forth  in  the  June  Atlantic1  is  in  preparation. 
All  the  disposable  forces  of  Pan-Germany  are 
concentrating  on  the  Western  front.  If  such  a 
state  of  affairs  is  possible  when  the  Entente  has 
an  abundance  of  admirable  troops  and  boundless 
resources,  it  is  because,  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
declared  in  his  speech  of  November  12,  with  his 
wonted  and  most  salutary  frankness,  after  more 
than  three  years  of  war  the  Entente  has  no  strate- 
gic plan.  What  is  the  cause  of  this  unfortunate 
condition?  That  is  what  it  is  most  important  to 
ascertain  first  of  all,  for  the  Allies  cannot  think 
seriously  of  winning  a  decisive  victory  unless  the 
problem  of  the  strategy  which  is  an  indispensable 
necessity  of  their  position  is  stated  in  such  terms 
that  it  can  readily  be  solved.  But  it  has  not 
yet  been  so  stated.  To  be  sure,  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
dwelt  upon  the  extreme  gravity  of  the  situation, 
but,  despite  the  fact  that  he  is  certainly  the  most 

1  See  Chapter  v,  supra. 

129 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


keen-sighted  of  the  leaders  of  the  Entente  in 
Europe,  he  did  not  point  out  definitely  the  posi- 
tive remedies  capable  of  putting  an  end  to  a  state 
of  affairs  which  is  intolerable  because  it  is  infi- 
nitely dangerous. 

The  reason  for  this  absence  of  concrete  sugges- 
tions on  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  part  is  that,  notwith- 
standing his  great  natural  intelligence,  he  too  is 
subject  to  that  profound  failure  of  insight  in  re- 
spect to  the  conduct  of  the  war  which  has  befallen 
all  the  leading  men  of  the  Entente  without  excep- 
tion. This  failure,  which  is  wholly  independent 
of  their  will,  is  due  mainly  to  the  fact  that  the 
present  leaders  of  the  Entente,  having  one  and  all 
been  firmly  convinced  that  the  war  would  never 
take  place,  had  not  trained  themselves  intellec- 
tually to  carry  it  on  when  it  should  break  out. 

Moreover,  for  we  must  set  things  down  as  they 
are,  the  majority  of  these  leaders  of  the  Entente 
knew  the  political  geography  of  Europe  only  in 
the  most  superficial  way.  As  for  the  ethno- 
graphic detail  which  plays  in  this  war  a  funda- 
mental part  that  is  still  far  from  being  under- 
stood, they  know  absolutely  nothing  about  it.  It 
is  the  same  with  the  practical  political  economy 
of  Central  Europe,  of  the  Balkans,  and  of  Tur- 
key, and  with  their  national  psychology.  Now, 
these  sciences  —  geography,  ethnography,  politi- 
cal economy,  and  national  psychology  —  are  abso- 
lutely indispensable  to  the  wise  conduct  of  the 

130 


THE    DISEASE     AND     CURE 

war;  and  they  do  not  teach  themselves.  It  is 
altogether  impossible  to  become  familiar  with 
them  without  hard  work,  long  continued.  That 
is  why,  even  assuming  that  all  the  guiding  spirits 
of  the  Entente  are  endowed  with  innate  genius,  it 
is  absolutely  impossible  for  them,  held  fast  as 
they  are  at  every  moment  by  the  daily,  always 
urgent,  demands  of  a  war  which  took  them  en- 
tirely by  surprise  and  in  which  they  had  to  impro- 
vise everything,  to  acquire  during  the  conflict  that 
intellectual  preparation  without  which  the  war 
cannot  be  effectively  carried  on. 

Strictly  speaking,  it  is  possible,  by  spending 
enough  money,  to  extemporize  in  two  or  three 
years  a  supply  of  war  material,  and  armies  in  the 
shape  of  soldiers  and  regiments,  whereas  these 
same  operations  would  require  half  a  score  of 
years  in  time  of  peace;  but  all  the  gold  on  earth  is 
powerless  to  implant  swiftly  in  any  man's  brain, 
however  well  endowed  he  may  be,  the  enormous 
mass  of  positive  knowledge  which  alone  will  en- 
able him  to  evolve  the  guiding  ideas  which  are 
indispensable  for  the  conduct  of  a  war  so  complex 
as  this.  Such  knowledge  and  such  ideas  cannot 
spring  to  life  spontaneously  in  a  human  brain; 
they  cannot  make  their  way  into  it,  and  arrange 
themselves  there  in  the  logical  order  of  their  rela- 
tive importance,  except  as  the  result  of  a  mental 
training  which  demands,  not  only  a  native  intelli- 
gence, but  an  enormous  amount  of  time. 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


To  acquire  these  essentials  William  II  and  his 
collaborators,  despite  the  vast  resources  at  their 
disposal,  had  to  work  a  full  quarter  of  a  century. 
Now,  not  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Entente  had 
received,  even  in  the  most  rudimentary  form, 
down  to  twenty-five  days  before  the  war,  the  spe- 
cial kind  of  intellectual  training  without  which  it  is 
impossible  to  direct  effectively  the  conduct  of  this 
war,  which  resembles  no  other  war  in  history  be- 
cause of  the  vast  scope  which  the  Germans  have 
given  to  it  and  the  endlessly  varied  methods 
which  they  are  employing  in  carrying  it  on. 

These  reasons,  then,  furnish  a  simple  explana- 
tion of  the  fact  that,  although  all  the  leaders  of 
the  Entente  have  at  last  agreed  to  form  an  Allied 
Staff,  in  order  to  unify  the  conduct  of  the  war,  no 
one  of  them  is  able  to  say  how  this  staff  should  be 
constituted  to  meet  the  special  necessities  of  the 
conflict.  Doubtless  they  understand  perfectly  - 
as  indeed  the  great  mass  of  the  public  understands 
-  that  this  is  not  simply  a  military  war,  but  a 
political  one  as  well.  But  this  idea  of  the  connec- 
tion between  the  war  and  politics  is  still  extremely 
vague  and  confused.  Consequently,  then,  it  is 
essential,  first  of  all,  to  give  it  a  definite  form. 


132 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 


THE   REAL   CHARACTER   OF   THE   WAR 

The  first  cause  of  the  errors  of  the  Allies  in  their 
conduct  of  the  war  is  their  failure  thus  far  to 
understand  clearly  its  predominant  characteristic. 
Some  say,  'This  is  a  war  of  effectives.'  Now  the 
Allies  have  had  for  three  years  an  overwhelming 
superiority  in  effectives.  They  have  had  entire 
liberty  in  arming  them  and  making  use  of  them, 
and  yet  they  are  not  victorious. 

Others  of  the  Allies  declare,  'This  is  a  war  of 
materiel/  Another  mistaken  idea.  In  the  third 
year  of  the  war  the  Allies,  as  a  whole,  certainly 
had  more  materiel  at  their  disposition  than  their 
adversaries.  Now  if,  in  the  second  half  of  1917, 
the  Russians  have  given  way;  if  the  Italians  have 
allowed  their  Friuli  front  to  be  pierced,  it  is  be- 
cause they  elected  not  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
materiel  on  hand.  In  these  instances,  then,  it  is 
very  clear  that  the  moral  factor  far  surpassed  the 
material  factor. 

Lastly,  others  of  the  Allies  declare  that '  This  is  a 
war  of  credit.  When  Germany  is  ruined,  she  will 
go  to  pieces  all  in  a  moment.*  These  men  do  not 
understand  that,  although  Germany's  external 
credit  is  beyond  question  sorely  shaken  by  the 
stoppage  of  her  exports,  on  the  other  hand,  her 
internal  credit  is  constantly  augmented  by  the 
enormous  profits  which  the  war  enables  her  to 

133 


PA  N-GERM  A  N  Y 


realize.1  Now  this  internal  credit  is  based  upon 
actualities  so  evident  that  it  will  permit  the  Berlin 
government  to  negotiate  all  the  internal  loans  it 
may  desire,  to  support  the  burden  of  the  war  as 
long  as  is  necessary.  If  the  character  of  the  war 
is  not  yet  understood,  it  is  because  it  has  been 
shaped  in  every  detail  by  the  Germans  them- 
selves, who,  having  embarked  upon  it  with  a  con- 
crete end  in  view,  have  long  been  studying  the 
question  by  what  endlessly  diversified  means  they 
might  attain  that  end.  It  is  their  employment  of 
these  means  which  gives  to  the  war  its  wholly 
unique  character. 

The  Berlin  government  entered  into  this  war 
in  order  to  obtain  by  conquest  the  instruments  of 
universal  domination.  As  this  was  a  far-reaching 
object,  the  Germans  devoted  themselves  for  a 
quarter  of  a  century  to  studying  all  the  military, 
naval,  geographic,  ethnographic,  economic,  and 
national-psychologic  problems  of  the  whole  world, 
and  especially  of  Europe.  This  preparation  — 
profoundly  scientific,  we  must  admit  —  for  the 
gigantic  Pangermanist  scheme,  led  the  Germans 
to  make  a  most  thorough  investigation,  not  only 
of  everything  relating  to  the  army  and  navy,  but 
also  of  four  political  sciences  —  geography,  eth- 
nology, political  economy,  and  national  psychol- 
ogy. These  four  sciences  are  known,  outside  of 
Germany,  only  in  the  theoretical  or  rudimentary 
1  See  Chapters  i  and  u,  supra. 

134 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

stage;  whereas  the  Germans  have  carried  their 
study  of  them  so  far,  that  they  derive  from  them 
immense  practical  powers  which  have  a  constant 
and  far-reaching  influence  on  the  whole  evolution 
of  the  war. 

The  Allied  leaders  do  not  even  suspect  the 
extreme  importance  of  these  factors  —  for  two 
reasons.  In  the  first  place,  not  one  of  them  has 
made  a  sufficient  study  of  the  four  political  sci- 
ences in  their  application  to  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  to  realize  the  extraordinary  efficacy  of  the 
intensive  use  that  the  Germans  are  making  of 
them.  Secondly,  while  the  powers  derived  from 
the  political  sciences  are  immense,  and  as  real  as 
the  X-rays,  like  those  rays  they  are  invisible. 

The  constant  use  of  the  political  sciences,  in 
enormous  doses,  made  by  the  Germans  in  their 
conduct  of  the  war,  has  this  result :  that  the  utili- 
zation of  the  military  art  alone,  even  when  most 
highly  perfected  from  a  material  standpoint,  is 
absolutely  insufficient  to  ensure  victory  to  the 
Allies.  It  is  because  of  their  failure  to  under- 
stand this  that,  notwithstanding  their  boundless 
resources,  they  have  condemned  themselves  to 
the  most  unremitting,  the  most  cruel,  the  most 
heart-rending  disappointments.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  this  war  not  only  is  not  solely  a  military 
and  naval  war  —  it  is,  in  addition,  a  geographical 
war,  an  ethnographical  war,  an  economic  war, 
a  war  of  national  psychology.  To  define  its 

135 


PA  N-GERM A  N  Y 


endlessly  complex  character  by  a  brief  phrase 
which  includes  all  these  factors,  we  may  say  that 
it  is  a  war  of  political  sciences. 

A  few  examples  derived  from  actual  events 
will  prove  that  this  is  not  a  matter  of  words  alone, 
but  that  the  utilization  of  the  political  sciences  is 
an  absolute  necessity  for  the  Allies. 

Down  to  the  present  time  the  swift  invasion 
of  Roumania  —  October-November,  1916  —  has 
been  regarded  as  a  triumph  of  the  German  heavy 
artillery.  But,  while  the  action  of  the  heavy  ar- 
tillery in  forcing  the  Dobrudja  and  the  passes  of 
the  Carpathians  was  the  great  physical  fact,  man- 
ifest to  all,  which  determined  the  German  victory, 
the  effective  use  of  the  heavy  guns  was  possible 
only  because,  long  before  the  military  movement 
was  begun,  the  ground  had  been  prepared  for  the 
invasion  of  Roumania,  by  the  Staff  at  Berlin,  with 
the  aid  of  a  practical  application  of  the  political 
sciences. 

Geographical  preparation.  In  March,  1916,  it 
was  known  that  a  system  of  espionage  had  been 
organized  in  the  Roumanian  Dobrudja  by  Ger- 
mans who  alleged  archaeological  explorations  as  a 
pretext  for  their  travels.  The  very  precise  in- 
formation thus  acquired  by  the  Staff  at  Berlin 
was  quite  indispensable  to  it.  In  fact,  the  Rou- 
manian Dobrudja  is  a  swampy  region  of  a  very 
peculiar  nature,  altogether  impassable  under  or- 
dinary conditions  by  the  immense  and  heavy 

136 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

materiel  of  modern  armies.  To  move  quickly 
through  such  a  country,  it  was  necessary  to  look 
ahead  —  to  construct  months  beforehand,  and 
have  in  readiness  for  use  on  the  Bulgarian  fron- 
tier, innumerable  small  bridges  to  be  thrown 
across  the  streams,  and  enormous  supplies  of  mov- 
able floors  to  be  used  in  building,  on  the  unstable 
soil,  artificial  roads  practicable  for  motor  caissons 
and  the  tractors  of  the  heavy  artillery. 

It  was  the  turning  to  account  of  the  minute  de- 
tails of  the  geographical  information  in  the  hands 
of  the  Germans,  operating  long  before  the  inva- 
sion, which  enabled  her  Staff  to  realize  precisely 
the  nature  and  amount  of  the  special  materiel 
which  it  was  necessary  to  manufacture  and  to  get 
together  long  before  the  offensive,  in  order  to 
ensure,  when  it  should  be  launched,  a  rapid  for- 
ward movement  of  the  troops  at  the  predeter- 
mined points. 

Ethnographical  preparation.  In  the  Dobrudja 
there  were  Bulgarians  and  Turks  as  well  as  Rou- 
manians. Side  by  side  with  the  geographical 
study  went  the  ethnographical  research,  which 
made  it  possible  to  arrange  systematically  for  a 
general  uprising  of  these  Pro-German  elements  - 
a  movement  which  was  considerably  facilitated 
by  the  rapidity  of  the  German  invasion. 

Economic  preparation.  Early  in  October,  1916, 
before  the  movement  was  begun,  a  number  of 
merchants,  experts  in  cattle  and  cereals,  and  cer- 

137 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


tain  specialists  in  political  economy,  assembled 
behind  Falkenhayn's  front,  and  were  thus  all 
ready  to  exploit  Roumania  after  the  invasion. 

Therefore  the  overthrow  of  Roumania  by 
means  of  military  operations,  —  advance  of  the 
Kaiser's  troops  and  effective  employment  of 
heavy  artillery,  —  which  alone  were  regarded  by 
Allied  public  opinion  as  having  had  a  decisive 
effect,  was  long  anticipated  by  the  geographical, 
ethnographical,  and  economic  preparation  for  the 
military  invasion,  which  was  simply  a  conse- 
quence of  that  preparation.  In  fact,  when  one  is 
familiar  with  the  swampy  character  of  the  Do- 
brudja,  one  can  but  be  satisfied  that,  without 
careful  forethought  for  the  geographical  obstacles 
and  without  preparing  the  means  to  overcome 
them,  the  rapid  advance  of  Falkenhayn's  heavy 
artillery  —  an  inescapable  condition  of  military 
success  after  the  offensive  was  started  —  would 
have  been  impossible.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was 
due  to  the  previously  arranged  scheme  for  the 
economic  exploitation  of  the  country  that  the 
German  troops  were  able  to  obtain  their  supplies 
on  Roumanian  soil  and  thus  to  force  the  Russo- 
Roumanian  troops  back  without  loss  of  time. 
Now,  this  rapidity  of  movement  was  an  essential 
condition  of  the  military  success.  It  is  perfectly 
certain,  therefore,  in  the  case  we  are  considering, 
that  the  military  success  of  the  Germans,  which 
was  apparent  to  all  eyes,  was  achieved  only  by 

138 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

virtue  of  the  previous  employment  of  three  ex- 
tremely powerful  invisible  forces,  derived  from 
the  practical  application  of  geography,  ethnog- 
raphy, and  political  economy  —  redoubtable 
forces  of  which  the  Allies  have  as  yet  made  no  use 
in  any  of  their  operations. 

Utilization  of  national  psychology.  The  recent 
occurrences  in  Russia  and  Italy  will  enable  me 
to  demonstrate  the  even  more  tremendous  power 
of  still  another  political  science  —  national  psy- 
chology. 

The  extraordinary  disruption  of  Russia  by 
Germany,  which  entails  such  threatening  conse- 
quences for  the  whole  world,  was  brought  about, 
not  by  force  of  arms,  but  by  means  of  a  moral 
propaganda  carried  on  by  speech  or  in  print. 
The  reason  that  this  manoeuvre  has  produced  such 
tremendous  results  is  that  it  was  based  upon 
exact  data  supplied  by  national  psychology  —  a 
political  science  of  which  the  Allies  seem  not  even 
to  suspect  the  existence.  It  was  by  favor  of  this 
science,  no  less  subtle  than  powerful,  founded  on 
minute  observations,  that  the  Germans  were  able 
to  exploit  unerringly  the  extraordinary  ignorance 
of  actualities  of  the  Russian  Socialists,  their  im- 
measurable pride,  and  the  artlessness,  even  the 
very  genuine  evangelical  spirit,  of  the  Russian 
people,  which  lead  them  naturally  to  forget 
affronts,  and,  lastly,  the  particularist  tendencies 
of  certain  Russian  nationalities,  which  the  Boche 

139 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


propaganda  has  transformed  into  separatist 
movements  to  be  immediately  carried  out.  Thus 
the  moral,  and  even  the  material,  dissolution  of 
the  vast  Russian  ex-Empire  of  one  hundred  and 
eighty  millions  of  people  was  made  possible  in  a 
few  months  by  the  application  of  the  science  of 
national  psychology. 

Now,  although  this  force  is  invisible,  it  is  un- 
questionably far  greater  than  the  most  stupen- 
dous military  force  imaginable,  since  its  knowledge 
of  the  national  psychology  of  the  mixed  peoples 
of  Russia  enabled  the  Berlin  government  to  ob- 
tain a  result  which  could  never  have  been  ob- 
tained by  millions  of  German  troops  using  the 
most  highly  perfected  weapons  and  the  most  ter- 
rifying explosives  of  the  present  day  in  greatest 
profusion. 

Again,  it  was  this  same  gigantic  force,  national 
psychology,  which  enabled  the  Boches  to  manu- 
facture systematically  the  'defeatist*  frame  of 
mind,  by  virtue  of  which  they  were  able  to  break 
through  the  Italian  front  at  Friuli,  which  they 
would  probably  never  have  succeeded  in  doing  if 
they  had  had  to  carry  by  sheer  assault  the  exceed- 
ingly strong  mountain  positions  held  by  the 
Italians. 


140 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 


II 

POLITICAL  STRATEGY  AND  THE  THREE  PHASES  OF 
THE  WAR 

The  utilization  of  these  invisible  forces  by 
the  Germans  has  varied  in  accordance  with  the 
changing  phases  of  the  war. 

One  can  distinguish  three  very  clearly  marked 
phases  in  their  conduct  of  the  war.  By  studying 
them,  we  can  appreciate  how  the  Grand  General 
Staff  at  Berlin  has  unvaryingly  pursued  the  same 
end  —  the  fulfillment  of  the  Pangermanist  plan  of 
1895-1911 — with  the  assistance  of  widely  dif- 
ferent methods,  which,  taken  as  a  whole,  consti- 
tute the  'strategy  of  political  sciences,'  which 
necessarily  coordinates  with  the  'war  of  political 
sciences/ 

First  phase  —  from  August  I ,  to  the  early  days 
of  October,  1914;  about  two  months. 

The  Staff  at  Berlin  plunged  into  war  confident 
of  a  speedy  triumph  by  means  of  a  whirlwind 
campaign  in  two  acts :  first,  utter  defeat  of  France 
in  five  or  six  weeks,  following  an  initial  blow  of 
formidable  and  unparalleled  intensity;  second,  a 
powerful  blow  against  Russia,  which  would  cer- 
tainly be  incapable  of  resisting  single-handed  the 
German  armies  which  had  just  triumphed  over 
France. 

If  this  scheme  could  have  been  carried  out, 
Germany,  after  a  contest  of  about  three  months, 

141 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


would  have  been  mistress  of  the  whole  of  Europe. 
In  that  case  no  Balkan  campaign  would  have 
been  necessary.  Serbia  and  Roumania  would 
have  had  no  other  choice  than  to  submit  on  the 
most  severe  conditions.  As  for  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  by  the  force  of  events  they 
would  have  fallen  under  the  absolute  hegemony 
of  Berlin.  As  a  result  of  this  new  state  of  affairs 
Pan-Germany  would  have  been  constituted  with- 
out visible  effort,  —  automatically  as  it  were,  - 
thus  assuring  Prussianism  of  the  domination  of 
the  rest  of  the  world. 

But  the  calculations  of  the  German  Grand 
General  Staff  were  upset  by  events  not  only  un- 
foreseen but  coincident :  the  invasion  of  East  Prus- 
sia by  the  Russians,  the  resistance  of  Belgium, 
the  intervention  of  Great  Britain,  the  much 
greater  consumption  of  munitions  than  had  been 
anticipated,  and,  finally,  by  the  victory  of  the 
Marne,  which  was  in  large  measure  the  conse- 
quence of  all  these  facts.  During  this  first  phase, 
marked  throughout  by  violence  carried  to  the 
point  of  frenzy,  the  German  strategy  was  purely 
military  —  the  strategy  of  political  sciences  had 
not  yet  appeared. 

Second  phase  —  from  October,  1914,  to  Decem- 
ber, 1917;  about  thirty-eight  months. 

At  the  beginning  of  October,  1914,  William 
II's  Grand  Staff  found  itself  constrained  to  aban- 
don the  idea  of  carrying  through  the  Pangerman- 

142 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

1st  scheme  by  means  of  the  whirlwind  campaign 
which  it  had  prepared.  It  was  obliged  therefore 
to  plan  to  attain  its  object  by  means  of  a  long  war. 
It  resigned  itself  the  more  readily  to  this  necessity 
because  it  knew  that  it  was  infinitely  better  sup- 
plied than  the  Allies  with  material  to  bring  about 
the  essential  moral  and  physical  conditions  - 
various  and  complicated  as  they  are  —  of  a  long- 
drawn  struggle. 

Furthermore,  on  the  morrow  of  the  battle  of 
the  Marne,  the  Staff  had  been  in  a  position  to 
appreciate  the  extraordinary  defensive  power  of 
strongly  fortified  continuous  points,  consisting  of 
deep  trenches  protected  by  barbed-wire  entangle- 
ments; a  defensive  system  the  technique  of 
which  it  had  studied  exhaustively  since  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  (1904-1905),  whereas  it 
was  wholly  unknown  to  the  French  and  British. 
For  these  reasons,  from  the  battle  of  the  Marne 
(October,  1914)  down  to  the  end  of  the  first  phase 
of  the  offensive  against  Italy,  that  is,  to  Decem- 
ber, 1917,  a  period  of  thirty-eight  months,  the 
whole  tactics  of  Berlin  has  been  directed  to  the 
object  of  carrying  out  a  programme  composed  of 
the  following  elements :  - 

1.  To  organize  an  immovable  defensive  on  the 
Western  front,  while  pretending  now  and  then  to 
attempt  a  genuine  attack. 

2.  To  carry  out  without  pause  a  series  of  circu- 
lar offensives  against  Russia,  Serbia,  and  Rou- 

H3 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


mania,  in  order  to  seize  one  after  another  the  ter- 
ritories of  those  states,  which  are  essential  to  the 
constitution  of  Central  Pan-Germany  according 
to  the  plan  of  1895. 

3.  To  take  advantage  of  these  successive  offen- 
sives on  the  Eastern  fronts  in  order  to  strike  at  the 
very  vitals  of  Germany's  allies,  properly  so-called : 
that  is  to  say,  under  color  of  helping  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  to  defend  themselves 
against  Russia,  Serbia,  and  Roumania,  to  organize 
those  three  countries  militarily  and  economically 
to  the  precise  degree  and  in  the  precise  form  nec- 
essary to  bring  it  about  that  even,  at  need,  with- 
out changing  their  ancient  names  and  the  frontiers 
of  1914,  they  should  contribute  to  practical  pur- 
pose, and  almost  without  suspecting  it,  to  the 
constitution  of  Central  Pan-Germany.  The  plan 
of  1895  assigned  to  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria, 
and  Turkey  an  essential  and  indispensable  part 
to  play  in  its  execution. 

Let  us,  first  of  all,  prove,  with  the  aid  of  a  docu- 
ment of  unquestionable  authenticity  twenty-two 
years  old,  that  this  was  actually  the  plan  of  the 
Berlin  Staff. 

The  Pangermanist  plan  of  1895,  which  is  that 
of  Central  Pan-Germany,  the  formation  of  which 
is  the  first  condition  of  carrying  out  all  the  other 
Pangermanist  plans,  is  set  forth  in  detail  in  a 
pamphlet  published  at  Berlin  in  1895,  with  a 
colored  map,  under  the  title,  Greater  Germany  and 

144 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Central  Europe  about  1950.  The  extraordinary 
importance  of  this  pamphlet  is  no  longer  open  to 
question,  for  these  three  reasons.  First:  from 
1895  on  it  was  spread  broadcast  among  the  Ger- 
man masses  by  the  Pangermanist  League  (All- 
deutsche  Verband),  whose  action  after  that  time 
in  making  war  inevitable  was  as  deplorable  as  it 
was  persistent  and  notorious.  Second:  every- 
thing points  to  the  probability  that  this  action  of 
the  Pangermanist  League  toward  executing  a 
concrete  scheme  of  annexations  was  secretly  but 
very  definitely  agreed  upon  with  the  Berlin 
Grand  Staff.  Third:  the  force  of  this  assump- 
tion is  peremptorily  proved  by  the  fact  that  the 
German  Grand  Staff,  from  the  beginning  of  the 
second  phase  of  the  war,  has  carried  it  on  in  a  way 
exactly  in  accord  with  the  political  Pangermanist 
plan  set  forth  in  the  pamphlet  of  189$. 

In  very  truth,  after  an  interval  of  a  score  of 
years,  coincidences  so  perfect  as  these  between 
plans  and  their  execution  assuredly  cannot  be 
fortuitous.  The  verification  of  what  I  say  is  sup- 
plied by  the  map  printed  on  page  146,  a  repro- 
duction of  the  map  of  the  pamphlet  of  1895,  on 
which  I  have  had  the  colors  represented  by  lines 
and  have  shown  the  German  front  as  it  was  at 
the  end  of  1917.  Now,  it  will  be  noticed  that  the 
German  armies  have  stopped  a  little  beyond  the 
lines  marking  the  future  frontiers  of  Central  Pan- 
Germany,  or  in  the  positions  that  are  necessary 

145 


Pang*rmanisi  Plan  of  1895 

of  Me  6eraMK  Canffderalioa 
to  be  estab/aheJ  in  Central  furope. 

ft  Me  Tributary  States  t» 
bt  established. 


MAP  PRINTED  IN  '  GREATER  GERMANY  AND  CENTRAL  EUROPE 
ABOUT  1950'  (1895) 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

to  make  sure  the  creation  of  the  satellite  states  of 
Pan-Germany  to  the  eastward.  Thus,  on  the 
Eastern  front,  they  have  stopped  on  lines  laid 
down  beforehand,  even  when  they  had  before 
them  no  Russian  troops  capable  of  opposing  their 
further  advance.  Our  map  also  enables  us  to 
declare  on  the  most  irrefutable  testimony  that  the 
offensive  against  Italy  —  that  is  to  say,  first  of 
all,  the  seizure  of  Italian  Friuli,  which  was  such  a 
surprise  to  the  Allied  Staffs  —  was  provided  for 
most  definitely  in  the  plan  of  1895.  In  fact,  on 
our  map  Italian  Friuli  is  plainly  included  in  Pan- 
Germany,  and  in  the  text  of  the  pamphlet,  pub- 
lished in  Berlin  twenty-two  years  ago,  is  a  passage 
on  the  rectification  of  frontiers  between  Italy  and 
Austria  which  the  Pangermanists  had  already 
determined  to  be  indispensable.  On  page  19  we 
read  as  follows :  — 

'The  frontier  between  Italy  and  Austria  will 
start  at  Marmolata,  and  will  run  by  Monte  Cris- 
tallo,  Monte  Croce,  and  Paralba  to  the  water- 
shed between  the  Piave  and  the  Tagliamento.  It 
will  continue  by  Monte  Cridola,  Monte  Premag- 
giore,  Monte  Valcolda,  and  Spilimberga,  and  will 
follow  the  line  of  the  lower  Tagliamento  to  the  sea.' 

Now,  on  November  22,  Italian  aviators  re- 
corded the  fact,  confirmed  by  German  officer- 
prisoners,  that  extensive  fortifications  had  been 
constructed  by  the  Austro-Germans  to  form  a 
Hindenburg  line  'on  the  line  of  the  Tagliamento,' 

147 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


that  is  to  say,  precisely  on  the  frontier  line  laid 
down  in  1895. 

Lastly,  the  Austro-Boche  schemes  of  annexa- 
tion in  this  region  have  been  plainly  asserted.  In 
the  orders  of  the  day  to  his  troops  on  November 
4,  the  Emperor  of  Austria  described  the  invasion 
of  Italian  Friuli  as  the  '  liberation  of  my  territory 
on  the  Adriatic  littoral/  a  phrase  which  suggests 
explicitly  both  the  idea  of  premeditation  and  the 
idea  of  conquest. 

Let  us  remark  in  passing  that,  as  in  the  matter 
of  Poland  and  indeed  in  all  others,  the  Emperor 
of  Austria  cooperates  docilely  in  the  execution  of 
the  Pangermanist  ideas  of  Berlin.  Certain  per- 
sons of  the  Entente  believe  that  the  government 
of  Vienna  is  subjugated  by  Berlin,  whose  tyran- 
nous yoke  it  would  be  glad  to  shake  off.  Nothing 
of  the  sort  is  true.  Even  though  the  hegemony 
of  Berlin  may  be  offensive  to  Austrian  self-esteem, 
the  leaders  in  Vienna  and  Budapest  submit  to  it 
readily  enough  for  this  simple  reason :  the  dynasty 
of  the  Hapsburgs  is  quite  well  aware  that  its 
fate  is  bound  up  with  that  of  the  Prussian  autoc- 
racy, and  that  it  can  save  itself  only  by  saving 
the  Hohenzollerns,  that  is  to  say,  by  strengthen- 
ing the  enormous  extension  of  Prussian  milita- 
rism. If  this  point  of  view  had  been  grasped  at 
the  outset  by  the  Entente,  blunders  resulting  in 
endless  evil  consequences  could  never  have  been 
committed. 

148 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Our  pamphlet  and  map  prove,  therefore,  that  in 
the  second  phase  of  the  war  the  German  Staff 
subordinated  everything  to  the  determination  to 
create  Central  Pan-Germany  first  of  all.  This 
determination  is  easily  explained  when  one  is 
familiar  with  the  Pangermanist  ideas  and  the 
conditions  of  their  fulfillment.  Brought  abruptly 
face  to  face,  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne,  with  a 
redoubtable  coalition  which  it  had  not  foreseen, 
and  which  threatened  to  take  in  the  whole  world, 
the  German  Staff  realized  perfectly  that  the 
military  forces  alone  of  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  in  view  of  the  ineradicable  hostility 
of  the  Slavs  and  Latins  who  form  the  majority  of 
the  population  of  the  Empire  of  the  Hapsburgs, 
and  because  of  the  insufficient  food-supply  of  the 
Central  Empires,  could  not  resist  the  combined 
forces  of  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  exhaustive  investigations  pur- 
sued for  more  than  twenty  years  in  preparation 
for  putting  into  effect  the  Pangermanist  plan,  had 
shown  the  German  staff  that  a  Central  Pan-Ger- 
many actually  constituted,  comprising,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  Central  Empires,  the  Balkans  and 
Turkey,  would  contain  all  the  military  and  econ- 
omic elements  necessary  to  confront  a  formidable 
coalition. 

Indeed,  it  was  because  it  had  been  established 
before  the  war  that  Central  Pan-Germany  would 
supply  Germany  with  the  means  of  universal 

149 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


domination,  that  the  war  was  begun.  Under 
these  conditions,  then,  it  was  absolutely  logical 
that  the  German  Staff,  before  seeking  to  obtain 
a  final  decision  in  the  West,  should  determine 
to  create  a  Central  Pan-Germany,  either  at  the 
expense  of  Russia,  Serbia,  and  Roumania,  or,  by 
dissembling  its  purpose,  at  the  expense  of  Berlin's 
own  allies,  who,  by  the  very  fact  of  this  creation 
of  Pan-Germany  would  automatically  become 
more  and  more  completely  the  vassals  of  Ger- 
many. 

It  is  not  true,  therefore,  as  people  still  persist  in 
saying  among  the  Allies,  because  of  their  extraor- 
dinary and  obstinate  ignorance  of  the  Panger- 
manist  plan,  that  the  Germans,  for  three  years 
past,  have  by  their  circular  offensives  simply  been 
seizing  territorial  pledges ;  no  —  during  the  second 
phase  of  the  war  the  Germans  have  taken  posses- 
sion of  the  various  fragments  of  territory  essential 
to  the  formation  of  Central  Pan-Germany,  not 
regarding  them  as  pledges,  but  as  acquisitions 
long  anticipated,  or  as  destined  to  remain  forever 
in  subjection  to  the  will  of  Berlin. 

Of  course,  to  refute  my  interpretation  of  events, 
any  one  can  say,  'But  Verdun  proves  that  the 
Germans  wished  to  break  through  on  the  Western 
front  early  in  1916.'  This  objection  has  only  an 
apparent  or  very  imperfect  force.  In  reality,  the 
German  offensive  against  Verdun  was  of  a  two- 
fold character  which  is  not  yet  understood  by  the 

150 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Allies,  still  because  of  their  ignorance  of  the  Pan- 
germanist  plan.  In  the  conception  of  the  German 
staff  the  Verdun  operation  had,  not  one,  but  two 
objectives  —  a  maximum  and  a  minimum.  If 
the  maximum  objective  could  have  been  secured, 
that  is  to  say,  if  the  morale  of  the  French  poilus 
could  have  been  destroyed  by  the  length  and  the 
savagery  of  the  German  offensive;  if  the  Germans 
had  succeeded  in  breaking  through  and  taking 
Paris,  France,  struck  to  the  heart,  would  unques- 
tionably have  been  put  out  of  the  war.  Verdun, 
therefore,  may  and  should  be  regarded  as  an  at- 
tempt to  break  through  and  to  resume  the  war- 
fare of  movement. 

But  what  must  be  clearly  understood  is  that, 
even  if  they  had  been  certain  at  the  outset  that 
this  maximum  result  was  absolutely  impossible  of 
attainment,  still  the  Germans  would  have  under- 
taken the  Verdun  operation;  for  to  them  it  had 
its  full  justification  in  view  of  the  extreme  im- 
portance of  the  minimum  objective  which  it  had 
in  the  conception  of  the  Staff  —  an  objective 
which,  as  we  shall  see,  was  in  conformity  with  the 
general  decision  at  Berlin  to  constitute  Central 
Pan-Germany  first  of  all,  before  really  thinking  of 
annihilating  France  by  a  genuine  offensive. 

This  demonstration  brings  me  to  the  setting 
forth  of  a  number  of  points  of  view  which  have 
never,  to  my  knowledge,  been  suggested. 

Not  until  the  early  days  of  1916  did  Germany, 


PA  N-GERMA  NY 


as  a  sequel  of  the  recent  seizure  of  Serbia,  come 
into  direct  geographical  contact  with  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey.  Berlin  was  still  a  long  way  from 
having  organized  the  various  resources  of  those 
two  countries  —  resources  which  were  indispen- 
sable to  her  to  enable  her  to  continue  the  war. 

Now,  at  that  very  time,  certain  persons  in 
France  were  making  persistent  efforts  to  have  the 
French  and  British  supply  the  expeditionary 
force  at  Saloniki  with  the  powerful  means  of  ac- 
tion which  it  ought  to  have.  These  efforts  were 
on  the  point  of  success,  for  a  very  large  body  of 
public  opinion  had  become  convinced  of  the  con- 
siderable importance  of  the  Balkan  theatre.  If 
therefore  the  Eastern  army  of  the  Allies  had 
received  quickly  the  powerful  reinforcements 
which  the  leaders  in  Paris  and  London  did  not 
give  it,  as  the  Bulgarians  had  not  as  yet  the  neces- 
sary materiel  for  fortifying  themselves  strongly, 
it  is  exceedingly  probable  that  the  Allies  would 
have  been  able  to  recover  the  Danube  front  — 
that  is,  the  strategic  position  which  is  the  key  of 
the  whole  war;  for  its  possession  alone,  by  putting 
into  effect  automatically  the  land  blockade  of 
Austria-Germany,  and  depriving  her  of  the  men 
and  supplies  without  which  she  could  not  go  on 
fighting,  would  have  assured  the  Entente  a  com- 
plete victory,  with  efforts  tenfold  less  vigorous 
than  those  which  have  been  compulsorily  decided 
upon,  with  the  result  that  we  know. 

152 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

The  German  Staff,  realizing  fully  that  the 
lengthening  of  the  war  would  be  of  advantage 
only  to  that  one  of  the  two  groups  of  belligerents 
which  should  be  in  possession  of  the  Danube 
front,  spied  an  immense  peril  in  the  campaign  car- 
ried on  in  France  in  favor  of  Saloniki.  It  deter- 
mined therefore,  at  any  cost,  to  prevent  the  Allies 
from  ascribing  to  their  actions  in  the  Balkans  the 
importance  which  would  have  made  it  possible  to 
bring  to  naught  all  the  Pangermanist  plans.  To 
divert  the  attention  of  the  Allies  from  Saloniki- 
Belgrade,  a  violent  and  persistent  offensive  against 
Verdun  was  the  best  expedient  that  could  be 
imagined,  given  the  fact  that  the  Pangermanist 
scheme  was  at  that  time  wholly  unknown  to  the 
Allied  leaders. 

In  fact,  the  Verdun  operation,  by  threatening 
the  very  heart  of  France,  presented  from  the 
German  standpoint  this  enormous  psychological 
advantage,  that  it  apparently  justified  those  of 
the  French  and  British  leaders  who  at  that  time 
regarded  the  Saloniki  expedition  with  the  oppo- 
site of  sympathy.  Indeed,  early  in  1916  they  were 
still  claiming  that  the  Balkans  could  not  have  any 
decisive  influence  on  the  result  of  the  war,  since 
they  were  sure,  as  they  declared,  that  they  could 
break  through  the  Western  front  —  which  they 
called  the  most  important  one  —  whenever  and 
wherever  they  chose. 

Under  these  conditions  it  is  easy  to  see  why  a 

153 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


part  of  the  press  also  —  and  hence  of  public  opin- 
ion —  was  hostile  to  the  Saloniki  expedition,  in 
France,  but  especially  in  England.  This  being 
so,  a  vigorous  offensive  against  Verdun  could  not 
fail  to  strengthen  these  currents  running  counter 
to  the  Balkan  expedition  by  seeming  to  justify  the 
opposition  that  had  been  offered  to  it.  Thus  the 
minimum  —  but  exceedingly  important  —  objec- 
tive of  the  Verdun  operation  consisted  in  prevent- 
ing the  Allies  from  shifting  the  chief  theatre  of  the 
war  to  the  Balkans  in  the  beginning  of  1916. 
This  minimum  objective  was  completely  attained. 

Unquestionably  the  Verdun  operation  was  ex- 
pensive to  the  Kaiser's  troops;  but  in  reality  these 
enormous  sacrifices  had  their  justification,  since 
they  resulted  in  enabling  Berlin  to  complete  the 
formation  of  Central  Pan-Germany,  which  alone 
could  furnish  the  means  of  contending  against  the 
world-wide  coalition.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
Verdun,  by  reason  of  the  Allies'  ignorance  of  the 
Pangermanist  plan,  caused  them  to  throw  away 
their  last  chance  of  sending  sufficient  reinforce- 
ments to  the  Balkan  front  before  the  Austro-Ger- 
mans  and  Bulgars  had  the  necessary  time  and 
materiel  to  make  it,  humanly  speaking,  about  as 
hard  to  break  through  as  the  Western  front. 

Third  phase  —  from  December,  1917,  to  -  — . 
As  Central  Pan-Germany  has  become  an  accom- 
plished fact  in  thirty-eight  months,  and  as  its  mil- 
itary and  political  forces  have  been  sufficiently 

154 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

developed,  the  combined  consequences  of  the 
length  of  the  war  and  of  the  existence  of  Central 
Pan-Germany,  have  manifested  themselves  in 
accordance  with  the  anticipations  of  the  German 
Staff.  As  Russia,  under  the  government  of  the 
Tsar,  was  not  put  in  a  condition  to  sustain  a  long 
struggle  either  morally  or  materially,  and  as  she 
was,  later,  completely  disorganized  by  the  Max- 
imalist traitors  and  maniacs,  she  has  gone  under. 
As  a  result,  Roumania  has  been  reduced  to  im- 
potence. Thus,  at  this  moment,  only  the  Allied 
army  at  Saloniki  continues  to  embarrass  the  Ger- 
man Staff.  But  that  army  not  having  been  rein- 
forced sufficiently  to  form  as  dangerous  a  menace 
as  was  essential,  the  Staff  has  already,  in  effect,  a 
sufficiently  free  hand  in  the  East  to  enter  upon  the 
third  and  last  phase  of  the  war,  that  is  to  say,  to 
concentrate  on  the  Western  front  the  whole  of  the 
disposable  forces  of  Pan-Germany,  — •  Germans, 
Austro-Hungarians,  Bulgarians,  and  Turks,  —  in 
order  to  make  another  trial  of  the  war  of  move- 
ment likely  to  bring  about  the  final  decision. 

At  this  moment  the  concentration  is  proceeding 
with  all  possible  speed.  But  we  must  thoroughly 
grasp  the  fact  that  in  the  German  scheme  the  gen- 
eral offensive  in  the  West  is  regarded  as  a  very 
complex  operation,  necessitating  recourse  to  the 
strategy  of  the  political  sciences,  and  hence  of 
national  psychology,  which  lies  at  the  root  of  all 
the  German  pacifist  manoeuvres. 

155 


CHAPTER    IX 

GERMAN    PACIFIST    MANOEUVRES 

IN  reality  Germany  has  succeeded  in  creating 
Central  Pan-Germany  only  with  the  aid,  since  the 
beginning  of  the  second  phase  of  the  war,  of  her 
six  main  pacifist  manoeuvres :  a  separate  peace  be- 
tween Berlin  and  one  of  the  Entente  Allies;  a 
separate  peace  between  Turkey,  Bulgaria,  and 
Austria-Hungary  and  the  Entente ;  the  democrat- 
ization of  Germany;  peace  through  the  Interna- 
tional ;  the  armistice  trick;  and  the  drawn  game  of 
the  deceptive  formula,  'peace  without  annexa- 
tions or  indemnities.' 

These  six  manoeuvres,  which  have  served  in 
some  sort  as  a  screen  for  the  never-ending  military 
achievements  of  the  German  armies,  had  as  their 
chief  object  the  exploitation  to  the  utmost  extent 
of  the  intellectual  lacunae  of  which  the  Germans 
had  detected  the  existence  among  the  Allies  — 
that  is  to  say .  — 

I.  The  incredible  yet  indubitable  ignorance  on 
their  part  of  the  Pangermanist  plan.  Even  at 
the  present  moment  this  ignorance  is  still  so  great 
that  some  of  the  leaders  and  some  even  of  the 
great  newspapers  of  the  Entente  are  wondering 
what  Germany's  real  war-aims  can  be,  although 

156 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

they  have  been  laid  bare  for  twenty- two  years  in 
numberless  German  publications,  and  the  whole 
German  people  knows  them,  and  the  geographical 
boundaries  of  Pan-Germany  correspond  exactly 
to  those  indicated  in  the  basic  plan  of  1895,  as  our 
map  shows.  It  is  this  undeniable  ignorance  on 
the  part  of  the  Allies  which  has  enabled  the  Ger- 
mans constantly  to  spread  the  belief  that  they 
were  going  to  stop;  whereas  in  reality  they  have 
planned  and  executed  without  a  pause  the  series 
of  offensives  destined  to  constitute  Central  Pan- 
Germany. 

2.  The  credulity  of  the  Allied  diplomacy,  which 
ever  since  the  outbreak  of  war  has  allowed  itself 
to  be  deluded  into  incessant  negotiations,  official 
or  semi-official,  with  the  Turks,  the  Bulgars,  and 
the  government  of  Vienna.     This  credulity  con- 
tributed largely  to  the  loss  by  the  Allies  of  the 
Danube  front,  the  key  to  the  war. 

3.  The  credulity  of  the  Allied  Socialists,  which 
is  as  extraordinary  as  that  of  the  diplomatists. 
The  Socialists  have  been  hoodwinked  by  means 
of  the  Stockholm  manoeuvre,  which  has  had  the 
following   disastrous    results:    the    accession    to 
power  of  Lenine;  anarchy  in  Russia;  the  capture 
of  Riga;  the  conquest  of  the  Baltic;  the  fact  that 
many  Allied  Socialists  have  declared  their  adher- 
ence to  the  Boche  formula  of  'no  annexations  or 
indemnities,'  without  a  suspicion  that  its  applica- 
tion would  assure  the  overwhelming  triumph  of 

157 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


Prussian  militarism  and  the  autocracy ;  the  pierc- 
ing of  the  Italian  front  through  the  'defeatist' 
campaign;  and,  finally,  the  armistice  with  Russia 
and  Roumania,  which  puts  them  at  Germany's 
discretion  while  leaving  her  at  liberty  to  devote 
all  the  effectives  at  her  disposal  to  the  final  offen- 
sive in  the  West. 

This  last  manoeuvre  was  sure  to  be  attended  by 
a  lot  of  others,  of  which  the  chief  are  easily  de- 
tected already.  Portugal  is  to  be  detached  from 
the  Entente.  The  recent  pronunciamento,  issued 
at  Lisbon  early  in  December,  1917,  has  begun  the 
process.  Switzerland,  deeply  undermined  by  the 
German  propaganda,  as  was  proved  by  the  dis- 
turbances at  Zurich  in  November  last,  is  to  be 
violated.  If  the  passage  of  troops  through  Swit- 
zerland should  become  possible,  the  Germans 
would  seize  Marseilles  and  Toulon.  France 
would  then  be  cut  off  from  the  Mediterranean, 
and  the  situation  for  which  the  Boche  propaganda 
has  long  been  laying  wires  in  Spain,  would  then 
produce  all  the  results  foreseen.  The  scheme  is  to 
align  Spain  against  the  Entente  through  the  me- 
dium of  the  junta  of  pro-German  officers  who  are 
to  create  a  military  dictatorship,  receiving  its 
orders  from  Berlin  and  managed  by  Prince  von 
Ratibor,  German  Ambassador  at  Madrid. 

To  sum  up  —  the  '  idealistic'  offensive  of  Pan- 
Germany  against  all  of  Western  Europe  which  is 
still  outside  the  rays  of  the  light  that  shines  from 

158 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

Berlin,  as  it  is  projected  by  the  Staff  of  William 
II,  is  to  be  executed  finally  by  means  of  a  land 
attack,  on  a  line  which  will  form  a  complete 
envelopment  on  the  day  when  the  intrigues  of 
Berlin  have  reached  their  fruition  in  Switzerland 
and  Spain.  Furthermore,  it  is  probable  that  the 
attack  on  the  Western  front  will  be  made  up  of 
several  simultaneous  Verduns,  in  order  to  involve 
the  Franco- British  troops,  admirable  in  their  gal- 
lantry and  courage,  but  manifestly  fatigued  by 
three  years  and  a  half  of  atrocious  warfare,  in  a 
momentary  weakness  which  will  make  possible 
the  piercing  of  the  wall  behind  which  the  freedom 
of  the  world  is  still  sheltered. 

It  is  clear,  moreover,  that  the  general  offensive 
of  the  Pan-German  forces  against  the  Western 
front  must,  in  order  to  be  successful,  take  place 
before  American  troops,  having  gone  through 
the  training  that  is  indispensable  to  make  them 
into  effective  fighting  men,  have  arrived  in  suffi- 
cient numbers  to  reinforce  that  front. 

Let  us  glance  now  at  the  other  side.  I  f  the  Ger- 
man offensive  now  in  preparation  on  the  West 
presents  a  very  serious  and  undeniable  danger,  we 
must  consider  as  well  that  it  will  have  to  reckon 
with  many  contingencies.  The  disposable  forces 
of  Pan-Germany  which  can  be  concentrated  on 
the  Western  front  are  tired  out,  whereas  the  Allied 
troops  on  that  front  are  infinitely  more  numerous, 
better  equipped  and  disciplined  than  they  were 

159 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


at  the  time  of  the  attack  on  Verdun.  It  is  ex- 
tremely probable,  therefore,  that  the  Verdun 
achievement  will  be  repeated  on  a  gigantic  scale, 
thus  postponing  the  definitive  decision  and  giving 
the  Allies  another  chance  to  conquer  Pan-Ger- 
many if  they  decide  to  make  use  at  last  of  the 
long  unemployed  forces  existing  in  Pan-Germany 
itself  which  I  have  described  in  a  previous  paper. 

The  grave  nature  of  these  contingencies  is  well 
understood  at  Berlin.  That  is  why  the  prepara- 
tion for  the  general  offensive  against  the  Western 
front  is  sure  to  be  attended  by  the  same  pacifist 
manoeuvres  which,  by  bringing  about  anarchy  in 
the  Russian  front  and  rear,  have  enabled  the  Ger- 
man Staff  to  avoid  an  expensive  military  move- 
ment which  the  moral  downfall  of  Russia  has 
made  unnecessary,  while  leaving  the  Germans  to 
become  de  facto  masters  of  the  former  Empire  of 
the  Tsars  by  virtue  of  the  monstrous  Maximalist 
delusion. 

It  is  plain,  in  truth,  that  if  —  let  us  pose  this 
hypothesis  in  order  to  make  our  argument  plausi- 
ble —  a  decided  moral  backsliding  should  mani- 
fest itself  among  the  Allies  in  the  West,  the  general 
military  offensive  against  them  of  the  forces  of 
Pan-Germany,  involving  such  great  losses  and  so 
many  contingencies,  would  cease  to  have  any 
purpose;  for  fallacious  negotiations  on  the  basis 
of  a  so-called  peace  by  agreement,  of  which  the 
negotiations  of  the  Boches  with  the  Maximalists 

160 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

give  a  very  succinct  idea,  would  suffice  to  assure 
Germany  of  a  complete  victory,  avoiding  the 
necessity  of  its  making  itself  manifest  by  a  bril- 
liant military  operation  as  a  tangible  sign. 

For  this  reason.  The  war-expenditures  of 
France  and  Great  Britain  are  so  formidable  that, 
unless  the  conflict  ends  with  the  utter  defeat  of 
Germany,  making  possible  a  progressive  repara- 
tion for  the  incredible  damage  caused  by  her,  a 
few  months  of  the  Boche  peace  —  the  '  peace  by 
agreement*  —  would  suffice,  if  our  hypothesis 
should  prove  true,  to  cause  the  French  and  Eng- 
lish bank-notes  to  lose  their  value,  and  there  would 
ensue  in  France  and  Great  Britain  a  financial, 
economic,  and  moral  disaster  of  such  gigantic  pro- 
portions that  those  two  countries  could  no  longer 
offer  the  slightest  resistance  to  the  constantly  aug- 
mented economic  and  military  resources  of  trium- 
phant Pan-Germany.  At  that  moment  the  Ger- 
mans, without  the  slightest  risk,  could  overrun 
France  as  far  as  Bayonne.  And  on  the  day  when 
affairs  reached  this  pass,  the  Germans  would  meet 
with  no  serious  obstacle  to  their  projected  inva- 
sion of  the  British  Isles. 

The  analysis  we  have  made  of  the  German 
methods  of  warfare  proves  that  the  strategy  of  the 
Grand  Staff  at  Berlin,  infinitely  more  complex 
than  the  purely  military  variety,  is  a  strategy  of 
the  political  sciences. 

161 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


This  is  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  creation  of 
the  complex  Pangermanist  scheme  has  brought 
the  Germans  to  realize  that  the  solution  of  every 
great  problem  susceptible  of  statement  demands 
for  its  performance  an  accurate  acquaintance 
with,  and,  generally  speaking,  the  employment  of 
six  well-defined  factors:  a  military  factor;  a  naval 
factor  (in  fact,  a  problem  that  seems  to  affect  only 
the  centre  of  Europe  always  reacts  to  some  extent 
on  the  general  naval  situation) ;  a  geographical  fac- 
tor; an  ethnological  factor;  an  economic  factor; 
and  a  national-psychologic  factor. 

It  results  from  this  that  a  military  operation  to 
be  executed  on  land,  on  the  sea,  or  in  the  air,  as 
soon  as  it  proves  to  have  any  relation  whatsoever 
to  the  general  conduct  of  the  war,  is  not  decided 
upon  at  Berlin  until  the  following  points  have 
been  determined  by  means  of  a  documentation 
always  kept  in  sight. 

1.  The  military  or  naval,  geographical,  ethno- 
graphical,   economic,    and    national-psychologic 
conditions  of  the  execution  of  the  operation  pro- 
posed. 

2.  If  the  operation  should  be  successful,  what 
would  be  its  military,  naval,  geographical,  eth- 
nological,   economic,    and    national-psychologic 
reactions  on  the  general  situation? 

The  result  of  these  considerations  is  that  the 
solution  of  every  problem  presented  by  the  gen- 
eral conduct  of  the  war  requires  the  solution  of  an 

162 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

equation  with  six  unknown  quantities,  not  one  of 
which  is  negligible. 

To  place  in  relief  the  extreme  importance  of 
this  last  aspect  of  the  matter,  I  will  take  as  an 
example  the  unknown  ethnographic  quantity. 
The  determination  of  this  quantity  is  so  indispen- 
sable to  the  proper  conduct  of  the  world-war,  that 
the  German  Grand  Staff,  although  already  pos- 
sessed of  a  documentation  of  exceptional  value  on 
the  ethnographic  questions,  carefully  got  together 
in  peace-time,  does  not,  nevertheless,  deem  itself 
justified  in  neglecting  other  sources  of  informa- 
tion. That  is  why  it  has  mobilized  in  its  service 
all  Germans  who  are  specially  familiar  with  for- 
eign countries,  particularly  those  who  are  experts 
as  to  the  various  nationalities  of  Austria-Hungary, 
the  Balkans,  and  Russia.  Thus  no  major  opera- 
tion which  may  have  an  effect  on  foreign  peoples 
is  decided  upon  at  Berlin  until  the  opinion  of 
these  specialists  has  been  most  seriously  consid- 
ered. 

It  was  by  virtue  of  this  information,  —  of  a 
purely  psychological  and  intellectual  order,  — 
that  the  Germans  were  able  to  obtain  in  the  East, 
and  especially  in  Russia,  the  successes  of  which 
we  are  all  aware,  although  the  normal  condition  of 
affairs  was  exceedingly  unfavorable  to  them,  and 
would  have  remained  so,  had  the  Allies  known 
enough  to  make  the  very  slight  effort  which  would 
have  sufficed  to  effect  that  result. 

163 


PA  N-GERM  A  N  Y 


To  summarize,  then  —  it  is  in  the  strategy  of 
scientific  politics  —  that  is  to  say,  in  the  intellec- 
tual management  of  the  war  in  every  domain  - 
that  the  whole  secret  of  the  German  victories  re- 
sides. In  like  manner,  it  is  the  ignorance  on  the 
part  of  the  Allies  of  this  kind  of  strategy  which 
explains  their  successive  set-backs  and  their  con- 
stant disappointments  despite  the  superabund- 
ance of  their  material  resources.  Now,  this  ig- 
norance is  so  undeniable  that,  after  three  years 
and  a  half  of  war,  it  is  impossible  to  point  to  a 
single  operation  of  theirs,  of  which  the  geographi- 
cal, ethnological,  economic,  and  national-psy- 
chologic conditions  of  its  execution  have  been 
first  seriously  studied.  They  have  not  even 
thought  of  such  a  thing;  and  at  the  present  mo- 
ment their  leaders  have  no  organization  intellec- 
tually equipped  to  solve  a  complete  strategic 
equation. 

But  such  an  organization  is  absolutely  essential 
to  winning  a  victory.  All  the  elements  exist  for 
creating  it  whenever  they  choose,  in  such  wise 
that  it  will  give  practical  results  with  comparative 
promptitude. 


CHAPTER   X 

THE   WESTERN    FRONT 

I  HOPE  that  I  have  shown  in  my  last  chapter 
what  the  real,  deep-seated  reason  is  of  the  suc- 
cesses that  the  Germans  have  achieved  over  the 
Allies.  We  have  seen  that,  while  the  Germans 
are  past  masters  in  burglary  and  murder,  and,  in 
committing  these  thefts  and  other  crimes,  employ 
the  most  highly  perfected  material  resources,  the 
most  thorough  study  of  chemistry,  and  the  most 
ingenious  mechanical  inventions,  they  are  equally 
far  advanced  in  the  purely  intellectual  domain, 
which  enables  them  to  derive  from  the  four  fun- 
damental political  sciences  —  geography,  eth- 
nography, political  economy,  and  national  psy- 
chology —  important  practical  results.  Now, 
the  Allies,  having  even  at  this  moment  no  com- 
prehension of  the  extraordinary  potency  of  these 
invisible  forces,  are  making  no  use  of  them.  The 
result  is  that  they  are  still  in  considerably  less 
advantageous  condition  to  contend  with  the 
Boches,  notwithstanding  their  vast  resources. 

Our  deductions  have  led  us  also  to  define  the 
'strategy  of  the  political  sciences'  and  the  in- 
tegral strategic  equation  which  makes  its  appli- 
cation possible.  This  equation  contains  six  un- 

165 


PA  N  -G  ER  MA  N  Y 


known  quantities:  military,  naval,  geographical, 
ethnographical,  politico-economic,  and  national- 
psychologic.  The  facts  established  by  three  and 
a  half  years  of  war  prove  that  it  is  absolutely  in- 
dispensable to  find  these  six  unknown  quantities 
before  undertaking  any  operation  capable  of 
exerting  an  appreciable  influence  on  the  general 
development  of  the  war.  Indeed,  the  amazing 
and  perilous  present  state  of  affairs  is  susceptible 
of  this  explanation,  which  summarizes  all  others : 
the  general  operations  of  the  Staff  at  Berlin  have 
been  planned  and  carried  out  in  accordance  with 
the  strategy  of  the  political  sciences.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  operations  of  the  Entente  have 
been  conducted  in  such  utter  ignorance  of  this 
strategy,  that  none  of  them  could  reasonably  be 
expected  to  succeed. 

It  is  of  supreme  importance  for  Americans  to 
understand  quite  clearly  the  fundamental  cause 
of  the  strategic  errors  of  the  Entente.  Indeed, 
such  a  clear  understanding  is  the  only  means 
by  which  the  United  States  can  avoid  sacrifices 
in  men  and  money  infinitely  greater  than  are 
necessary,  as  the  European  Allies  of  three  and  a 
half  years  must  agree.  I  shall,  therefore,  treat 
this  part  of  my  subject  by  appealing  to  the  un- 
mitigated truth,  without  the  slightest  regard  for 
other  considerations. 


166 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 


THE   THEORY    THAT   THE    WESTERN    FRONT 
IS    THE    MOST    IMPORTANT   ONE 

I  propose  to  show  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  all 
the  strategic  errors  of  the  Entente  are  derived 
from  this:  that  the  Western  front  has  been  re- 
garded as  the  most  important  front.  The  first 
source  of  this  idea  is  the  incredible  but  undoubted 
ignorance  of  the  Pangermanist  scheme  on  the 
part  of  the  leaders  of  the  Entente.  This  ignorance 
is  a  phenomenon  which  I  set  down,  but  which  I 
cannot  explain.  The  Pangermanist  scheme  dates 
from  1895.  Since  then  it  has  been  elaborated  in 
Germany  in  thousand  of  lectures.  Innumerable 
pamphlets,  spread  broadcast,  have  made  this 
scheme  familiar  to  an  immense  majority  of  the 
sixty  millions  of  Germans.  Moreover,  it  was  for 
the  reason  that  this  scheme  was  carefully  devised 
a  long  while  beforehand  that  the  Germans  became 
earnestly  desirous  of  its  execution,  and,  generally 
speaking,  went  cheerfully  forth  to  war,  believing, 
doubtless,  that  it  would  be  short,  but  firmly  con- 
vinced that  it  would  bring  them  enormous  booty 
-  a  bait  which  has  always  set  the  Germans  in 
motion  from  the  beginnings  of  history. 

Now,  despite  the  extraordinary  publicity  of 
the  Pangermanist  scheme  throughout  Germany 
for  twenty-two  years,  the  guiding  spirits  of  the 
Entente  did  not  believe  in  its  existence  during  the 

167 


PA  N-GERM A  N  Y 


first  two  years  of  the  war.  I  agree  that  this  state- 
ment seems  incredible,  but  I  receive  constantly 
so  many  new  proofs  of  its  truth  that  to  doubt  it 
is  impossible. 

This  ignorance  of  the  Pangermanist  scheme  on 
the  part  of  the  Allies  has  had  this  result;  that  they 
have  failed  to  realize  that  Germany  made  war, 
before  all  else,  to  make  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  plan  a  reality,  and  that  that  achievement, 
by  reason  of  its  inevitable  consequences,  would 
suffice  to  assure  Germany  of  the  dominion  of  the 
world.  It  is  this  failure  to  grasp  the  real  war-aim 
pursued  by  Germany,  which  explains  why  the 
supreme  importance  of  the  Danube  front  —  which 
was  the  key  of  the  war,  which  the  Allies  had  in 
their  possession,  and  which  it  was  relatively  easy 
for  them  to  retain  —  did  not  receive  serious  at- 
tention while  it  was  time.  At  the  opening  of 
hostilities,  and  even  for  a  very  long  time  there- 
after, the  leaders  of  the  Allies  were  convinced 
that  Germany  was  fighting  to  rid  herself  of  France, 
and  especially  of  England.  France  and  England 
therefore  undertook  simply  to  fight  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary,  very  little  importance  being 
attributed  to  the  action  of  the  latter.  Practically 
then  the  war  was  regarded,  at  Paris  and  London, 
as  a  sort  of  prize-fight,  in  which  one  of  the  two 
chief  adversaries  —  either  the  French  and  British 
on  the  one  hand  or  Germany  and  Austria  on  the 
other  —  would  fall  in  the  ring. 

168 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

This  quasi- 'sportive*  idea  of  the  war  was  par- 
ticularly prevalent  among  the  British.  Having 
in  reality  no  military  traditions,  they  regarded 
the  conflict  as  a  gigantic  boxing-match,  in  which 
the  best '  slugger '  would  necessarily  be  the  victor. 
So  it  came  about  that  to  the  British  the  war  was, 
and  perhaps  still  is,  solely  a  matter  of  endurance. 
On  the  other  hand,  once  the  war  was  begun  by 
Germany,  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine  inevit- 
ably came  to  the  front  for  the  French.  Now, 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  close  at  hand.  Must  she 
not  be  set  free  first  of  all? 

For  these  diverse  reasons,  the  French  and  Brit- 
ish were  inclined  to  argue  that  the  chief  theatre 
of  operations  was  necessarily  where  the  chief 
adversaries  were,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  all  ap- 
pearance, their  principal  and  mutual  interests  — 
that  is  to  say,  in  the  West.  This  conviction  once 
formed,  this  consequence  was  deduced  from  it  in 
London  and  Paris,  namely,  that  the  Balkans  and 
Turkey  could  have  no  serious  effect  on  the  result 
of  the  war;  that  it  was  not  only  useless,  therefore, 
but  positively  dangerous,  to  send  a  considerable 
force  to  the  East,  because  the  principal  front  — 
that  in  the  West,  where  everything  was  destined 
to  be  decided  —  would  thus  be  deprived  of  the 
benefit  of  armies  which  the  Entente,  taken  by 
surprise  by  the  war,  had  been  obliged  to  raise  and 
equip  in  haste,  and  therefore  had  no  right  to  send 
them  a  long  way  from  home. 

169 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


This  extraordinarily  limited  conception  of  the 
vast  conflict  inaugurated  by  Germany  also  pre- 
vented the  realization  of  this  fact:  if  it  be  true 
that  the  Western  front  is  the  principal  one  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  Germans,  because  there 
alone  can  they  win  a  decisive  victory  over  France 
and  England,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Germans 
could  not  undertake  to  bring  about  such  a  defini- 
tive decision  in  the  West  until  the  day,  the  mo- 
ment indeed,  at  which  we  have  now  arrived, 
when  the  Allies  have  committed  the  error  of  con- 
centrating all  their  forces  in  the  West. 

Furthermore,  we  must  reflect  that  the  Western 
front  could  not  be  the  principal  one  for  the  Allies 
-  the  one,  that  is  to  say,  on  which  to  bring  about 
a  final  decision.  For,  ever  since  the  day  when 
it  was  demonstrated  that  fortified  fronts  which 
could  be  very  rapidly  increased  in  depth  by  means 
of  trenches,  deep  shelters,  and  barbed-wire  en- 
tanglements could  not  be  quickly  pierced,  —  a 
demonstration  which  was  almost  conclusive  in 
October,  1914,  —  it  has  been  contrary  to  common 
sense  for  the  Allies  to  hope  that  they  could  obtain 
on  the  Western  front  a  victory  so  overwhelming 
as  to  compel  Germany  to  abandon  the  Hamburg- 
Persian  Gulf  idea.  But  this  controlling  point  of 
view  was  unheeded  —  a  perfectly  natural  con- 
sequence of  the  Allied  ignorance  of  the  Panger- 
manist  scheme. 


170 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 


II 
THE   MILITARY    EXPERT    OF   THE    'TIMES* 

However  that  may  be,  the  theory  that  the 
Western  front  is  all-important  has  been  repeatedly 
laid  down  by  Colonel  Repington,  lately  the 
military  critic  of  the  London  Times.1 

Finding  myself  compelled,  in  order  to  make 
more  clear  my  indispensable  demonstration,  to 
show  how  far  Colonel  Repington  has  gone  astray, 
and  what  infinite  harm  his  errors  have  done  to 
the  cause  of  the  Entente  by  reason  of  the  mighty 
influence  of  the  Times  which  is  almost  a  national 
organ,  I  conceive  that  no  sinister  motive  can  be 
attributed  to  me  if  I  make,  by  way  of  preamble, 
this  statement.  I  was  one  of  the  first  Frenchmen 
who  favored  the  Franco- British  rapprochement, 
at  a  time  when  public  opinion  in  my  country  was 
opposed  to  that  policy.  To  the  powerful  Times, 
which  has  many  a  time  assisted  me  in  propagating 
my  ideas,  I  am  most  grateful.  To  me  personally, 
therefore,  it  is  really  distressing  to  take  issue  with 
one  of  its  chief  collaborators.  But  according  to 
my  honest  belief,  Colonel  Repington,  because  of 
the  extraordinary  influence  of  the  organ  in  which 
he  writes,  has  been  instrumental  in  leading  the 
Allies  to  commit  errors  in  strategy  which  have 
cost  millions  of  men  and  endangered  the  issue  of 
the  war.  I  feel,  therefore,  in  duty  bound  to  call 

1  Now  of  the  Morning  Post. 

171 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


the  attention  of  the  Allies  to  the  immense  amount 
of  harm  done  by  Colonel  Repington.  His  con- 
stantly repeated  forecasts  have  this  characteristic 
in  common,  that  for  three  years  and  a  half  they 
have  been  falsified  by  events  in  the  most  striking 
way. 

But  the  Repington  peril  still  exists.  In  fact, 
even  to-day  a  large  number  of  Allied  newspapers 
continue  to  reproduce  his  forecasts  because  they 
appear  in  the  Times  as  coming  from  one  having 
authority,  although  any  sort  of  credit  should  have 
been  denied  to  him  a  long  while  since.  But  his 
failure  to  reason  from  the  most  indubitable  indi- 
cations and  the  most  notorious  facts  seems  to  be 
complete.  This  appears  from  certain  passages  in  an 
interview  on  the  general  condition  of  affairs  given 
by  the  colonel  to  the  Temps,  October  10,  1917. 

'The  situation  [declared  the  military  critic  of 
the  Times  at  that  late  date]  is  that  the  Boches  are 
getting  the  worst  of  it  except  in  Boche  commun- 
iques, and  that  they  know  it.  Moreover,  every 
time  that  we  go  into  battle  they  are  beaten.  .  .  . 
Our  losses  are  slight  now  because  we  are  proceed- 
ing according  to  the  plan  of  an  offensive  with  a 
limited  objective.  .  .  .  Our  victories  are  almost 
automatic.  .  .  .  Italy  and  Russia  still  have  very 
strong  effective  forces.  .  .  .  Russia?  Yes,  she  is 
passing  through  a  serious  crisis,  but  we  must  not 
lose  confidence  in  her.  Russia  is  a  jack-in-the- 
box,  and  the  winter  is  working  on  her  side. ' 

172 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

Less  than  a  month  after  these  statements  the 
Italians  suffered  a  serious  disaster,  Russia  went 
to  pieces,  and  Roumania  was  reduced  to  impo- 
tence. Now,  these  disastrous  events  might  very 
easily  have  been  forecast  several  months  before, 
with  the  help  of  the  frequent  and  accordant  in- 
telligence from  Italy  and  Russia.  But  Colonel 
Repington  has  been  so  hypnotized  by  the  West- 
ern front  that  he  has  consistently  refused  to  give 
any  weight  to  what  was  going  on  in  the  rest  of 
Europe.  We  proceed  now  to  trace  the  chrono- 
logical development  and  the  influence  of  his 
theory. 

At  the  end  of  August,  1914,  Colonel  Repington 
set  forth  his  own  conception  of  the  most  important 
front  when  he  described  the  part  to  be  played  by 
the  Russian  armies  on  the  one  hand  and  by  the 
Franco- British  armies  on  the  other,  in  the  words 
quoted  below,  disclosing  at  the  same  time  his 
idea  of  German  strategy.  I  quote  from  Le  Temps 
of  September  i,  1914:  — 

1  We  must  fight,  even  if  we  have  to  fall  back  to 
the  Atlantic,  without  allowing  Germany  to  over- 
whelm us.  It  is  absolutely  indispensable  for  her 
to  have  her  Metz  and  her  Sedan,  and  a  long  war 
would  be  disastrous  for  her  with  her  largely  indus- 
trial population,  her  business  paralyzed,  her  coast 
blockaded.  Her  entire  strategy  is  based  on  these 
considerations,  and  it  should  be  our  aim  to  bring 
this  plan  to  naught  and  to  fight  with  all  our 

173 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


strength,  without  endangering  the  welfare  of  our 
people  by  brilliant  coups  which  would  expose  us 
to  attack  by  the  enemy. 

4  It  is  fear  that  is  behind  the  present  German 
tactics,  borrowed  from  the  dervishes  —  the  Ger- 
man vandalism  and  this  policy  of  terrorizing  the 
civil  population ;  it  is  fear  —  not  physical  fear, 
but  fear  of  the  consequences  which  would  result 
for  her  if  France  and  England  should  not  be 
quickly  and  completely  crushed. 

1  Russia,  for  her  part,  is  performing  the  func- 
tion of  a  "steam-roller."  Her  role  in  the  war  is 
most  important,  and  final  triumph  depends  in 
large  measure  on  the  way  in  which  she  carries  it 
out.  The  Franco-British  armies  have  diverted 
the  main  bulk  of  the  German  armies  from  Russia; 
and  while  the  Allies  operating  in  France  keep 
their  claws  in  that  bulk,  Russia  must  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  opportunity. 

'  The  results  obtained  by  her  thus  far  indicate 
that  such  is  her  purpose. 

'Taking  into  account  the  season  of  the  year 
and  its  natural  concomitants,  Russia  must  reach 
Berlin  within  two  months;  if,  at  the  end  of  that 
time  our  claws  are  still  buried  in  the  mass  of  the 
German  armies  of  the  West,  and  if  Serbia  has  suc- 
ceeded in  maintaining  until  then  her  hold  on  the 
Austrians,  the  strategic  and  political  object  of 
the  war  will  have  been  attained.' 

These  lines  expose  very  clearly  the  germ  of  the 

174 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

theory  of  the  main  front  afterward  developed  by 
Colonel  Repington.  According  to  his  idea,  the 
Franco- British  armies  must  'operate  in  France/ 
Russia  playing  the  part  of  'steam-roller/  moving 
forward  slowly  but  surely  in  such  wise  as  to  reach 
Berlin  in  two  months.  The  plain  inference  from 
these  words  is  that  Colonel  Repington  was  the 
original  inventor  of  the  phrase, '  Russia,  the  steam- 
roller/ Events  have  shown  the  value  of  this 
metaphor. 

The  passage  quoted  proves  in  addition  the  error 
of  Colonel  Repington  as  to  what  military  Russia 
really  was,  as  to  the  condition  of  the  Russian 
fortresses  in  1914,  and  as  to  the  very  different 
condition  of  the  German  armies  and  fortresses  at 
that  same  time.1 

As  the  l  steam-roller '  had  not  arrived  at  Berlin 
in  November,  1914,  according  to  his  forecast, 
Colonel  Repington  gave  the  final  touch  to  his 
theory  of  the  main  front  by  publishing  the  follow- 
ing in  the  middle  of  1915,  when  the  question  arose 
of  sending  Franco- British  troops  to  Serbia :  — 

*I  deem  myself  justified  in  these  reflections  because,  on  page 
414  of  my  book,  Le  Monde  et  la  Guerre  Russo-Japonaise,  published 
in  1906,  eight  years  before  the  war,  I  wrote,  after  much  investiga- 
tion in  Russia  and  the  Far  East:  'Will  Russia  become  again  a 
great  military  power?  First  of  all,  is  the  Russian  people  bent 
upon  it?  Nothing  is  less  certain.  Putting  the  best  face  on  affairs, 
and  recalling  what  happened  in  France  after  1870,  we  must  never- 
theless conclude  that  she  will  not  within  ten  or  fifteen  years  have 
become  again  a  great  military  power,  in  condition,  for  example, 
to  take  part  in  really  effective  fashion  in  a  war  against  Germany.' 

175 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


'What  we  must  do  is  kill  Germans  until  the 
German  losses  mount  up  to  ten  thousand  daily. 
If  we  accomplish  our  task,  we  shall  make  final 
victory  inevitable.  What  we  must  avoid  are 
adventures  which  might  give  Germany  an  oppor- 
tunity to  secure  important  strategic  successes,  as 
at  Ulm  and  Sedan. 

'The  war  of  attrition,  in  the  trenches,  on  both 
fronts,  is  exceedingly  burdensome;  there  is  noth- 
ing inspiring  about  it,  but  it  must  kill  Germany 
in  the  end  if  it  is  kept  up.'1 

The  Allies  having  followed  Colonel  Repington's 
advice  and  sent  no  troops  to  the  Danube,  the  at- 
tack on  Serbia  was  begun  in  October,  1915.  At 
that  time  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  the  Allies 
in  the  way  of  sending  to  Serbia,  by  way  of  Salon- 
iki  and  by  the  Santi  Quarante  route,  sufficient  re- 
inforcements, might  still  have  saved  the  greater 
part  of  Serbia  and  thus  have  maintained  the 
Allies  in  a  position  to  recover  the  Danube  front. 
Thereupon  Colonel  Repington  reiterated  with 
singular  vigor  his  theory  of  the  main  front  as  op- 
posed to  the  dispatch  of  Allied  troops  to  the  rescue 
of  Serbia. 

'No  new  units  [he  said]  have  made  their  ap- 
pearance in  the  East  or  the  West  for  several 
months.  It  may  well  be  true,  therefore,  that 
Germany  has  not  the  necessary  men  to  create 
such  units.  Under  these  conditions  our  manifest 

1SeeLe  Matin,  June  18,  1915. 

176 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

duty  is  to  persevere  on  the  main  front,  that  is,  in 
France  and  Flanders.  That  is  where  the  final 
decision  will  be  had,  and  nothing  on  earth  would 
justify  us  in  withdrawing  troops  from  there.  We 
must  send  thither  all  the  men  and  all  the  muni- 
tions at  our  disposal,  in  order  to  kill  the  greatest 
possible  number  of  Germans. 

'The  Germans  are  still  capable  of  holding  out 
against  Russia,  and  of  massing  more  troops 
against  us.  What  a  plight  we  should  find  our- 
selves in  if,  at  such  a  time,  our  forces  in  the 
Western  theatre  had  been  reduced!  The  respon- 
sibility would  fall,  not  on  the  army,  which  has 
fought  so  superbly,  but  on  those  who  have  the 
supreme  management  of  the  war/1 

These  vigorous  arguments  had  a  tremendous 
influence  on  British  public  opinion,  and  Serbia 
was  abandoned  to  her  fate.  Furthermore,  still 
as  a  result  of  this  theory  of  the  main  front, 
Colonel  Repington  afterwards,  whenever  he  had 
a  chance,  made  the  bitterest  opposition  to  the 
dispatch  of  the  Allied  expeditionary  force  to  the 
Balkans.  As  he  found  important  supporters  in 
France,  the  army  at  Saloniki  is  still  without  suffi- 
cient means  of  action. 

However  that  may  be,  Colonel  Repington's 
campaign  in  support  of  his  disastrous  theory 
that  the  Western  front  is  the  most  important  one 
has  produced  such  far-reaching  effects  that  it  has 

*Le  Petit  Parisien,  October  15,  1915. 
177 


PA  N-GERM A  N  Y 


influenced  men  occupying  very  high  official  posi- 
tions. For  example,  early  in  October,  1917, 
General  Smuts,  a  Boer  officer,  unquestionably  of 
great  valor,  but,  by  reason  of  his  foreign  birth, 
having  never  been  in  a  position  to  study  the  vast 
complexities  of  the  European  war,  in  a  speech  at 
a  luncheon  given  by  the  President  of  the  Cham- 
bers of  Commerce  of  the  United  Kingdom,  —  a 
speech  of  special  importance  because  of  his  mem- 
bership in  the  British  War  Cabinet, — declared :  - 

'The  Central  allies  are  beaten  everywhere,  are 
retreating  everywhere,  except  in  Russia.  .  .  .  To 
whip  Germany  we  need  not  go  as  far  as  the  Rhine. 
To  effect  this  purpose  one  strip  of  land  is  as  good 
as  another,  so  long  as  the  Germans  choose  to  oc- 
cupy it;  and,  take  my  word  for  it,  long  before  we 
have  reached  the  Rhine,  Germany  will  sue  for 
peace.  .  .  .  Our  military  superiority  on  the  West- 
ern front  is  no  longer  open  to  the  slightest  ques- 
tion. ...  If  we  turn  to  the  Italian  front,  can  we 
entertain  any  doubt,  after  the  great  victories  of 
the  Italian  army,  that  our  Allies  on  that  front 
have  obtained  a  complete  preponderance  over 
the  Germans?' 

A  few  days  later  events  proved  the  value  of 
these  assertions.  As  General  Smuts  had  several 
times  announced  that  Germany  was  virtually 
whipped,  the  Weekly  Dispatch  did  not  hesitate  to 
make  the  following  truly  stupefying  comment 
on  these  statements :  - 

178 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

1  When  so  circumspect  a  soldier  and  statesman 
as  General  Smuts  declares  that  we  have  won  the 
war,  we  can  assume  that  there  are  good  and  suffi- 
cient reasons  why  so  bold  an  assertion  is  a  proof 
that  we  have  won  it/ 

Comments  of  this  description  unfortunately  do 
not  stand  alone.  For  three  years  and  a  half  a 
number  of  Allied  newspapers  have  reproduced 
declarations  of  men  of  more  or  less  prominence, 
about  as  valuable  as  those  of  General  Smuts,  as 
being  undeniable  truths.  As  a  result,  very  great 
harm  has  been  done,  for  Allied  public  opinion  has 
been  misled  by  men  of  unquestionable  sincerity, 
who  are,  nevertheless,  incapable  of  forming  an  ac- 
curate judgment  of  the  situation  because  they 
have  never  been  trained  for  it,  and  because  they 
do  not  know  a  hundredth  part  of  what  it  is  neces- 
sary to  know  in  order  to  put  forth  a  prophecy  of 
any  value. 

It  is  because  of  these  divagations  that  a  forest 
of  false  ideas  has  been  nurtured  among  the  Allies 
like  a  carefully  tended  garden,  until  in  December 
last  the  majority  of  newspapers  proclaimed  the 
victory  of  the  Entente  at  the  precise  moment 
when  the  Pangermanist  schemes  were  on  the 
point  of  fulfillment. 

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  aberration  caused  in 
numerous  controlling  councils  of  the  Allies  by  the 
theory  of  the  Western  as  the  principal  front  has 
gone  so  far  that,  even  after  the  Italian  catastro- 

179 


PAN-GERMANY 


phe,  when  Germany  was  already  master  of  three 
fourths  of  Europe,  Major  Sir  Philip  Sassoon, 
M.P.,  private  secretary  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  in  a 
letter  to  his  constituents,  reiterated  this  theory, 
declaring  that  the  outstanding  facts  of  the  war 
are  not  the  momentary  collapse  of  Russia  and  the 
invasion  of  Italy,  but  the  steady,  inexorable  ad- 
vance of  the  British  armies  in  Flanders,  which 
neither  the  enemy  nor  the  weather  conditions  can 
check.  At  that  time  Major  Sassoon  believed  that 
the  British  advance  on  Cambrai  would  prove  to 
be  irresistible  and  continuous.  A  few  days  later, 
the  German  counter-attack,  and  the  serious  Bri- 
tish losses  which  resulted  from  it,  gave  the  lie 
once  more  to  forecasts  of  this  sort. 

On  the  occasion  of  Major  Sassoon 's  amazing 
letter  the  Socialist  journal  L'Humanite,  which 
often  indulges  in  Utopian  conceits,  published  so 
accurate  a  summary  of  the  doctrine  of  the  princi- 
pal front  at  the  end  of  1917,  that  I  deem  it  my 
duty  to  quote  it. 

' "  Don't  be  alarmed,"  say  the  partisans  of  Oc- 
cidentalism, or  Repingtonians,  "by  the  confusion 
and  backsliding  of  Russia.  Don't  ascribe  too 
much  importance  to  the  invasion  of  Northern 
Italy,  Serbia,  Roumania  —  there  is  no  use  in 
stopping  to  talk  about  them.  All  this  is  of  no  ac- 
count. The  absolute  definitive  victory  we  shall 
win  on  the  Western  front,  or,  more  precisely,  on 
the  British  front.  The  irresistible  advance  of  the 

1 80 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

British  army  in  Flanders  will  give  it  to  us.  The 
occupation  by  the  enemy  of  Poland,  Lithuania, 
and  Courland,  of  Wallachia  and  Venetia;  Riga 
captured,  Venice  within  cannon-shot  of  the  Aus- 
tro-German  lines  —  all  this  is  of  no  account  in 
comparison  with  the  taking  of  Passchendaele  (a 
small  village  in  Flanders).  What's  the  use  of 
unifying  the  conduct  of  operations,  when  there  is 
but  one  operation  of  any  importance?  "  —  Such  is 
the  doctrine.  It  has  never  varied.'1 

1  UHumaniti,  November  17,  1917. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE    WESTERN    FRONT   THEORY   CRITICIZED 

As  for  the  reasons  given  to  justify  this  theory  of 
the  principal  front  by  its  partisans,  they  are  all 
summed  up  in  this  statement,  which,  however, 
has  never  been  supported  by  any  technical  evi- 
dence. 'This  is  a  war  of  attrition.  As  the  re- 
sources of  the  Allies  are  inexhaustible,  they  can 
certainly  hold  out  much  longer  than  the  Germans, 
who  are  the  besieged  party.  We  have  only  to 
establish  ourselves  more  and  more  strongly  on 
the  Western  front.  As  the  Germans  cannot  re- 
main in  a  state  of  war  indefinitely,  they  will  be 
compelled  to  attack  us.  Consequently  the  Kai- 
ser's troops  will  have,  perforce,  to  come  and  be 
killed  on  the  Western  front.  It  is  a  mathematical 
certainty,  therefore,  that  a  time  will  come  when 
we  shall  have  inflicted  upon  Germany  losses  in 
man -power  so  prodigious,  that,  finding  herself 
bled  white,  she  will  sue  for  a  peace  every  condition 
of  which  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  impose  upon 
her.  At  that  moment  we  shall  be  completely  vic- 
torious without  having  been  compelled  to  cross 
the  Rhine,  as  we  have  many  times  declared.' 

Such  is,  in  reality,  incredible  as  it  may  appear, 
the  ominously  puerile  and  prodigiously  rudimen- 

182 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

tary  reasoning  which  has  been  the  sole  basis  of 
the  management  by  the  Allies  of  this  complex, 
world-embracing  war;  whereas  the  Germans  in 
carrying  it  on  act  consistently  according  to  some 
plan  or  other,  but  always  one  that  has  been 
studied  in  every  part  of  the  Universe  without  ex- 
ception. In  truth,  this  theory  by  which  the  West- 
ern front  is  regarded  as  the  principal  one  does  not 
deserve  even  to  be  considered  as  a  strategic  plan 
at  all,  for  it  rests  upon  an  accumulation  of  such 
gigantic  blunders  that  it  would  seem  impossible 
that  they  could  have  been  committed,  were  we 
not  constrained  to  admit  their  reality  by  facts 
that  are  only  too  manifest. 

Let  us  remark  first  of  all  that  this  theory  is 
strictly  opposed  to  the  fundamental  principle  of 
warfare  as  established  by  military  history  from 
its  most  far-off  origins.  This  immutable  princi- 
ple may  be  stated  thus:  While  supporting  one's 
allies  to  the  utmost,  to  carry  the  war  into  the 
enemy's  country,  at  the  weakest  spot,  with  su- 
perior forces.  Now,  the  theory  that  we  are  con- 
sidering has  had  the  following  results :  - 

1 .  It  has  prevented  the  Allies  from  carrying  the 
war  into  the  enemy's  country,  and  has  confined 
the  most  frightful  struggle  that  has  ever  taken 
place  to  the  richest  and  most  densely  populated 
territory  of  Belgium  and  France. 

2.  It  has  compelled  the  Allies  to  abandon  the 
hope  of  striking  their  enemy  at  his  weakest  point, 

183 


PA  N-GERM A  N  Y 


which  was  beyond  question  the  southern  line  of 
Hungary. 

3.  It  has  led  the  Allies  to  concentrate  their 
most  powerful  forces  against  the  strongest  por- 
tions of  the  German  front,  where  the  German  staff 
could  most  easily  manage  the  most  stubborn  de- 
fense by  virtue  of  the  vast  network  of  railways 
that  it  controls  in  the  West. 

4.  It  has  abandoned  successively  to  the  Pan- 
germanist  Moloch  such  admirable,  gallant,  and 
loyal  allies  as  the  unhappy  Serbs  and  Roumanians. 
Such  abandonment  not  only  was  an  unpardon- 
able moral  error  on  the  part  of  the  Allied  leaders, 
but  also  consummated  the  substantial  strategic 
blunder  of  the  Entente.    For,  by  an  extraordinary 
chance,  the  territories  of  Montenegro,  Serbia,  and 
Roumania  were,  and  still  are,  strategically  con- 
sidered, the  key  of  the  world- war,  because  they 
form  the  natural  Danube  front,  the  mere  posses- 
sion of  which  by  the  Allies  deprived  Austro-Ger- 
many  of  the  aid  of  the  Bulgarian  and  Turkish 
effectives,  and  of  the  resources  of  the  Orient,  with- 
out which  it  could  not  have  continued  the  war. 
Therefore,  by  supporting  with  vigor  their  small 
Balkan  allies,  the  great  Allies  would  not  only  have 
fulfilled  their  moral  duty,  but  would  at  the  same 
time  have  forwarded  their  essential  strategic  in- 
terests and  the  war  would  long  since  have  ended 
victoriously. 

Now,  the  sole  obstacle  to  this  logical  develop- 

184 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

ment  of  the  military  efforts  of  the  Allies  has  been 
the  theory  that  the  Western  front  is  the  principal 
front. 

Given  the  huge  blunders,  even  of  a  strictly 
military  description,  which  have  resulted  from 
this  disastrous  theory,  one  can  readily  under- 
stand that  it  makes  no  account  of  the  strategy  of 
the  political  sciences,  the  existence  of  which  is  not 
suspected,  even  at  the  present  moment,  by  the 
supporters  of  that  theory.  Let  us  note  once  more 
that  it  is  based  by  them  upon  a  long  succession  of 
material  misconceptions.  Events  have  proved 
that  Colonel  Repington's  reckoning  of  the  Ger- 
man reserves  was  erroneous.  Furthermore,  in  his 
calculation  of  the  enemy's  forces,  Colonel  Reping- 
ton  has  never  dealt  seriously  with  the  Austro- 
Hungarian,  Bulgarian,  and  Turkish  effectives, 
which,  however,  do  actually  exist  and  whose  sup- 
port enables  Austro-Germany  to  keep  the  field. 
Not  taking  into  the  account  the  total  military 
effectives  of  Pan-Germany,  Colonel  Repington 
has  neglected  also  to  consider  the  resources  in  sup- 
plies and  raw  materials  of  this  vast  territory.  But 
these  resources,  because  of  the  effects  of  the  sub- 
marine campaign,  are  to  all  intent  greater  for  the 
Boches  —  or,  at  all  events,  more  readily  acces- 
sible and  transportable  —  than  the  resources  of 
the  Western  Allies,  who  cannot  live  now  without 
America  and  Australia,  that  is  to  say,  without 
articles  of  prime  necessity  brought  from  a  great 

185 


PA  N-GER  MA  N  Y 


distance  by  slow,  infinitely  burdensome,  and  un- 
certain means  of  transport. 

Lastly,  if  it  had  been  true  that  Austro-Ger- 
many,  blockaded  by  land,  —  the  Allies  being  on 
the  Danube  front,  —  would  have  been  in  effect 
a  besieged  fortress  inevitably  doomed  to  capitu- 
late by  reason  of  the  insufficiency  of  food-supplies, 
—  because,  in  fact,  the  resources  of  Austro-Ger- 
many  alone  would  have  been  insufficient  for  its 
population,  —  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  utterly 
absurd  to  regard  Austro-Germany  augmented  by 
the  Balkans  and  Turkey  (that  is  to  say,  Pan- 
Germany)  as  a  fortress  susceptible  of  being  re- 
duced by  starvation.  Pan-Germany  to-day  is  in 
very  truth  a  fortress,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  en- 
circled by  continuous  fortified  fronts;  but  it  is 
nonsense  to  liken  Pan-Germany  to  a  fortress 
having  necessarily  to  surrender  because  of  famine, 
when,  by  virtue  of  its  geographic  immensity,  in- 
cluding the  vast  exploitable  territories  of  the 
Balkans  and  Turkey,  it  affords  the  most  diverse 
products  of  the  soil.  And  the  latent  resources  of 
Pan-Germany  are  immeasurably  increased  now 
that  the  whole  of  European  and  Asiatic  Russia 
is  open  to  it. 

To  sum  up  —  the  theory  that  the  Western 
front  is  the  principal  one  is  the  capital  strategic 
blunder  of  all  the  Allied  leaders,  and  it  explains  all 
their  other  blunders.  The  facts  are  at  hand  to 
prove  that  it  was  impossible  to  conceive  of  any 

1 86 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

general  plan  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  by  the 
Allies  which  would  have  made  it  easier  for  the 
German  General  Staff  to  carry  out  the  Panger- 
manist  scheme.  For,  from  this  point  of  view,  the 
theory  has  had  the  following  further  results:  - 

1 .  It  has  allowed  Germany  to  lay  hold  freely  of 
the  territories  necessary  for  the  creation  of  Pan- 
Germany. 

2.  It  has  given  her  all  the  time  that  she  re- 
quired so  to  organize  Pan-Germany  that  its  mili- 
tary strength  should  bring  about  one  of  its  first 
effects  —  the  collapse  of  Russia. 

3.  It  has  confirmed  Germany  in  the  possession 
of  all  the  sources  of  troops,  supplies,  and  raw  ma- 
terials existing  in  the  Balkans  and  Asiatic  Turkey. 

4.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  deprived  the  Allies 
of  the  sources  of  strategic  strength,  and  of  effec- 
tives, represented  by  the  Balkans  and  Russia,  and 
has  compelled  them  to  seek  beyond  the  Atlantic 
those  things  which  are  indispensable  for  their 
subsistence. 

5.  It  has  enabled  the  German  General  Staff 
to  concentrate  all  the  disposable  effectives  of 
Pan-Germany  on  the  Western  front,  which  con- 
centration was  impossible  so  long  as  the  Allies 
were  sufficiently  formidable  in  the  East. 

Doubtless  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  deny  to  the 
Western  front  the  title  of  principal  front;  but 
this  is  because  there  is,  practically,  no  other  now. 
Clearly  it  is  the  principal  one  for  the  Germans, 

187 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


because  they  can  unquestionably  bring  about  a 
definitive  decision  there.  But  it  is  assuredly  not 
the  principal  one  for  the  Allies  except  so  far  as  it 
is  a  question,  first  of  all,  of  not  being  hopelessly 
defeated  there. 

Thus  the  first  effort  of  the  Allies  must  be  to  do 
their  utmost  not  to  be  crushed  in  the  West.  But 
will  all  the  successes  that  they  may  be  able  to 
win  in  the  West  suffice  to  give  them  the  victory 
-  that  is  to  say,  to  force  Germany  to  abandon 
her  grip  on  Central  Europe  and  the  Balkans,  in 
other  words,  on  the  instruments  of  universal 
domination?  Of  course,  no  one  could  undertake 
to  say  absolutely  that  it  will  not  be,  but  the 
chances  of  such  a  result  are  exceedingly  slender. 
The  facts  developed  by  the  war,  and  the  concord- 
ant precedents  of  all  military  history,  enable  one 
easily  to  convince  one's  self  that  it  cannot  be  so. 
In  fact,  Germany  not  only  is  proceeding  with  the 
organization  of  Pan-Germany,  but  she  proposes 
also  to  exploit  Russia,  whence  she  will  obtain  im- 
mense supplemental  resources.  The  means  of 
resistance  of  the  Germans  on  the  Western  front 
must  be  regarded  therefore  as  augmented  in  at 
least  as  great  measure  as  the  means  of  offensive 
action  which  the  Allies  will  be  able  to  accumulate 
on  that  front.  Consequently  it  is,  to  say  the  least, 
extremely  doubtful  whether  the  results  on  the 
Western  front  can  be  decisive  for  the  Allies. 

Now,  the  mere  fact  that  any  doubt  about  it 
1 88 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

exists  is  enough  to  make  it  the  duty  of  the  Allies 
to  take  the  precautions  which  wisdom  enjoins 
against  this  new  possible  blunder,  which  this  time 
would  be  beyond  remedy.  The  Allies  must 
therefore  understand  that,  to  win  the  war,  they 
must,  by  new  methods,  enter  upon  military  opera- 
tions elsewhere  than  on  the  Western  front.  As 
I  hope  to  show,  such  supplementary  operations 
are  comparatively  simple  to  prepare. 


in 

MR.   LLOYD   GEORGE  AND  THE  WESTERN   FRONT 

In  his  reverberating  speech  at  Paris  on  Novem- 
ber 12,  1917,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  performed  the 
service  of  proclaiming  aloud  the  military  blunder 
of  the  Allies,  —  which  he  justly  characterized  as 
'inconceivable/  —  in  having  fixed  their  attention 
solely  on  the  Western  front.  I  quote  the  essential 
passages  of  this  speech  which  particularly  merit 
the  notice  of  American  readers.  But  I  must  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that,  although  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  did  fully  realize  the  essential  nature  of  the 
Danube  front  from  the  military  standpoint,  he  did 
not  grasp  its  capital  political  importance,  as  is 
shown  by  his  speech  of  January  5,  1918,  in  which 
he  sanctions  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire;  I  allude  further 
to  this  speech  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

189 


PA  N-GERM A  N  Y 


'There  is  one  feature  of  this  war  which  makes 
it  unique  among  all  the  innumerable  wars  of  the 
past.  It  is  a  siege  of  nations.  The  Allies  are 
blockading  two  huge  Empires.  It  would  have 
been  well  for  us  if  at  all  times  we  had  thoroughly 
grasped  that  fact.  In  a  siege,  not  only  must 
every  part  of  the  line  of  circumvallation  be  strong 
enough  to  resist  the  strongest  attack  which  the 
besieged  can  bring  to  bear  upon  it ;  more  than  that, 
the  besieging  army  must  be  ready  to  strike  at  the 
weakest  point  of  the  enemy,  wherever  that  may 
be.  Have  we  done  so?  Look  at  the  facts. 

'The  enemy  was  cut  off  by  the  Allied  navies 
from  all  the  rich  lands  beyond  the  seas,  whence 
he  had  been  drawing  enormous  stores  of  food  and 
material.  On  the  east  he  was  blockaded  by  Rus- 
sia, on  the  west  by  the  armies  of  France,  Britain, 
and  Italy.  But  the  south,  the  important  south, 
with  its  gateway  to  the  East,  was  left  to  be  held 
by  the  forces  of  a  small  country  with  half  the 
population  of  Belgium,  its  armies  exhausted  by 
the  struggles  of  three  wars,  and  with  two  treach- 
erous kings  behind,  lying  in  wait  for  an  opportu- 
nity to  knife  it  when  it  was  engaged  in  defending 
itself  against  a  mightier  foe. 

'What  was  the  result  of  this  inconceivable 
blunder?  What  would  any  man  whose  mind  was 
devoted  to  the  examination  of  the  whole,  not 
merely  to  one  part,  of  the  great  battlefield,  have 
expected  to  happen?  Exactly  what  did  happen. 

190 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

While  we  were  hammering  with  the  whole  of  our 
might  at  the  impenetrable  barrier  in  the  West,  the 
Central  Powers,  feeling  confident  that  we  could 
not  break  through,  threw  their  weight  on  that 
little  country,  crushed  her  resistance,  opened  the 
gate  to  the  East,  and  unlocked  great  stores  of 
corn,  cattle,  and  minerals,  yea,  unlocked  the  door 
of  hope  —  all  essential  to  enable  Germany  to 
sustain  her  struggle. 

'Without  these  additional  stores  Germany 
might  have  failed  to  support  her  armies  at  full 
strength.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  splendid 
fighting  material  were  added  to  the  armies  which 
Germany  can  control  —  added  to  her  and  lost  to 
us.  Turkey,  which  at  that  time  had  nearly  ex- 
hausted its  resources  for  war,  cut  off  from  the 
only  possible  source  of  supply,  was  reequipped 
and  resuscitated,  and  became  once  more  a  for- 
midable military  power,  whose  activities  absorbed 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  our  best  men  in  order 
to  enable  us  at  all  to  retain  our  prestige  in  the 
East.  By  this  fatuity  this  terrible  war  was  given 
new  life. 

'Why  was  this  incredible  blunder  perpetrated? 
The  answer  is  simple.  Because  it  was  no  one's 
business  in  particular  to  guard  the  gates  of  the 
Balkans.  The  one  front  had  not  become  a  reality. 
France  and  England  were  absorbed  in  other 
spheres.  Italy  had  her  mind  on  the  Carso.  Rus- 
sia had  a  thousand-mile  frontier  to  guard,  and, 

191 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


even  if  she  had  not,  she  could  not  get  through  to 
help  Serbia,  because  Roumania  was  neutral.  It 
is  true  we  sent  forces  to  Saloniki  to  rescue  Serbia, 
but,  as  usual,  they  were  sent  too  late.  They  were 
sent  when  the  mischief  was  complete. 

1  Half  of  those  forces  sent  in  time  —  nay,  half 
the  men  who  fell  in  the  futile  attempt  to  break 
through  on  the  Western  front  in  September  of 
that  year  —  would  have  saved  Serbia,  would  have 
saved  the  Balkans  and  completed  the  blockade  of 
Germany. 

'You  may  say  that  is  an  old  story.  I  wish  it 
were.  It  is  simply  the  first  chapter  of  a  serial 
which  has  been  running  to  this  hour.  .  .  . 

'  When  we  advance  a  kilometre  into  the  enemy's 
lines,  snatch  a  small  shattered  village  out  of  his 
cruel  grip,  capture  a  few  hundreds  of  his  soldiers, 
we  shout  with  unfeigned  joy.  And  rightly  so,  for 
it  is  the  symbol  of  our  superiority  over  a  boastful 
foe  and  a  sure  guaranty  that  in  the  end  we  can 
and  shall  win.  But  what  if  we  had  advanced 
50  kilometres  beyond  his  lines  and  made  200,000 
of  his  soldiers  prisoners  and  taken  2,500  of  his 
best  guns,  with  enormous  quantities  of  ammuni- 
tion and  stores?' 

Fundamental  strategic  errors,  then,  have  been 
committed.  The  responsible  cause  of  these  errors 
is  very  simple.  The  leaders  of  the  Entente,  with 
the  assurance  born  of  their  misconstruction  of 
actual  European  conditions,  of  which  they  have 

192 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

afforded  so  many  proofs,  deeming  themselves 
sure  of  their  position,  have  obstinately  refused 
to  listen  to  the  few  men  who  are  aware  of  the  real 
object  with  which  Germany  entered  upon  the  war, 
and  consequently  of  the  means  which  would  per- 
mit an  effective  opposition  to  her  success. 

The  same  reason  explains  why  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  speech  of  January  5,  1918,  contains  the 
heartrending  contradictions  and  technical  blun- 
ders to  which  I  deem  it  my  imperative  duty  to 
call  the  attention  of  my  American  readers.  If 
his  declarations  relative  to  war-indemnities  should 
be  followed  by  a  practical  application,  France, 
on  the  signature  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  would 
be  condemned  to  absolute  bankruptcy,  and  the 
value  of  the  French  bank-note  would  vanish 
with  magical  rapidity. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  declaration  concerning 
the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  is  utterly  at  variance  with 
the  principle  laid  down  by  the  Allies,  that  the  dif- 
ferent races  must  be  permitted  to  decide  freely 
concerning  their  own  destiny.  Now,  the  Czechs 
and  Jugo-Slavs  want  no  more  of  the  Hapsburgs  or 
of  Austria-Hungary.  Why  compel  them  to  re- 
main subject  to  the  yoke  of  Vienna,  which,  as  all 
those  familiar  with  the  Central  European  prob- 
lem are  well  aware,  is  unable  to  escape  from  the 
grip  of  Berlin?  They  know  equally  well  that  it  is 
altogether  impossible  to  place  the  least  reliance 

193 


PA  N  -  GERM A  N  Y 


on  Austria-Hungary,  which  is  not  a  nation,  which 
is  not  even  a  state,  but  which  is,  in  reality,  a  sys- 
tem of  ultra- reactionary  oppression,  operating 
for  the  benefit  of  the  German- Magyar  hegemony 
of  Europe.  As  for  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  for 
centuries  past  it  has  broken  its  word  as  freely  as 
the  Hohenzollerns  have  broken  theirs.  Not  the 
slightest  credit  can  be  given  to  its  signature  by 
any  sane  person. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  Austria-Hungary  is  al- 
lowed to  exist,  the  promises  of  integral  restitu- 
tion made  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  Roumania, 
Montenegro,  and  Serbia,  are  valueless,  because 
incapable  of  fulfillment  by  reason  of  the  conti- 
guity of  the  Austro-German  mass.  Nor  has  the 
promise  of  restitution  of  Alsace-Lorraine  any 
greater  value.  Such  restitution  could  not  be 
permanent  unless  Pan-Germany  is  definitively 
crushed,  that  is  to  say,  unless  Austria-Hungary 
disappears. 

It  is  not  pleasant  to  place  one's  self  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  almost  universal  concert  of  approval, 
which  has  greeted  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  declara- 
tion in  the  Allied  countries;  but  I  cannot  consent 
to  conceal  a  truth  of  which,  in  my  judgment,  it  is 
indispensable  for  the  Allies  to  be  informed.  For 
twenty  years  I  stood  alone  in  proclaiming  the 
Pangermanist  peril,  and  the  impending  war  in 
exactly  the  shape  which  it  has  assumed.  I  shall 
stand  alone,  if  I  must,  in  telling  you  this:  Lloyd 

194 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

George's  peace  terms  are  either  unrealizable  or 
can  result  only  in  a  terrible  deception  of  the 
Allies  which  would  cause  them  to  lose  the  war  by 
making  Pan-Germany  triumphant. 

If  the  enormous  political  blunders  which  I  am 
forced  to  point  out  have  been  committed  by  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  in  his  peace  programme,  it  is  still 
for  the  same  old  reason :  he  has  neglected  to  con- 
sult the  real  experts,  that  is,  the  Englishmen  who 
have  given  long  study  to  the  problem  of  Central 
Europe.  To  consult  these  men  is  an  absolute 
necessity,  for  at  this  moment  there  is  not,  in  the 
whole  Entente,  any  political  leader,  any  diplomat, 
who  is  personally  thoroughly  conversant  with  this 
question  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  thorough  com- 
prehension of  which  requires  about  twenty  years 
of  study.  What  has  Mr.  Lloyd  George  done?  He 
has  consulted  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Mr.  Asquith,  and 
Mr.  Henderson,  who  certainly  have  never  been  to 
Austria-Hungary  to  make  serious  investigations. 
Per  contra,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  would  assuredly 
never  have  been  guilty  of  the  serious  errors  that  I 
am  indicating,  if  he  had  chosen  to  listen  for  one 
hour  to  the  only  three  Englishmen  who,  to  my 
knowledge,  have  given  genuine  study  to  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  question  on  the  spot,  for  many 
months:  Sir  Arthur  Evans,  Mr.  Seton -Watson, 
and  Mr.  Wickham  Steed.  The  last-named  gen- 
tleman was  for  ten  years  before  the  war  the  re- 
markably able  correspondent  of  the  Times  at 

195 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


Vienna.  His  service  of  information  was  so  well 
organized  that  it  was  to  him  that  the  French  and 
British  embassies  applied  for  information  on  a 
multitude  of  matters,  which  they  were  utterly 
unable  to  procure  for  themselves.  It  is,  therefore, 
altogether  contrary  to  the  most  elementary  com- 
mon sense,  to  say  nothing  of  British  interests, 
not  to  place  the  greatest  reliance  on  his  opinion 
as  to  the  proper  solution  of  the  problem  of  Central 
Europe. 

All  the  foregoing  leads  us  to  insistence  upon 
the  urgent  necessity  of  this  step:  to  revise  the 
revision  of  the  war-aims  of  the  Allies  as  set  forth 
in  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  programme;  for  that  pro- 
gramme embodies  technical  blunders  which  make 
it  either  infinitely  hazardous  or  practically  un- 
workable. 

It  will  be  enough,  I  believe,  for  every  right- 
thinking  American  to  know  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
made  these  no  less  justifiable  than  alarming  state- 
ments concerning  the  strategic  blunders  of  the 
Entente  in  November,  1917,  or  after  forty  months 
of  warfare;  and  that  in  the  forty-second  month 
the  same  Lloyd  George  was  guilty  of  the  tech- 
nical political  blunders  that  I  have  pointed  out, 
in  connection  with  the  Allies'  terms  of  peace  - 
this  will  be  enough,  I  say,  to  convince  every  such 
American  that  the  conduct  of  the  war  and  the 
preparation  for  peace,  so  far  as  it  has  developed 

196 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

at  present  as  well  in  the  military  as  in  the  political 
aspect,  can  no  longer  be  tolerated. 

One  of  the  greatest  services  that  the  United 
States  could  render  to  the  Allies  in  Europe  would 
be  to  say  to  them:  'We,  the  United  States,  are 
determined  to  wage  war  to  the  limit  by  all  the 
means  at  our  disposal,  but  we  do  not  propose 
that  our  men  and  our  money  shall  be  wasted  to 
no  avail.  Henceforth  the  war  must  be  carried  on, 
and  peace  prepared  for,  in  accordance  with  seri- 
ously considered,  and  hence  truly  scientific, 
plans,  as  well  in  the  intellectual  as  in  the  material 
domain,  and  as  well  from  a  political  as  from  a 
military  standpoint. ' 

I  am  well  aware  that  you  Americans,  by  the 
very  force  of  circumstances,  have  much  to  learn 
from  our  military  leaders,  in  order  to  be  able  to 
carry  on  effectively  this  great  war  in  which  you 
have  become  involved  so  suddenly;  but  you  have 
special  advantages  over  the  Allies  in  Europe, 
which  should  be  utilized.  Your  distance  from 
the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  gives  you  the  neces- 
sary interval  of  space  to  avoid  being  hypnotized 
by  the  special  views  of  each  of  the  Allies,  and 
hence  to  see  the  conflict  as  a  whole,  which  is  most 
essential.  Having  never  been  obliged  up  to  the 
present  time  to  take  sides  in  European  political 
questions,  you  have  none  of  the  old-time,  erro- 
neous ideas  with  regard  to  them  which  are  held 
by  the  Allied  diplomats  in  Europe  —  archaic 

197 


PA  N-GERM  A  N  Y 


ideas  which  are  the  initial  cause  of  all  the  dip- 
lomatic set-backs  of  the  Allies.  You  have  there- 
fore nothing  to  forget;  and  that  fact  gives  you 
an  immense  chance  of  avoiding  many  disastrous 
blunders. 

As  you  certainly  have  no  predetermined  plan, 
and  as  you  are  seeking  honestly  the  actual  truth, 
you  will  inevitably  find  it  if  you  follow  the  meth- 
od of  your  great  captains  of  industry,  all  of  whom 
know  that,  in  order  to  accomplish  anything  im- 
portant and  efficacious  in  a  province  with  which 
they  are  not  familiar,  they  must  begin  by  apply- 
ing to  the  '  expert/  Of  course,  the  expert  is  not  in- 
fallible. He  may,  like  all  of  us  poor  mortals,  be 
mistaken;  but  when  he  really  deserves  to  be 
called  an  expert,  he  avoids,  with  certainty,  the 
commission  of  such  monumental  blunders  as 
those  heaped  up  by  the  European  Allied  leaders, 
simply  because  they  did  not  realize  the  necessity 
of  consulting  experts.  Now,  there  are  among 
the  Allies  experts  on  each  of  the  great  questions 
presented  by  the  war  and  the  peace  that  is 
to  ensue,  who  are  neither  politicians,  nor  dip- 
lomats, nor  soldiers,  but  who  must  be  con- 
sulted because  they  know  these  questions,  root 
and  branch,  for  the  very  simple  reason  that  they 
have  studied  them  long  and  freely.  To  be  sure, 
these  men  are  far  from  numerous,  but  I  declare 
that  they  do  exist.  If  you  Americans  demand 
that  henceforth  a  call  shall  be  made  upon  men 

198 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

of  real  competence,  and  that  there  shall  be  no 
more  discussion  about  phrases,  but  solely  about 
carefully  studied  realities,  you  will  confer  upon 
all  the  Allies  a  tremendous  service,  which  will 
bring  us  considerably  nearer  to  victory. 

All  these  advantages  are  peculiarly  yours, 
Americans.  If  you  choose  to  make  the  utmost 
use  of  them,  you  will  then  be,  in  many  instances, 
in  a  position  to  play  the  part  of  a  beneficent  ar- 
biter between  the  European  Allies.  Although 
their  leading  minds,  having  been  taken  unawares 
by  the  war,  have  not  conducted  it  as  they  should 
have  done,  they  are  honest  and  well-meaning 
men.  Your  advice  will  certainly  be  well  received, 
provided  that  they  feel  that  it  is  invariably 
dictated  in  the  interest  of  a  mutual,  decisive, 
complete  victory  —  the  only  sort  of  victory  that 
will  ensure  peace  for  many  years  to  come,  and  will 
save  civilization. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   LESSON   OF   THREE   YEARS    OF   WAR 
AND   OF   EVENTS   IN   RUSSIA 

IN  the  preceding  chapters,  seeking  only  the  truth, 
I  have  laid  before  my  American  readers  the  actual 
situation  of  affairs  with  regard  to  the  war,  the 
causes  of  the  blunders  heretofore  committed  by 
the  Allies,  and  the  operation  of  political  strategy 
—  or  what  I  have  called  'the  strategy  of  the 
political  sciences/  In  my  mind  these  studies  are 
not  simply  of  an  historical  or  theoretical  nature. 
They  were  intended  to  precede,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  justify,  the  exposition  of  a  concrete  war- 
plan  for  the  Allies  —  a  plan  which  should  be  quite 
new,  based  upon  the  political  sciences,  and  really 
adapted  to  conditions  as  they  exist  to-day. 

I  have  devoted  twenty  years  of  my  life  to  study 
of  the  Pan-German  scheme,  in  order  to  prevent  its 
execution  by  giving  warning  of  the  peril.  I  have 
not  succeeded  in  making  myself  heard  in  time. 
And  now  when,  in  spite  of  everything,  Pan-Ger- 
many is  actually  created,  I  would  like  to  demon- 
strate the  surest  method  of  destroying  it,  and 
hence  of  putting  an  end  to  the  war  by  winning  it, 
and  —  making  due  allowance  for  the  blunders 
already  committed  —  winning  it  comparatively 
quickly. 

200 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

I  have  laid  down  the  broad  outlines  of  the  plan 
which  I  recommend,  in  my  paper,  'The  Best  Way 
to  Crush  Pan-Germany,'  in  the  Atlantic  for  De- 
cember, 191 7-1  The  pages  which  follow  are 
written  with  the  object  of  setting  forth  this  plan 
in  detail,  and  of  convincing  public  opinion  in 
America  of  its  possibilities  and  advantages.  When 
it  shall  be  so  convinced,  the  mighty  force  of  Ameri- 
can opinion  will  go  far  to  secure  quickly  the  adop- 
tion of  the  measures  essential  for  its  execution. 

The  plan  that  I  suggest  is  in  reality  the  out- 
come of  much  meditation  on  the  war  and  the 
means  of  winning  it.  As  for  the  technical  infor- 
mation which  the  plan  assumes,  I  can  fairly  say 
that  it  is  derived  from  the  most  reliable  sources. 
Naturally,  like  every  novel  idea,  it  may  cause 
surprise  at  the  first  glance ;  but  it  must  be  clearly 
understood  that  it  is  impossible  to  get  out  of  the 
strange  and  unprecedented  situation  now  existing 
in  Europe  as  a  result  of  the  audacity  of  the  Boches, 
except  by  adopting  ideas  which  are  themselves 
unprecedented  and  of  premeditated  audacity. 
Moreover  this  plan  is  based  solely  on  the  employ- 
ment of  elements  now  in  being,  in  the  moral  no 
less  than  in  the  material  domain.  In  reality, 
therefore,  there  is  nothing  fanciful  about  it. 

I    beg   leave   to   remind   those  who  may  be 
tempted  to  ascribe  especially  great  weight  to  the 
possible  objections  which  every  momentous  pro- 
1  See  Chapter  vii,  supra. 

201 


P  AN  -GERM  AN  Y 


posal  is  likely  to  arouse,  of  these  facts:  that 
events  have  shown,  unhappily,  that  the  other 
plans  suggested  by  myself  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  —  for  instance,  that  relating  to  the  for- 
mation of  the  Danube  front,  the  strategic  key  to 
the  whole  business,  —  were  not  only  the  simplest, 
but  the  most  susceptible  of  execution,  the  most 
efficacious,  and  the  least  costly  in  men  and 
money.  But  these  plans  were  regarded  as  chi- 
merical by  persons  who  were  considered  especially 
competent  to  judge. 

At  the  present  moment,  the  question  is  how 
to  put  an  end  to  the  existing  cataclysm  as  soon 
as  possible  —  but  only  by  victory,  for  slavery  is 
more  cruel  than  death.  I  may  be  permitted 
therefore,  I  trust,  to  be  listened  to  in  season  for  at 
least  once  in  my  life. 

That  is  why  I  am  making  a  personal  appeal  to 
American  public  opinion,  and  I  urge  it  to  support 
me  vigorously  and  instantly  if  I  succeed  in  con- 
vincing it. 

For  my  own  part,  I  have  a  deeply  rooted  con- 
viction that,  if  the  execution  of  the  general  plan 
set  forth  in  this  study  is  begun  without  delay, 
methodically,  persistently,  and  upon  broad  bases, 
it  will  certainly  bring  the  Allies  a  complete  vic- 
tory by  the  end  of  1918;  but  I  must  make  one 
explicit  reservation.  The  longer  the  execution  of 
this  plan  is  postponed,  the  less  efficacious  it  will  be. 
If  this  be  true,  it  is  for  the  reason  that  the  Austro- 

202 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

German  seizure  of  Russia  involves  tremendous 
consequences  which  are  even  yet  imperfectly  real- 
ized by  the  Allies.  If  they  give  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  time  to  double,  yes,  even  to 
triple,  the  railways  connecting  them  with  South 
Russia,  the  Austro-Germans  will  have  at  their 
disposal  limitless  supplies  of  every  description,  — 
food,  metals,  and  all  the  rest,  —  which  will  enable 
them  to  hold  out  as  long  as  is  necessary  against 
the  universal  coalition.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
such  multiplication  of  the  railways  connecting 
the  Central  Empires  with  South  Russia  cannot 
be  effected  within  six  months.  It  follows  that 
during  that  interval  the  communication  of  Austria- 
Germany  with  the  East,  where  are  the  particu- 
larly sensitive  and  vulnerable  strategic  positions 
of  Pan-Germany,  must  be  definitively  cut.  Fur- 
thermore, the  state  of  mind  of  the  slaves  of 
Central  Europe  is  still  such  that  they  can  be  led 
to  rebel.  We  must  not  run  the  risk  of  moral 
collapse  on  their  part  which  would  inevitably 
come  about  if  the  Allies  should  neglect  to  give 
their  attention  immediately  and  by  practical 
methods,  to  the  fate  of  the  eighty-six  millions  of 
Slavs,  Latins,  and  Semites  who  are  immured 
against  their  will  in  Pan-Germany  and  are  atro- 
ciously oppressed.  Thus  there  are  very  serious 
motives  for  entering  at  once  upon  the  execution 
of  the  plan  proposed. 

For  these  divers  reasons,   I  regard  it  as  my 

203 


P  AN  -GERM  A  N  Y 


imperative  duty  to  declare  emphatically  my  con- 
viction that  this  plan  is  not  only  necessary, 
but  indispensable,  to  the  victory  of  the  Allies. 


HOW    RUSSIA   WAS    DESTROYED 

In  view  of  the  general  condition  of  affairs  in 
Europe  at  the  beginning  of  1918,  the  dissolution 
of  Russia,  provided  that  the  lesson  it  teaches  is 
thoroughly  learned,  in  no  wise  lessens  the  chances 
of  the  complete  victory  of  the  Entente,  as  the 
German  propagandists  are  doing  their  utmost 
to  convince  Allied  public  opinion  that  it  does, 
through  the  medium  of  pacifists  of  various  breeds. 
The  one  thing  that  the  dissolution  of  the  forces  of 
Russia  by  Germany  demonstrates  above  all  else 
is  the  potency  of  the  strategy  of  political  sciences, 
which  the  Allies  can  employ  in  their  turn  to  dis- 
solve Pan-Germany,  and  thereby  to  obtain,  in  a 
comparatively  short  time,  a  complete  victory. 

It  was  not  by  the  employment  of  military  force, 
in  the  sense  ordinarily  given  to  that  phrase,  that 
the  Germans  put  Russia  out  of  the  game,  but  by 
turning  to  account  their  knowledge  of  the  eth- 
nography and  psychology  of  the  various  races 
living  in  Russia.  Indeed,  it  was  this  knowledge 
which  enabled  the  Germans  to  exploit  unerringly 
the  extraordinary  ignorance  of  actualities  of  the 
Russian  Socialists,  and  their  stupendous  pride; 

204 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

the  artlessness,  even  the  very  genuine  kindliness, 
of  the  Russian  people,  which  predispose  them  to 
forget  speedily  the  most  cruel  outrages;  and, 
lastly,  the  particularist  tendencies  of  certain  Rus- 
sian nationalities  —  tendencies  which  the  Berlin 
propaganda  has  artificially  transformed  into  sep- 
aratist movements  to  be  put  into  effect  at  once. 
Now,  I  maintain  that  the  ethnographic  and 
psychological  facts  of  which  the  Germans  cyni- 
cally take  advantage  to  reduce  these  peoples  to 
slavery,  can  very  quickly  be  turned  to  account, 
equitably  and  effectively,  by  the  Allies,  to  free 
those  who  are  oppressed  by  the  Boches  and  Pan- 
Germans,  to  assure  the  truimph  of  liberty,  and  to 
make  certain  the  absolute  defeat  of  Prussian 
militarism. 

II 

THE   OPPOSED   FORCES 

To  make  sure  that  we  do  not  deceive  ourselves, 
we  will  not  only  leave  Russia  out  of  the  reckoning, 
but  will  also  omit  the  resources,  considerable  and 
varied  though  they  are,  which  the  Allies  derive 
from  their  extensive  colonies,  and  the  assistance 
(although,  taken  as  a  whole,  it  is  very  important) 
of  the  Belgians,  Portuguese,  Serbs,  Greeks,  Rou- 
manians, and  Japanese.  We  will  enumerate  sim- 
ply the  forces  of  the  great  Allied  powers. 

France  has  forty  millions  of  inhabitants ;  Great 
Britain,  forty-six  millions;  Italy,  thirty-six  mil- 

205 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

lions;  the  United  States,  one  hundred  millions; 
making  in  all  two  hundred  and  twenty- two  mil- 
lions of  the  Allies,  who  have  to  contend  against 
seventy-three  millions  of  Germans,  ten  millions 
of  Magyars,  five  millions  of  Bulgars,  and  six 
millions  of  Turks  —  or  only  ninety-four  millions 
of  actual  adversaries. 

But  we  have,  in  addition,  allies  in  the  fortress 
that  we  have  to  subdue. 

In  fact  —  and  this  is  a  matter  of  extreme  im- 
portance1 —  all  the  rest  of  the  one  hundred  and 
eighty  millions  of  inhabitants  of  Pan-Germany, 
the  enormous  number  of  eighty-six  millions  (that 
is  to  say,  nearly  one  half),  of  French,  Belgians, 
Alsace-Lorrainers,  Danes,  Poles,  Lithuanians, 
Letts,  Ruthenians,  Czechs,  Slovaks,  Jugo-Slavs, 
Roumanians,  Italians,  Armenians,  Greeks  and 
Arabs,  are  slaves,  imprisoned  in  their  own  despite 
in  Pan-Germany.  They  are,  therefore,  anti- 
Boche  by  conviction,  being  well  aware  that  only 
the  decisive  triumph  of  the  Entente  can  put  an 
end  to  their  serfdom. 

Having  studied  these  oppressed  peoples  on  the 
spot  for  more  than  twenty  years,  knowing  their 
interests  and  their  sentiments,  I  affirm  that  this  is 
a  psychological  situation  of  enormous  concern  to 
the  Allies.  I  maintain  further  that  these  eighty- 
six  millions  of  Slavs,  Latins,  and  Semites  represent, 
by  virtue  of  the  strategic  importance  of  the  dis- 

1Sce  map  opposite. 

207 


P  A  N  -GERM  AN  Y 


tricts  in  which  they  live,  a  force  which  —  on  the 
single  condition  that  they  are  supplied  with  the 
means  of  action  adapted  to  their  unique  situation, 
—  may  assist  materially  in  the  final  victory,  and 
a  force  infinitely  stronger  than  that  which  the 
hundred  and  eighty-two  millions  of  inhabitants 
of  the  former  Empire  of  the  Tsars  ever  repre- 
sented. 

Estimated  according  to  its  psychological  value, 
the  minimum  bulk  of  the  Allies  is  composed  of  two 
groups :  - 

(a)  The  two  hundred  and  twenty-two  millions 
of  the  declared  Allies ; 

(b)  The    eighty-six    millions    of    latent    allies 
immured  in  Pan-Germany. 

Thus,  regarded  from  the  standpoint  of  their 
sentiments,  the  Allies  form  a  total  minimum  of 
three  hundred  and  eight  millions,  opposed  by  only 
ninety-four  millions  of  Boches  and  Pro-Germans ; 
that  is  to  say,  they  are  about  three  to  one. 

Ill 

GREAT  IMPORTANCE  OF  OUR  LATENT  ALLIES 

But  some  one  may  say:  'These  eighty-six  mil- 
lions of  latent  allies  can  do  nothing  because  they 
are  shut  up  in  Pan-Germany.'  But  it  is  this 
very  condition  which  is  extraordinarily  favorable. 
In  order  to  win  the  war  the  Allies  must  absolutely 
subdue  the  immense  fortress  which  Pan-Ger- 

208 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

many  now  is.  The  experience  of  three  years  has 
proved  that  its  ramparts,  constantly  strengthened 
by  the  Boches,  are  very  hard  to  raze ;  but  hitherto 
the  Allies  have  assailed  it  only  from  the  outside, 
heedless  of  the  important  fact  that  half  of  the 
garrison  is  inclined  to  favor  their  action. 

Now,  out  of  these  eighty-six  millions  of  anti- 
Boches  in  Pan-Germany,  an  ethnological  analysis 
enables  us  to  reckon  that  about  seven  millions 
(Slavs,  Latins,  and  Arabs)  have  been  mobilized, 
that  is  to  say,  incorporated  against  their  will  in 
the  armies  directed  from  Berlin.  At  the  present 
moment,  therefore,  in  the  armies  of  Pan-Germany, 
one  man  in  every  three  —  an  enormous  proportion 
-  is  an  anti-Pangermanist,  who  detests  this  war, 
who  is  a  soldier  by  compulsion,  who  is  fully  aware 
that  his  own  sacrifice  helps  to  confirm  his  own 
servitude  and  that  of  his  family,  and  who  holds 
his  oppressors  in  horror;  who  is  armed,  and  who 
will  beyond  question  be  overjoyed  to  use  his 
weapons  against  his  Boche  or  Pan-German  neigh- 
bors the  moment  that  a  condition  of  general 
unrest  enables  him  to  do  it  effectively. 

It  is  possible,  too,  for  the  Allies  to  arm  the 
other,  immobilized  anti-Boches,  who  are  shut  up 
in  Pan-Germany,  to  such  effect  that  there  will 
result  a  condition  of  general  unrest  so  far-reaching 
that  the  seven  millions  of  anti-Pangermanist 
soldiers  mobilized  contrary  to  their  wishes  will 
be  able  to  rise  suddenly  and  use  their  weapons 

209 


PAN-GERMANY 


against  their  oppressors  with  irresistible  force,  if 
at  that  moment  a  carefully  planned  Allied  of- 
fensive is  started  on  the  Western  front. 

Judging  from  what  the  Boches  have  done  in 
Russia,  and  what  they  are  at  present  trying  to 
do  in  Greece,  Switzerland,  and  Spain,  it  is  very 
certain  that  if  they  were  in  our  place  they  would 
long  gone  have  profited  tremendously  by  the 
exceedingly  favorable  conditions  which  we  have 
described.  The  essential  reason  that  the  Allies 
have  not  yet  taken  this  situation  into  serious 
consideration  is  that  they  have  deemed  it  neces- 
sary to  employ  only  the  material  instruments  of 
war,  not  ascribing  the  importance  that  they  de- 
serve to  intellectual  methods  based  upon  a  knowl- 
edge of  ethnography  and  national  psychology. 
But  the  dissolution  of  Russia  by  the  Boches  has 
proved  —  and  herein  it  may  be  of  use  to  the 
Allies  —  the  extraordinary  potency  of  these 
intellectual  methods,  which  is  certainly  much 
greater  than  that  of  the  most  terror-inspiring 
explosives. 

On  the  other  hand,  from  a  moral  standpoint, 
the  Allies  unquestionably  have,  not  only  the 
right,  but  the  absolute  duty  of  conveying  to  those 
Slavs  and  Latins  and  Arabs  effective  means  of 
successful  revolt,  since  they  are  now  subjected  to 
the  most  odious  form  of  servitude.  Finally,  there 
are  in  each  of  the  Allied  countries  numerous 
students  who  are  thoroughly  familiar  with  the 

210 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

ethnographical  and  psychological  facts  which 
make  it  possible  to  prepare  upon  genuinely 
scientific  lines  the  contest  for  the  liberty  of  the 
oppressed  peoples  of  Pan-Germany. 

IV 
THE   FORMULA   OF   VICTORY 

To  bring  about  an  explosion  in  Pan-Germany, 
we  must  start  with  the  following  formula,  deduced 
from  the  lessons  of  the  war,  which  seems,  in  view 
of  the  present  situation  and  the  blunders  hitherto 
committed,  to  be  the  formula  by  which  the  Allies 
are  destined  to  win  a  complete  victory. 

To  combine  henceforth  the  military  pressure  of  the 
Allies  outside  of  Pan-Germany  with  the  scientific, 
methodical,  constant,  and  persistent  development 
of  the  internal  causes  of  dissolution  which  exist  in  a 
considerable  part  of  the  territory  of  Pan-Germany. 

To  maintain  on  the  Western  front  an  impenetrable 
and  vigilant  defensive;  but,  in  order  to  keep  down 
the  losses  to  the  lowest  point,  to  undertake  no  offen- 
sive on  a  grand  scale  on  that  front  until  the  German 
rear  has  been  thrown  into  confusion,  morally  and 
physically,  by  means  of  legitimate  and  essential 
insurrections  systematically  organized  by  the  Allies 
and  carried  out  by  the  slaves  shut  up  in  Pan-Ger- 
many, demonstrably  to  their  advantage. 


211 


P  AN  -GERM  AN  Y 


THE   STRATEGICALLY   VITAL   REGIONS 
OF   PAN-GERMANY 

This  programme,  if  carried  into  effect,  would 
have  enormous  and  prompt  consequences;  and 
yet  it  can  be  carried  into  effect  with  comparatively 
little  exertion.  Indeed  the  effectiveness  of  such 
exertion  depends,  not  on  its  extent,  but  on  its 
intelligence.  It  must  be  put  forth  against  the 
specially  vulnerable  parts  of  the  military  organ- 
ization of  Pan-Germany. 

Of  the  eighty-six  millions  of  Boches  shut  up  in 
Pan-Germany,  at  least  fifty  millions  of  non- 
mobilized  inhabit  the  vast  territories  stretching 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  southern  Balkans  (about 
1500  kilometres).  Now  these  territories  con- 
stitute the  most  essential  and,  at  the  same  time, 
the  most  vulnerable  strategic  bases  of  all  military 
Pan-Germany.  In  fact  all  the  channels  of  com- 
munication—  rail  and  water  —  which  connect 
Austria-Germany  with  Russia,  the  Balkans,  and 
Turkey,  pass  through  these  territories.  Now, 
three  years  have  shown  clearly  that  without  the 
troops  and  multifarious  supplies  of  the  Balkans 
and  Turkey,  —  to  which  are  now  to  be  added 
the  resources  of  South  Russia,  —  Austria-Ger- 
many would  long  ago  have  found  it  impossible 
to  continue  the  struggle.  In  reality,  therefore, 
it  is  enough  that  the  Austro-German  communica- 

212 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

tions  should  be  seriously  disturbed,  for  the  situa- 
tion to  become,  with  extraordinary  swiftness, 
very  difficult  both  morally  and  materially  for  the 
armies  concentrated  on  the  Western  front  by  the 
German  Staff. 

This   result  can   be   secured   by   an   entirely 
novel  method  of  carrying  on  the  war. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
A  PLAN  FOR  THE  ALLIES 


WHY   IT   MUST    BE   DISCUSSED   PUBLICLY 

A  NEW  war-plan  may  bring  about  very  swiftly 
the  explosion  of  Pan-Germany,  and,  as  a  result, 
the  complete  triumph  of  the  Allies ;  hence  it  may 
make  possible  the  conclusion  of  a  peace  on  gen- 
uinely democratic  principles. 

This  plan  presents  several  original  features. 
In  the  first  place,  for  technical  reasons  set  forth 
later,  the  Boches,  even  if  they  knew  that  the 
Allies  were  working  to  carry  out  this  plan,  could 
not  oppose  its  execution  to  any  effective  purpose. 
Moreover,  on  the  twofold  condition  that  the 
exposition  is  limited  to  the  general  outlines  of 
the  plan,  and  that  no  allusion  is  made  to  any 
features  of  the  eventual  preparation  except  those 
which  it  would  be  impossible  to  conceal  from 
Boche  espionage,  publicity  ensures  to  the  Allies 
the  following  immediate  and  worth-while  ad- 
vantages. 

I.  It  cannot  fail  to  impair  the  morale  of  the 
Germans  by  letting  them  know  that  they  are  not 
by  any  means  so  near  a  final  triumph  as  their 

214 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

leaders  give  them  to  understand,  since  the  Allies 
are  able  to  employ  new  media  of  victory,  exceed- 
ingly powerful  and  of  great  rapidity  of  execution. 

2.  This   publicity  cannot   fail    to   strengthen 
materially  the  morale  of  all  the  Allied  nations  by 
showing  them  that  the  vanished  Russian  co6p- 
eration  can  really  be  replaced  by  forces  of  a  dif- 
ferent character,  to  be  sure,  and  to  be  employed 
in  an  unforeseen  way,  but  which,  by  reason  of  the 
peculiar  vulnerability  of  the  points  upon  which 
they  will  be  brought  to  bear,  make  it  possible 
to  secure  a  complete  victory  much  more  quickly 
than  it  has  ever  been  possible  to  expect  it  with 
the  assistance  of  the  Russian  forces. 

3.  This  publicity,  again,  cannot  fail  to  demon- 
strate what  an  enormous  and  fatal  blunder  it 
would  be  for  the  Allies,  yielding  to  a  momentary 
lassitude,  to  allow  themselves  to  be  trapped  by 
the  Austro-Boche  pacifist  manoeuvres,  when  a 
definitive  and  comparatively  speedy  victory  is 
still  entirely  possible. 

4.  Lastly,  this  publicity  cannot  fail  to  embarrass 
the  Germans  very  seriously,  from  now  on,  from 
the  strategic  standpoint.     At  this  time  the  Ger- 
man Staff   is  concentrating  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible on  the  Western  front  all  the  troops  at  its 
disposal.     A  definite  demonstration  that  its  vital 
lines  of  communication  with  the  Orient  can  ac- 
tually be  threatened  by  unforeseen  means  and 
at  widely  separated  points,  will  inevitably  cause 

215 


PAN-GERMAN  Y 


havoc  in  the  calculations  of  Berlin.  On  any  hy- 
pothesis the  decisions  resulting  from  this  embar- 
rassment must  be  advantageous  to  the  Allies. 
If,  for  prudential  reasons,  in  consideration  of 
possibilities  which  it  has  not  as  yet  confronted, 
the  German  Staff  should  slow  up  its  concentra- 
tion in  the  West  so  as  to  leave  sufficient  forces  in 
the  oppressed  districts  of  Pan-Germany,  it  will 
thereby  decrease  its  chances  of  success  in  its  ap- 
proaching offensive  in  the  West;  the  result  being 
a  reprieve  for  all  the  Allied  troops.  But  if,  per- 
sisting in  its  present  plan,  the  Kaiser's  Staff  con- 
tinues to  denude  of  reliable  troops  extensive 
regions  of  Pan-Germany  which  are  capable  of 
being  roused  to  revolt,  then  they  will  simply 
make  it  easier  than  it  now  is  to  carry  the  proposed 
plan  into  effect. 

II 

MORAL  CONDITIONS  OF  THE  SUCCESS  OF  THE  PLAN 

Common  sense  warns  us  that  we  cannot  seri- 
ously expect  the  oppressed  peoples  to  rebel,  if  at 
the  same  time  we  refuse  to  guarantee  that  they 
shall  not  long  remain  under  the  yoke  of  their  op- 
pressors. In  order,  therefore,  that  the  desired 
rebellion  may  become  possible,  the  Allies  must 
give  the  Poles,  Czechs,  Jugo-Slavs,  Roumanians, 
and  the  rest  a  categorical  promise  that,  after  the 
victory,  they  shall  actually  and  freely  decide 
their  own  destiny.  Indeed  it  is  sufficient  to  ap- 

216 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

ply  to  the  conduct  of  the  war  the  democratic 
principle  invoked  by  the  Entente  —  by  the 
Allied  governments  and  by  the  Allied  Socialists 
alike  —  for  the  peace-settlement;  a  principle 
which  is  the  basis,  and,  moreover,  the  justifica- 
tion of  President  Wilson's  intervention  in  the 
affairs  of  Europe.  The  proposed  plan,  then,  as- 
sumes that,  in  order  to  bring  about  a  democratic 
peace,  the  war  itself  will  be  waged  on  democratic 
lines.  Under  this  assumption  one  of  the  essen- 
tial objects  of  the  war  —  the  right  of  'self- 
determination*  on  the  part  of  the  different 
peoples  —  becomes  likewise  one  of  the  instru- 
ments of  victory.  Thus  are  set  in  motion  new 
forces  which  can  but  hasten  the  coming  of  peace. 

I  have  now  to  prove  that  the  Allies  have 
actually  in  their  hands  the  material  means  to 
make  the  insurrection  within  Pan-Germany  ex- 
ceedingly effective  in  a  very  short  time. 

in 

THE   ESSENTIAL   SPECIAL   WEAPON   EXISTS 

To  enable  them  to  act  efficaciously,  the  op- 
pressed peoples  of  Pan-Germany  must  be  put  in 
a  condition  to  contend  successfully  against  the 
troops  employed  to  suppress  the  insurrection. 
The  Allies  must,  therefore,  supply  in  large  quan- 
tities a  very  effective  weapon,  which,  however, 

217 


PA  N  -GERM  A  N  Y 


will  meet  the  complex  necessities  growing  out  of 
the  present  military  situation  and  of  the  peculiar 
conditions  in  which  the  insurgent  masses  will 
have  to  operate.  For  these  various  reasons  the 
weapon  in  question  must  be  manufactured  by 
the  Allies  rapidly  and  by  the  million.  It  must 
be  easy  to  transport,  hence  very  light;  easy  to 
conceal,  hence  small;  and  yet  it  must  be  indis- 
putably powerful.  Now,  there  is  in  existence  a 
weapon  which  meets  all  these  diverse  conditions. 
I  can  describe  it  with  absolute  certainty  that  I 
am  revealing  no  secret,  for,  by  the  irony  of  fate, 
the  weapon  best  adapted  to  bring  about  the 
explosion  of  Pan-Germany  and  thus  to  revolu- 
tionize the  war  even  more  completely  than  the 
machine-gun,  the  barbed-wire  entanglement,  or 
the  submarine  has  done,  is  a  German  weapon, 
which  the  Allied  factories  —  notably  those  in 
the  United  States  —  can  turn  out  rapidly  by  the 
million,  at  a  relatively  small  expense  compared 
with  all  the  other  expenses  imposed  upon  the 
Allies  by  the  war. 

The  German  automatic  ten-shooter  Mauser  pis- 
tol has  sights  graded  to  a  thousand  metres.  Its 
bullet  is  deadly  at  that  distance,  which  is  practi- 
cally sufficient  for  all  purposes.  Again,  thanks 
to  its  wooden  sheath  which  acts  as  a  stock,  it  is 
very  accurate  at  five  hundred  metres.  So  that 
the  ammunition  of  this  weapon  —  and  this  is  a 
point  of  great  importance  —  can  be  expended 

218 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

with  pretty  good  practical  results,  which  is  not 
the  case  with  a  pistol  without  a  stock. 

For  practical  purposes,  then,  this  pistol,  — 
or  some  other  similar  one,  provided  that  it  is  as 
light  and  as  powerful,  has  the  same  range,  and  is 
supplied  with  a  stock,  —  which  is  essential,  —  is 
as  effective  a  weapon  as  a  rifle.  Now,  this  pistol 
weighs  only  1650  grammes.  It  constitutes,  there- 
fore, a  sort  of  pocket  machine-gun,  very  easy  to 
keep  out  of  sight.  Furthermore,  the  7.63  mm. 
cartridge  used  in  it  weighs  only  12  grammes. 
Thus  the  whole  thing  —  pistol,  sheath,  200  cart- 
ridges, and  cartridge-box  —  weigh  less  than  five 
kilogrammes,  with  which  a  man  can  be  effec- 
tively equipped  for  several  weeks.  So  that  the 
weapon  that  is  perfectly  adapted  to  the  special 
needs  of  the  slaves  of  Pan-Germany  unquestion- 
ably exists.  The  next  point  is  to  inquire  if  it 
can  be  supplied  to  them  in  large  quantities. 

IV 

THE   MEANS    OF   TRANSPORT    EXISTS 

On  this  point,  again,  I  shall  make  my  demon- 
stration without  revealing  anything  to  the 
Boches.  I  shall  rely  solely  upon  something  that 
exists  already,  and  I  shall  give  only  reliable  in- 
formation which  may  well  be  in  the  possession  of 
those  well  informed  in  aviation  matters.  I  shall 
give  figures  relating  only  to  one  type  of  airplane, 

219 


P  AN  -GERM  AN  Y 


which  not  only  is  in  being  but  is  sufficiently 
standardized  to  be  built  at  the  present  time  in 
series.  This  airplane  —  or  other  similar  ones 
which  are  certainly  in  use  in  the  Allied  armies; 
for  of  course  I  do  not  recommend  one  type  rather 
than  another,  for  I  am  thinking  only  of  victory  - 
this  airplane,  then,  can  be  built  by  hundreds  or 
by  thousands,  in  a  few  months,  without  further 
study. 

Now,  the  powerful  motor  of  this  standardized 
airplane  will  run  for  nine  consecutive  hours. 
With  a  tank  of  sufficient  size  and  an  average  speed 
of  150  kilometres  an  hour,  it  would  have  a  range 
of  1350  kilometres  —  that  is  to  say,  it  could  make 
a  raid  of  600  kilometres  and  return  to  the  start- 
ing-point. Now  a  range  of  600  kilometres  is 
more  than  sufficient  to  permit  an  unlimited 
number  of  expeditions  to  widely  separated  and 
strategically  vital  parts  of  Pan-Germany,  in 
Europe  or  Asia. 

In  addition  to  the  stock  of  fuel  for  1200  kilo- 
metres, the  pilots,  and  their  equipment,  our  air- 
ship can  carry  on  the  journey  a  load  of  340  kilo- 
grammes, that  is  to  say,  68  packages  of  arms  and 
munitions  of  five  kilogrammes  each,  or  enough 
to  equip  68  anti-Boches.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
life  of  an  airplane  may  be  reckoned  at  80  hours; 
so  that  as  nine  hours  is  enough  for  a  raid  of  1 200 
kilometres  (600  to  go  and  600  to  return),  our  ves- 
sel will  be  able  to  carry  out  nine  such  raids,  or  to 

220 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

carry  nine  times  68  packages  of  arms  a  distance 
of  600  kilometres.  At  that  distance,  then,  one 
hundred  Allied  airplanes  can  in  a  few  days  equip 
61,200  men  in  the  heart  of  Pan-Germany,  for 
several  weeks.  A  thousand  planes  would  equip 
612,000  men.  If  four  thousand  planes  were  as- 
signed to  this  service,  —  a  figure  not  at  all  chi- 
merical if  all  the  Allies  chose  to  take  part,  - 
2,448,000  men,  all  new  combatants,  could  be 
equipped  within  a  few  months,  in  the  strategically 
vital  portions  of  Pan-Germany. 

And  so,  inasmuch  as  the  requisite  type  of  trans- 
port aircraft  exists,  the  Allies,  if  they  are  really 
determined  upon  it,  can  send  millions  of  arms  to 
the  slaves  of  Pan-Germany  within  a  very  few 
months  from  the  day  the  decision  is  reached. 
And  as  the  Boche  and  pro-Boche  elements  of  the 
armies  of  Pan-Germany  are  held  by  force  of  cir- 
cumstances in  the  West,  as  their  present  reserves 
are  not  inexhaustible,  the  Staff  at  Berlin  cer- 
tainly could  not  hold  its  own  against  large  hos- 
tile forces,  fully  armed,  operating  with  rapidity 
in  the  very  heart  of  Pan-Germany  —  a  con- 
tingency which  has  never  been  provided  for  in 
its  plans. 

For  all  these  reasons,  therefore,  it  is  quite 
within  bounds  to  assert  that  it  is  possible  to 
establish  the  ascendency  of  the  revolt  of  the  op- 
pressed democratic  races  of  Pan-Germany  over 
the  Austro-Boche  tyranny. 

221 


PAN-GERMANY 


ADVANTAGES,    AND   CONDITIONS    OF    SUCCESS 

I.  Possible  large  increase  in  the  output  of  Allied 
aircraft.  —  In  its  eighty  hours  of  serviceable  life,  a 
bomb-dropping  airplane  can  carry  about  11,000 
kilogrammes  of  projectiles  300  kilometres.  Again, 
in  eighty  hours  this  same  vessel  could  carry  only 
3060  kilogrammes  600  kilometres ;  but  those  3060 
kilogrammes  represent  the  wherewithal  to  equip 
612  men  in  the  very  heart  of  Pan-Germany.  If 
we  deduct  military  bombardments  in  the  rear  of 
the  Boche  armies  on  the  Western  front,  —  which 
are  indispensable  operations,  —  what  practical 
effect  do  11,000  kilogrammes  of  bombs  produce? 
They  result  in  reparable  local  damage,  money 
loss,  and  the  deaths  of  a  few  women  and  children ; 
but  it  is  certain  that  they  put  very  few  enemy 
fighting  men  where  they  can  do  no  harm.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  3060  kilogrammes  which 
would  make  possible  the  fitting  out  with  arms  for 
several  weeks  612  determined  anti-Boches  who 
constitute  a  new  fighting  force  for  the  Entente, 
dwelling  in  the  strategically  vital  portions  of 
Pan-Germany,  and  placed  in  a  position  to  ac- 
count for  many  Germans  and  pro-Germans, 
would  manifestly  have  an  infinitely  greater  in- 
fluence on  the  winning  of  a  speedy  complete  vic- 
tory than  the  1 1 ,000  kilogrammes  of  bombs  would 
have.  This  reasoning  seems  to  prove  that  by 

222 


THE    DISEASE    AND    CURE 

assigning  to  the  armament  of  these  oppressed 
peoples  at  least  a  part  of  their  bomb-carrying  air- 
craft, which  are  beginning  to  come  from  the 
factories  in  large  numbers,  the  Allies  can  very 
soon  augment  very  largely  the  effectiveness  of 
their  thousands  of  aircraft  now  under  construc- 
tion. 

2.  The  helplessness  of  the  Bodies  to  defeat  the  new 
plan.  —  If  it  were  a  question  of  fomenting  an 
insurrection  in  a  small  district  of  two  or  three 
million  people,  and  the  Boches  were  in  no  uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  locality  threatened,  they  would 
not  hesitate  to  protect  themselves  against  any 
revolutionary  uprising  by  massacring  the  popula- 
tion. But  such  is  not  the  case.  The  oppressed 
territories  in  Pan-Germany  are  of  enormous  ex- 
tent. The  Allies,  therefore,  can  equip  the  people 
in  widely  separated  districts,  and  postpone  making 
their  choice  of  the  special  regions  to  be  supplied 
until  the  last  moment.  Thus  the  Germans  will 
be  forced  to  remain  in  a  state  of  uncertainty. 
Moreover,  as  these  oppressed  districts  contain, 
all  together,  eighty-six  millions  of  Slavs,  Latins, 
and  Semites,  the  Austro- Boches,  hard-pressed  as 
they  are  by  the  Allies  on  the  West,  cannot,  even 
if  they  would,  put  such  vast  masses  of  people  to 
the  sword.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  and 
their  vassals  are  already  inflicting  the  most  shock- 
ing terrorism  on  these  populations.  Long  since 
they  were  forbidden  to  have  weapons,  and  those 

223 


PAN-GERMAN  Y 


who  have  them  in  their  possession  are  shot  when 
they  are  discovered.  But  despite  the  prohibi- 
tion and  despite  the  terrorism,  there  are  constant 
disturbances  throughout  the  oppressed  districts. 
It  follows  that,  even  if  they  knew  that  the  pro- 
posed plan  was  being  put  into  effect,  the  Germans 
could  not  terrorize  these  enslaved  people  more 
than  they  are  doing.  Conversely,  since  they  are 
constantly  revolting  even  now,  when  they  are 
without  arms  and  have  small  chance  of  success,  it 
is  plain  that  they  would  make  much  more  trouble 
if  they  were  effectively  and  abundantly  armed, 
so  that  their  chance  of  success  would  be  much 
greater  than  it  is  to-day. 

It  is  impossible  to  prevent  the  Boche  air- 
ships from  flying  over  London  and  Paris,  which 
are  especially  well  looked  after  and  defended. 
Manifestly,  therefore,  the  Boches  could  not  inter- 
fere with  numerous  passenger-carrying  aircraft 
which  would  have  an  endless  choice  of  routes  a 
long  way  from  the  military  fronts,  and  by  flying 
low,  could  drop  their  packages  of  munitions  in 
many  different  parts  of  Pan-Germany  (in  Europe 
and  Asia),  by  means  of  a  very  simple  apparatus, 
without  even  alighting.  How  then  could  the 
Boches,  threatened  on  all  sides,  set  up  a  really 
effective  anti-aircraft  organization  over  hundreds 
of  square  miles  of  territory  situated  as  we  have 
described? 

If  the  Boches  can,  almost  at  will,  with  their 

224 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

submarines,  strew  the  sea  with  mines  which 
destroy  Allied  ships,  it  is  equally  true  to  say  that, 
whenever  the  Allies  choose  to  do  it,  they  can, 
much  more  freely,  strew  these  Boche-harried 
districts  with  innumerable  packages  of  muni- 
tions —  veritable  mines  which  will,  by  virtue  of 
their  combined  action,  blow  up  the  whole  of 
Pan-Germany. 

I  am  justified,  therefore,  in  saying  that  the 
Boches  could  not  effectively  interfere  with  the 
plan  proposed. 

3.  The  conditions  of  success  of  the  new  plan.  — 
If  it  is  to  be  surely  efficacious,  this  plan  must 
be  methodically  prepared  with  a  view  to  its  ex- 
ecution on  a  large  scale.  It  is  plain  that  such 
preparations  on  a  large  scale  could  not  be  con- 
cealed from  the  Boches,  —  for  example,  that  pas- 
senger-carrying airships  are  being  built  in  large 
numbers,  —  any  more  than  we  have  been  able  to 
conceal  from  them  the  manufacture  of  heavy 
artillery.  But  the  fact  that  the  Boches  were  ap- 
prized of  these  preparations  would  not  only  be  no 
drawback,  but  would  actually  be  of  advantage. 
Indeed,  it  is  essential,  in  view  of  the  lasting  moral 
shock  that  they  are  destined  to  receive,  that  they 
and  their  vassals  should  have  the  sense  of  being 
constantly  threatened  in  all  those  parts  of  Pan- 
Germany  which  are  not  pro-German.  This  threat, 
indubitable  so  far  as  the  possibility  of  its  being 
translated  into  action  is  concerned,  but  always 

225 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


vague  as  to  the  exact  localities  concerned,  would 
be  to  our  foes  a  source  of  wearing  fatigue,  which, 
added  to  all  the  rest,  would  hasten  the  moment 
of  their  final  collapse,  and  hence  of  victory. 

The  time  for  carrying  out  the  plan  having 
arrived,  the  transport  of  arms  must  take  place 
as  rapidly  as  possible  to  widely  separated  dis- 
tricts of  Pan-Germany.  Thus  the  Boches  and 
their  vassals,  having  to  deal  hurriedly  with  a  well- 
equipped  insurrection  breaking  out  over  exten- 
sive territories  and  at  points  far  removed  from 
one  another,  would  find  it  practically  impossible 
to  put  it  down. 

Although  the  general  preparation  we  have  de- 
scribed may  be  known  to  the  Boches  without 
disadvantage,  on  the  other  hand,  the  actual  execu- 
tion of  the  plan  must  be  rigorously  kept  secret: 
for  example,  the  starting-point  of  the  aircraft, 
the  time  fixed,  and  the  objective  of  the  raid.  As 
general  preparations  would  be  made  at  all  pos- 
sible starting-points,  which  are  innumerable, 
the  Boches  would  feel  that  they  were  threatened 
in  every  direction  —  a  most  desirable  consum- 
mation ;  but  the  Allied  high  command  will  always 
have  the  power  to  issue  starting  orders,  at  the 
last  moment,  to  the  leaders  of  the  air-squadron, 
as  well  as  to  indicate  the  precise  points  to  be 
reached.  Under  these  conditions,  the  secrecy 
indispensable  to  success  will  be  easy  to  secure. 
Thus  it  will  be  a  comparatively  simple  matter 

226 


THE     DISEASE    AND     CURE 

to  surprise  the  Boches  despite  their  knowledge 
of  the  plan  as  a  whole. 

I  have  pointed  out  why  the  plan  in  question, 
that  its  success  may  be  assured,  should  be  un- 
dertaken on  a  large  scale.  I  propose  now  to 
show  why  a  few  hundreds  of  thousands  of  auto- 
matic Mausers,  if  they  are  judiciously  distributed 
in  Pan-Germany,  would  alone  have  a  probably 
decisive  effect  on  the  war. 

The  disturbances  which  have  already  taken 
place  in  Poland,  Austria-Hungary,  and  the  Bal- 
kans have  seriously  embarrassed  the  Austro- 
Germans  and  the  Bulgarians.  Down  to  the 
present  time  the  Boches  and  their  vassals  have 
been  able  to  deal  with  the  situation  because  the 
insurgents  are  without  arms;  but  if,  in  certain 
parts  of  Pan-Germany,  there  were  supplies  of 
weapons  practically  as  effective  as  the  rifle,  such 
as  the  automatic  Mauser,  the  present  situation 
would  be  made  much  harder  for  the  Boches,  even 
if  the  number  of  these  pistols  sent  by  the  Allies 
amounted  to  no  more  than  500,000  to  600,000, 
which  a  bare  thousand  aircraft  could  deliver. 

This  estimate  of  the  weapons  and  aircraft  to  be 
employed,  although  comparatively  small,  is  large 
enough  nevertheless  to  have  a  great  effect,  be- 
cause to-day,  after  so  long  and  exhausting  a 
struggle,  a  simple  rupture  of  equilibrium  is  suffi- 
cient to  ensure  victory. 

227 


PA  N-GERM  A  N  Y 


At  this  moment  the  scales  of  Destiny  may  be 
likened  to  a  steelyard,  of  which  the  hook  is  on 
the  Western  front  and  the  end  of  the  beam  in 
Eastern  Pan-Germany.  For  the  moment  the 
balance  is  in  equilibrium.  To  break  it,  the 
Boches  are  preparing  to  place  the  supplementary 
weight  of  their  disposable  forces  from  the  East 
on  the  hook  at  the  West.  On  their  side,  to  pre- 
vent the  equilibrium  being  thus  broken,  which 
would  mean  their  defeat,  the  Allies  are  preparing 
to  station  all  their  disposable  forces  under  the 
hook,  in  order  to  checkmate  the  new  German 
movement.  But  if,  in  addition,  the  Allies  could 
place  a  supplementary  weight  on  the  end  of  the 
beam  in  Eastern  Pan-Germany,  even  though 
the  weight  be  a  light  one,  it  will  act  with  great 
force,  because  of  the  length  of  that  arm  of  the 
lever;  and  its  force  will  be  exerted  in  the  same 
direction  as  the  upward  push  of  the  Allies  in  the 
West.  Thereupon  the  hook  of  the  steelyard, 
rising  abruptly,  will  give  the  Allies  victory  by 
destroying  the  equilibrium. 

This  comparison,  which  summarizes  the  actual 
facts  of  the  situation,  will  make  it  clear  why  this 
army  of  only  a  few  hundred  thousands  of  Allied 
combatants,  recruited  from  among  our  latent 
allies,  could  not  fail  to  have  an  extremely  far- 
reaching  influence  on  the  issue  of  the  conflict, 
because  they  would  be  a  newly  organized  force, 
operating  in  territory  through  which  the  vital 

228 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

lines  of  communication  of  Pan-Germany  pass. 
Indeed,  serious  disturbances  in  Eastern  Pan- 
Germany,  by  disturbing  these  essential  lines  of 
communication,  would  react  powerfully,  both 
from  a  moral  and  a  material  standpoint,  upon 
every  one  of  the  Austro-Boches  fighting  on  the 
Western  front.  As  soon  as  this  condition  of  af- 
fairs is  brought  about,  there  would  result  instantly 
the  special  situation  which  would  enable  the 
seven  millions  of  Slav  and  Latin  troops  incor- 
porated against  their  will  in  the  armies  of  Pan- 
Germany  —  of  whom  Berlin  is  so  far  from  sure 
that  she  dares  not  use  them  in  large  bodies  on 
the  Western  front  —  to  join  the  insurgents  in 
Central  Pan-Germany,  and,  armed  with  their  Ger- 
man weapons,  to  act  effectively  and  with  little 
risk  against  their  Austro-Boche  oppressors. 

Now,  if,  at  that  precise  juncture,  a  carefully 
prepared  Allied  offensive  is  launched  in  the  West, 
it  would  manifestly  have  a  vastly  greater  chance 
of  success  than  in  the  past,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  danger  of  heavy  losses  on  the  Allies' 
part  would  be  much  less  than  heretofore. 

4.  Cost  of  carrying  out  the  plan.  —  An  airplane 
of  the  type  under  consideration,  with  all  its  ac- 
cessories, is  worth  at  most  100,000  francs.  The 
value  of  a  package  of  munitions  weighing  five 
kilogrammes,  reckoning  the  price  of  an  automatic 
Mauser  at  the  cost  to  a  private  individual  before 
the  war,  is  about  100  francs.  The  fuel  for  a  trip 

229 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


of  600  kilometres,  with  equipment  for  68  men, 
would  cost  1500  francs.  And  in  its  eighty  hours 
of  serviceable  life  one  airplane  can  make  nine  of 
such  trips.  We  have,  then:— 

Airplane,  100,000  francs 

Fuel,  9X1500,  I3»5<>0 
Packages  of  munitions, 

68X9X100,  61,200 

Total  cost,  174,700  francs 

Thus  the  net  cost  of  one  armed  man  600  kilo- 
metres away  in  Pan-Germany  is  only  285  francs, 
or,  in  round  numbers,  300.  So  that  the  equip- 
ment of  612,000  men,  which  can  be  effected  by 
using  1000  airplanes  would  cost  only  184,000,000 
francs  in  round  numbers  —  or  just  about  as 
much  as  Great  Britain  is  spending  in  a  single  day. 

Now,  in  order  to  place  half  a  million  men  on  the 
Western  front,  the  Americans  will  certainly  have 
to  spend  tens  of  billions  of  francs.  Consequently 
the  cost  per  capita  of  their  combatant  troops  will 
be  ten  times  greater  than  that  of  equipping  one 
fighting  man  in  the  strategically  vital  portions  of 
Pan-Germany. 

Not  only,  then,  is  the  plan  proposed  likely  to 
prove  extremely  efficacious  on  the  military  side, 
but  its  execution  would  require  a  relatively  small 
outlay  in  comparison  with  what  the  Allies  have  to 
spend  every  day  in  the  effort  to  obtain  results 
immeasurably  less  important. 

230 


THE    DISEASE    AND     CURE 

VI 
CONCLUSIONS 

Beyond  question,  the  plan  of  which  I  have 
set  forth  only  the  main  outlines,  like  every  con- 
ception of  the  human  mind,  involves  numerous 
difficulties,  of  different  kinds,  to  be  overcome;  but 
by  studying  them  one  by  one,  I  have  con- 
vinced myself  that  they  can  be  surmounted  more 
easily  than  the  problems  which  must  be  solved 
in  order  to  carry  on  a  successful  offensive  in  the 
West. 

In  any  case,  after  all  that  has  been  attempted 
fruitlessly,  are  we  justified  in  not  at  least  giving 
this  plan  a  trial?  The  moral  situation  of  the 
eighty-six  millions  of  slaves  in  Pan-Germany  is 
indisputably  favorable  to  its  execution.  The 
essential  physical  instruments  are  in  being.  If 
the  Allied  leaders  really  wish  it,  these  instruments 
can  be  produced  in  ample  quantities  with  com- 
parative promptitude.  The  general  strategic 
idea  of  the  plan  is  consonant  with  good  sense. 
The  outlay  it  demands  is  comparatively  insignif- 
icant. The  plan  would  supply  the  Entente  with 
a  new  fighting  force  without  necessitating  the 
sacrifice  of  more  men  on  its  part.  It  solves  the 
problem  of  effectives  for  the  Allies  and  makes  it 
insoluble  for  the  Boches  and  their  vassals.  It  is 
in  strict  conformity  with  the  democratic  peace- 
aims  of  the  Allies.  Furthermore,  its  adoption 

231 


PA  N-GERMA  N  Y 


would  give  the  war  a  direction  which  would  pave 
the  way  for  the  reconstitution  of  Europe  at  the 
peace  conference.  Lastly,  it  would  make  the 
offensive  operations  on  the  Western  front  in- 
finitely less  costly  in  men  for  the  Allies,  while 
considerably  increasing  their  chances  of  success. 

During  twenty  years  of  peace  I  warned  public 
opinion  of  the  formidable  peril  that  was  drawing 
near.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  my  various 
prognostications  have,  on  the  whole,  been  justified 
by  the  event.  I  may  be  permitted,  therefore, 
m  the  interest  of  the  Allied  cause,  to  appeal  for 
the  support  of  public  opinion  in  inducing  those 
in  authority,  first,  to  examine  the  proposed  plan 
thoroughly  and  without  prejudice;  and,  secondly, 
to  set  about  the  intensive  construction,  with 
rights  of  priority,  of  passenger-carrying  aircraft 
with  a  very  extensive  radius  of  action. 

//  is  my  sincere  conviction  that  this  plan  may  well 
lead  to  a  swift  and  definitive  decision  before  the  end 
of  1918. 

The  present  time  (February,  1918)  is  especially 
favorable  for  preparing  to  put  it  into  effect 
morally.  After  the  signature  of  the  treaty  with 
the  Poles,  despite  the  momentary  concessions 
made  to  them,  they  cannot  fail  to  see  that  they 
have  been  duped  by  Vienna  and  Berlin.  The 
Roumanians,  Czechs,  and  Jugo-Slavs,  always 
admirable  for  their  physical  energy,  are  demand- 
ing independence.  The  Italians  realize  at  last 

232 


THE    DISEASE      AND     CURE 

the  necessity  of  coming  to  an  understanding  with 
the  Jugo-Slavs  and  all  the  other  Slavs,  Latins, 
and  Semites  in  Pan-Germany,  who  also  are  in 
the  bonds  of  a  degrading  servitude. 

In  very  truth,  then,  the  moral  cohesion  of  the 
eighty-six  millions  of  slaves  in  Pan-Germany, 
fifty  millions  of  whom  inhabit  the  strategically 
vital  portions  thereof,  can  be  achieved  at  once. 

Under  these  conditions,  can  we,  without  be- 
traying the  cause  of  democracy,  without  in  some 
sort  refusing  to  accept  victory,  fail  to  attempt  at 
least  to  carry  out  this  plan?  Can  we  refuse  to 
play  this  card  when  it  seems  to  be  the  best  one 
that  we  can  ever  hold  to  win  the  war? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  present  situation  is 
perfectly  well  defined.  If  the  Allies  are  content 
to  fight  on  on  the  Western  front,  allowing  the 
numerous  pacifist  machinations  to  depress  the 
morale  of  their  people,  they  risk  —  on  the  most 
favorable  hypothesis  —  being  compelled  within 
a  few  months  to  negotiate  a  peace  on  the  decep- 
tive basis  of  '  no  annexations  and  no  indemnities.' 
In  that  case,  as  the  governments  of  Berlin  and 
Vienna  have  never  kept  their  word,  whatever 
terms  the  Allies  may  make  with  them  will  be  ab- 
solutely worthless.  Pan-Germany  will  survive. 
The  Boches  will  derive  a  formidable  accession  of 
power  from  their  enormous  war-profits,  whereas 
the  European  Allies,  sinking  under  the  deadly 

233 


PA  N-GERM  A  N  Y 


weight  of  their  incredible  war-expenditure,  will 
be  reduced  to  servitude.  And  —  mark  it  well, 
Americans  —  the  assault  of  Pan-Germany  on 
the  United  States  will  begin  forthwith. 

On  the  contrary,  if,  desiring  to  conclude  a 
democratic  peace,  we  are  able,  in  addition,  to 
conduct  the  war  on  democratic  principles,  - 
that  is  to  say,  to  supply  the  eighty-six  million 
slaves  of  Pan-Germany,  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  with  effective  means  of  fighting  for  the 
liberty  of  the  world,  —  we  shall  inevitably  bring 
about  an  internal  explosion  in  Pan-Germany,  and, 
before  the  close  of  1918,  complete  victory  will 
be  ours.  Then  will  the  conclusion  of  an  equitable, 
restorative,  and  durable  peace  become  possible. 

The  choice  must  be  made  between  these  two 
alternatives. 


ANNOUNCEMENT   OF   OTHER   VOLUMES 
DEALING  WITH  THE   GREAT  WAR 

AND  PUBLISHED   BY 

THE  ATLANTIC  MONTHLY   PRESS 

41    MOUNT  VERNON   STREET,   BOSTON,   MASS. 

WILL  BE  FOUND  ON   THE 

FOLLOWING   PAGES 


THE  WAR  AND  THE  SPIRIT  OF  YOUTH 


This  book  is  a  spiritual  interpretation  of  the  suffering  and  sac- 
rifice of  the  World  War,  expressed  in  a  group  of  three  papers  of 
kindred  significance,  yet  written  from  three  different  points  of 
view  by  a  Frenchman,  an  Englishman,  and  an  American.  The 
volume  includes: 

YOUNG  SOLDIERS  OF  FRANCE,  By  Maurice  Barres. 

JUVENTUS  CHRISTI,  By  Anne  C.  E.  Allinson. 

THE  SOUL'S  EXPERIENCE,  By  Sir  Francis  Younghusband. 

Each  writer  is  seeking  in  the  dreadful  welter  of  war  some  com- 
mon revelation  of  spiritual  comfort  and  advance.  Is  the  agony  of 
these  years  meaningless  and  wanton?  Is  the  heartsickening 
struggle  brutal  and  brutalizing,  and  nothing  more?  Each,  in  his 
or  her  own  way,  finds  an  answer. 

One,  a  questioner  by  temperament,  has  come  to  see  the  regen- 
eration of  human  life  in  the  miracle  which  the  war  has  worked  in 
the  younger  generation.  Another,  by  profession  a  soldier,  found 
a  new  and  vivid  faith  born  of  physical  impotence  and  pain.  The 
third,  an  American  woman,  has  come  to  her  new  belief  from  far 
distant  fields  of  the  imagination.  All  three  unite  in  confidence 
that  the  generation  now  culminating  in  manhood  is  passing 
through  blackness  into  light  brighter  than  any  dawn  the  world 
has  known. 

The  spirit  of  the  volume  is  the  spirit  of  youth,  learning  in  the 
Book  of  Life,  trusting  that  the  best  is  yet  to  be,  and  reading  with 
shining  eyes  to  the  end.  It  is  the  spirit  or  Leo  Latil,  a  young  sol- 
dier of  France,  who,  shortly  before  his  death  on  the  edge  of  a  Ger- 
man trench,  wrote  to  his  family,  — 

Our  sacrifices  will  be  sweet  if  we  win  a  great  and  glorious  victory,  —  if  there 
shall  be  more  light  for  the  souls  of  men;  if  truth  shall  come  forth  more  radiant, 
more  beloved. 

THE  WAR  AND  THE  SPIRIT  OF  YOUTH  is  an  inspiring,  heartening 
little  volume.  It  is  well  printed,  handsomely  bound,  and  sells 
postpaid  for  one  dollar. 


THE  ATLANTIC  MONTHLY  PRESS 

41  MT.  VERNON  STREET,  BOSTON,  MASS. 


SHOCK  AT  THE  FRONT 

By  WILLIAM  TOWNSEND  PORTER 

Few  works  of  fiction  are  so  filled  with  action  as  Doctor  Porter's 
book;  few  writers  of  romance  ever  pictured  scenes  more  colorful 
or  more  thrilling.  And  this  story  is  true.  The  scream  of  the 
shells,  the  humor  and  tragedy  of  the  trenches,  the  triumphs  and 
pathos  of  the  hospital,  goings  and  comings  in  a  war-ridden 
countryside,  alarms  and  excursions  of  battle,  soldiers,  officers, 
nurses,  peasants,  dignitaries —  Doctor  Porter  presents  them  all — 
clear  and  compelling  cameos  cut  from  life. 

Doctor  Porter  was  sent  abroad  by  the  Rockefeller  Foundation 
to  investigate  the  cause  and  treatment  of  shock.  His  quest  was 
successful;  for  as  he  modestly  sums  up  his  work,  'the  cause  of 
shock  was  found,  and  a  new  remedy.'.  Yet,  in  the  words  of  the 
New  York  Sun  — 

'  This  is  not  a  medical  treatise,  but  a  series  of  glimpses  of  the 
war,  done  in  sharp  strokes  by  a  physician  who  has  as  pretty  a  technic 

with  the  pen  as  with  the  scalpel Members  of  his  profession 

will  turn  to  medical  journals  for  the  detail  of  his  work;  the  public 
will  get  from  what  is  here  presented  just  the  sweeping  outline  of 
discovery  and  results  that  matter  to  us  all.' 

The  author's  profession  has  taught  him  to  observe.  Together 
with  his  remarkably  ability  to  see  things,  he  has  sympathy,  humor, 
and  a  talent  for  writing  unsurpassed  in  the  literature  of  the  war. 
From  the  text: — 

Opposite  me  is  a  man  evidently  in  poor  health — an  intelli- 
gent, kindly  face,  lined  with  premature  old  age.  He  has  two 
collapsed  air-cushions,  but  breath  only  for  one.  I  blow  up  the 
second  cushion.  We  fraternize. 

'You  must  know,'  says  he,  'that  I  am  a  Frenchman  living  in 
Canada.  I  have  come  over  to  be  ready  for  my  call.  They  have 
called  the  class  of  forty-seven.  My  age  is  fifty.  Soon  they  will 
need  me.  Of  course,'  he  adds,  carefully  adjusting  the  air-cushion 
to  support  his  ailing  back,  '  I  cannot  hope  for  the  first  line,  but 
perhaps  I  can  slip  in  just  behind. '  It  is  the  celebrated  French 
esprit. 

SHOCK  AT  THE  FRONT  is  attractively  bound  in  cloth,  and 
priced  at  $1.25,  postpaid. 

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HEADQUARTERS  NIGHTS 

By  VERNON  KELLOGG 


When  the  World  War  broke  out,  Vernon  Kellogg  was  Professor 
of  Biology  at  Leland  Stanford  University.  As  a  man  of  science,  he 
was  accustomed  to  weigh  facts  calmly  and  dispassionately.  He 
was  an  admirer  of  Germany,  a  neutral,  and  a  pacifist.  With  the 
hope  of  relieving  human  suffering,  he  went  to  Europe  and  became 
special  envoy  of  the  Committee  for  the  Relief  of  Belgium  at  Ger- 
man General  Headquarters  and  at  the  headquarters  of  General 
Von  Bissing  in  Brussels. 

For  many  months,  Professor  Kellogg  lived  with  Germany's 
military  leaders  in  the  West,  worked  with  them,  argued  with 
them,  learned  from  their  own  lips  their  aims  and  principles  of  life. 
He  saw  the  workings  of  German  autocracy  among  the  people  it 
had  crushed,  heard  German  methods  defended  by  some  of  the 
ablest  men  in  the  Kaiser's  empire,  tried  in  vain  to  understand  the 
German  point  of  view. 

"Quite  four  nights  of  each  seven  in  the  week,"  he  says,  "there 
were  other  staff  officers  in  to  dinner,  and  we  debated  such  trifles 
as  German  Militarismus,  the  hate  of  the  world  for  Germany, 
American  munitions  for  the  Allies,  submarining  and  Zeppelining, 
the  Kaiser,  the  German  people." 

These  "headquarters  nights,"  and  the  days  he  spent  trying  to 
assuage  the  misery  caused  by  the  German  military  system, 
brought  about  "the  conversion  of  a  pacifist  to  an  ardent  sup- 
porter, not  of  War,  but  of  this  war;  of  fighting  this  war  to  a  defini- 
tive end  —  that  end  to  be  Germany's  conversion  to  be  a  good 
Germany  or  not  much  of  any  Germany  at  all." 

One  of  the  most  graphic  pictures  of  the  German  attitude,  the  attitude  which 
rendered  this  war  inevitable,  is  contained  in  Vernon  Kellogg's  HEADQUARTERS 
NIGHTS.  It  is  a  convincing,  and  an  evidently  truthful,  exposition  of  the  shock- 
ing, the  unspeakably  dreadful,  moral  and  intellectual  perversion  of  character 
which  makes  Germany  at  present  a  menace  to  the  whole  civilized  world. 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT. 

HEADQUARTERS  NIGHTS  is  attractively  printed  and  bound  in 
cloth.  Its  price  is  one  dollar  postpaid. 


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